[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates

Wayne Thayer wthayer at gmail.com
Fri Jan 24 20:46:09 MST 2020


On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 8:42 PM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <
dzacharo at harica.gr> wrote:

> It could also theoretically be used for IV certificates too, right? It
> kind of defeats the purpose of TOR but who knows🙂
>
>
Yes, the ballot is generically referring to both OV and IV with the term OV.



> Dimitris.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> To: servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> Sent: Sat, 25 Jan 2020 1:49
> Subject: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates
>
> This begins the discussion period for ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion
> Certificates
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
> This ballot will permit CAs to issue DV and OV certificates containing Tor
> onion addresses using the newer version 3 naming format.
>
> In ballot 144, later clarified by ballots 198/201, the Forum created rules
> for issuing EV certificates containing onion addresses. A primary reason
> for requiring EV level validation was that onion addresses were
> cryptographically weak, relying on RSA-1024 and SHA-1. More recently a
> newer "version 3" addressing scheme has removed these weaknesses. For much
> the same reason that EV certificates are not always a viable option for
> website operators (e.g. sites operated by individuals), many onion sites
> would benefit from the availability of DV and OV certificates for version 3
> onion addresses.
>
> The Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension required in the EV Guidelines to
> contain the full hash of the keys related to the .onion address is no
> longer needed as this hash is part of the version 3 address.
>
> Older version 2 onion addresses are still in use, so this ballot does not
> remove the existing EV Guidelines requirements for onion names.
>
> Reference to discussion of EV onion certificates:
> https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-November/004569.html
>
> Reference to reasons we required EV in the past:
> https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html
>
> Reference to prior discussion of this topic:
> https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/012451.html
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and
> endorsed by Roland Shoemaker of Let's Encrypt and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of
> HARICA.
>
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version
> 1.6.7, or based on Version 1.6.7 as modified by ballot SC25:
>
> ADD a paragraph to section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements as defined
> in the following redline:
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631
>
> ADD Appendix C to the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following
> redline:
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631
>
>
> This ballot modifies the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of
> Extended Validation Certificates" as follows based on version 1.7.1:
>
> MODIFY Appendix F as defined in the following redline:
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631
>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
>
> This ballot proposes two Final Maintenance Guidelines.
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 25-January 2020 00:00 UTC
>
> End Time: No earlier than 01-February 2020 00:00 UTC
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: TBD
>
> End Time: TBD
>
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