[Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: Ballot SC27v3: Version 3 Onion Certificates

Atilla BİLER atilla.biler at turktrust.com.tr
Fri Feb 14 06:03:42 MST 2020


TÜRKTRUST “abstains” on Ballot SC27v3.

 

 

N. Atilla BILER

Business Development Manager / Advisor to R&D Center

TURKTRUST Inc.

 

Address: Hollanda Cad. 696.Sok. No:7 Yildiz 06550 Cankaya - Ankara / TURKEY

Phone   : +90 312 439 10 00

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Fax         : +90 312 439 10 01

E-mail   :  <mailto:atilla.biler at turktrust.com.tr> atilla.biler at turktrust.com.tr 

Web      :  <http://www.turktrust.com.tr/> www.turktrust.com.tr 

 

 

 

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 3:00 PM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> >
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: Ballot SC27v3: Version 3 Onion Certificates

 

This begins the voting period for Version 3 of ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates

 

Purpose of Ballot:

This ballot will permit CAs to issue DV and OV certificates containing Tor onion addresses using the newer version 3 naming format.

 

In ballot 144, later clarified by ballots 198/201, the Forum created rules for issuing EV certificates containing onion addresses. A primary reason for requiring EV level validation was that onion addresses were cryptographically weak, relying on RSA-1024 and SHA-1. More recently a newer "version 3" addressing scheme has removed these weaknesses. For much the same reason that EV certificates are not always a viable option for website operators (e.g. sites operated by individuals), many onion sites would benefit from the availability of DV and OV certificates for version 3 onion addresses.

 

The Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension required in the EV Guidelines to contain the full hash of the keys related to the .onion address is no longer needed as this hash is part of the version 3 address.

 

Older version 2 onion addresses are still in use, so this ballot does not remove the existing EV Guidelines requirements for onion names.

 

Reference to discussion of EV onion certificates: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-November/004569.html

 

Reference to reasons we required EV in the past: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html

 

Reference to prior discussion of this topic: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/012451.html


The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by Roland Shoemaker of Let's Encrypt and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA.

 


-- MOTION BEGINS --

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.6.7, or based on Version 1.6.7 as modified by ballot SC25:

ADD a paragraph to section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9

 

ADD Appendix C to the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9

 

 

This ballot modifies the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates" as follows based on version 1.7.1:

 

MODIFY Appendix F as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9

 

-- MOTION ENDS --


This ballot proposes two Final Maintenance Guidelines.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 25-January 2020 00:00 UTC

End Time: 12-February 2020 20:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)


Start Time: 12-February 2020 20:00 UTC

End Time:  19-February 2020 20:00 UTC

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