[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC31v3: Browser Alignment

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Wed Jul 1 16:36:07 MST 2020

This begins the discussion period for Ballot SC31v3: Browser Alignment

*Purpose of Ballot:*

As a regular part of Root Program maintenance, and reflecting the
independent nature of each Root Programs' needs and requirements, Root
Programs have introduced a number of requirements above and beyond those
captured in the Baseline Requirements. For Root Programs, this approach
results in a lack of certainty, as the requirements are not independently
audited and assessed, unless otherwise provided for. For CAs, this
introduces confusion when applying to have the same CA certificate trusted
by multiple Root Programs, as the effective requirements that the CA and
certificates need to comply with are the union of the most-restrictive

The following ballot attempts to resolve this uncertainty for Root
Programs, and ambiguity for CAs, by incorporating Root Program-specific
requirements that are either effective or will, in the future, be effective.

This was originally drafted in
https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/10 , and as a pull request is
available at https://github.com/cabforum/documents/pull/195

The full description, and motivation, of each change, along with the
effective dates, are available at the above pull request.

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and
endorsed by Clint Wilson of Apple and Mike Reilly of Microsoft.

The changes between SC31v1 and SC31v2 can be viewed at
This corrects "Not applicable" to "No stipulation", updates the
formatting/markup for Pandoc and provides additional example text to the
effective date table for the Chair or Vice-Chair.

The changes between SC31v2 and SC31v3 can be viewed at
This addresses an issue with certificate suspension for pre-existing,
non-TLS certificates from TLS-capable subordinate CAs, and attempts to
clarify the expectations around the use of CRL reason codes by requiring
they be documented in the CA's CP/CPS. This also shuffles a requirement
already present in the BRs and the RFCs, regarding Delegated Responders
being conflated with TLS-capable CAs, into the "Cleanup and Clarification"

This ballot modifies "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management
of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements") as follows,
based on Version 1.7.0

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following redline:

This ballot modifies the “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of
Extended Validation Certificates” (“EV Guidelines”) as follows, based on
version 1.7.2:

MODIFY the EV Guidelines as defined in the following redline:

The Chair or Vice-Chair is permitted to update the Relevant Dates of the
Baseline Requirements and the EV Guidelines to reflect these changes.

*--- MOTION ENDS ---*
This ballot proposes two Final Maintenance Guidelines.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)
Start Time: 2-July 2020 00:00 UTC
End Time: after 9-July 2020 00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)
Start Time: TBD
End Time: TBD
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