[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC29: System Configuration Management

Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) dzacharo at harica.gr
Sun Mar 15 23:41:53 MST 2020


On behalf of HARICA I would like to kindly ask the proposer of the 
ballot to delay the voting for at least a week. Due to the coronavirus 
outbreak we haven't had a chance to carefully analyze the ballot and its 
consequences.


Thank you,
Dimitris.

On 2020-03-09 6:39 μ.μ., Neil Dunbar via Servercert-wg wrote:
>
> This begins the discussion period for the Ballot SC29: System 
> Configuration Management
>
> [Note: this is the resubmission of Ballot SC20, which did not proceed 
> to a voting phase]
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
> Two sections of the current NSRs contain requirements for 
> configuration management. Section 1(h) demands a weekly review and 
> Section 3(a) a process to monitor, detect and report on 
> security-related configuration changes.
>
> There was consensus in the discussions of the Network Security 
> Subgroup that unauthorized or unintentional configuration changes can 
> introduce high security risks but the current wording allows CAs to 
> comply with s1(h) without noticing such a change for several days. 
> Whether the weekly human reviews have to be performed every 7 days or 
> just once per week is a matter of interpretation but for the 
> discussion of our proposal this is immaterial. The change we are 
> proposing seeks to encourage CAs to rely on continuous monitoring 
> rather than human reviews because alerts created by a continuous 
> monitoring solution can notify a CA by orders of magnitude earlier 
> than a human review i.e. within minutes not within days.
>
> The question has been raised (at the Bratislava F2F meeting) as to 
> whether this ballot should also cover OS patching, since that involves 
> installing new packages on top of others. The view of the proposers is 
> an unequivocal “yes” - patched packages from OS vendors should go 
> through a CA change management process, and only those patches which 
> are approved for installation should make their way to production systems.
>
>
> **More detailed discussions and considerations can be found in this 
> document, maintained by the NetSec Subgroup: 
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo.
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo> 
>
>
> [For those unable to view the discussion document, a PDF of the above 
> document is attached to this mail]
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Neil Dunbar of TrustCor and 
> endorsed by Tobias Josefowitz of OPERA and Dustin Hollenback of Microsoft.
>
> --- MOTION BEGINS ---
>
> This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security 
> Requirements” based on Version 1.3. A redline against the CA/B Forum 
> repository is found here:
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9b...neildunbar:108e555?diff=split
>
> (Each CA or Delegated Third Party SHALL)
> (...)
>
> Insert as new Section 1(h):
>
> Ensure that the CA’s security policies encompass a Change Management 
> Process, following the principles of documentation, approval and 
> testing, and to ensure that all changes to Certificate Systems, 
> Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Security Support 
> Systems, and Front-End / Internal-Support Systems follow said Change 
> Management Process;
>
> Remove from Section 3(a):
>
> Implement a Security Support System under the control of CA or 
> Delegated Third Party Trusted Roles that monitors, detects, and 
> reports any security-related configuration change to Certificate Systems;
>
> Insert as new Section 3(a):
>
> Implement a System under the control of CA or Delegated Third Party 
> that continuously monitors, detects, and alerts personnel to any 
> configuration change to Certificate Systems, Issuing Systems, 
> Certificate Management Systems, Security Support Systems, and 
> Front-End / Internal-Support Systems unless the change has been 
> authorized through a change management process.  The CA or Delegated 
> Third Party  shall respond to the alert and initiate a plan of action 
> within at most twenty-four (24) hours.
>
> --- MOTION ENDS ---
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2020-03-09 17:00:00 UTC
>
> End Time: 2020-03-16 17:00:00 UTC
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: 2020-03-16 17:00:00 UTC
>
> End Time: 2020-03-23 17:00:00 UTC
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg

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