[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL] Ballot SC23: Precertificates

[Ryan Sleevi]

Bruce,

That sounds like a really long time. Could you share data about the
presumed impact?

In the past, it was suggested that 30 days (in addition to the 30 days
provided by the IP review period) is sufficient for changes.

If the argument is that it requires significant effort, I think any data
that can be used to establish this would be useful. There's plenty of data
available that disputes the challenge or complexity here. For example,
we've already seen Commercial Off the Shelf Software and Open Source
software able to comply with this within hours, using existing tools and
capabilities.

In short: I think any CA asking for a delay has a duty of care to share why
they believe a delay is in the community interest, especially when the
failure to comply calls into question the security for users.

On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 5:24 PM Bruce Morton via Servercert-wg <
servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

> Hi Wayne,
>
>
>
> This ballot may impact how CAs are providing OCSP responses
> precertificates; however, there is no future effectivity date provided. To
> allow the CAs to be compliant, I would request that we have a effectivity
> date which is 6 months after the IPR review period is completed.
>
>
>
> Thanks, Bruce.
>
>
>
> *From:* Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of *Wayne
> Thayer via Servercert-wg
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 3, 2019 1:30 PM
> *To:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <
> servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL][Servercert-wg] Ballot SC23: Precertificates
>
>
>
> *WARNING:* This email originated outside of Entrust Datacard.
> *DO NOT CLICK* links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know
> the content is safe.
> ------------------------------
>
> Ballot SC23: Precertificates
>
>
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
>
>
> This ballot intends to clarify requirements placed on precertificates in
> BR section 7.1.2.5.
>
>
>
> During a lengthy discussion on the mozilla.dev.security.policy forum [1],
> it was discovered that BR section 4.9.10 combined with BR section 7.1.2.5
> prevents a CA from responding “good” for a precertificate. This is a
> problem because there is no guarantee that a certificate corresponding to a
> precertificate has not been issued, resulting in root store policies such
> as [2] that require CAs to treat the existence of a precertificate as a
> presumption that a corresponding certificate has been issued and thus that
> a valid OCSP response is required.
>
>
>
> This ballot intends to resolve the problem by reducing the scope of
> section 7.1.2.5. This section was originally [3] intended only to address
> duplicate serial numbers that would violate RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.2. In
> addition, this ballot removes legacy effective dates from BR section 4.9.10.
>
>
>
> [1]
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/LC_y8yPDI9Q/NbOmVB77AQAJ
>
> [2]
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Required_or_Recommended_Practices#Precertificates
>
> [3] https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-January/002694.html
>
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and
> endorsed by Jeremy Rowley of DigiCert and Rob Stradling of Sectigo.
>
>
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
>
>
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version
> 1.6.6:
>
>
>
> *REPLACE section 7.1.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements in its entirety
> with:*
>
>
>
> 7.1.2.5 Application of RFC 5280
>
>
>
> For purposes of clarification, any Precertificate MAY have the same serial
> number as exactly one certificate that is not a Precertificate, provided
> that the two are related as described in RFC 6962 - Certificate
> Transparency. This is a modification of the uniqueness requirements of RFC
> 5280  - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
> Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile section 4.1.2.2 under these
> Baseline Requirements.
>
>
>
> *REPLACE section 4.9.10 of the Baseline Requirements in its entirety with:*
>
>
>
> 4.9.10 On-line Revocation Checking Requirements
>
>
>
> The CA SHALL support an OCSP capability using the GET method for
> Certificates issued in accordance with these Requirements.
>
>
>
> For the status of Subscriber Certificates:
>
> The CA SHALL update information provided via an Online Certificate Status
> Protocol at least every four days. OCSP responses from this service MUST
> have a maximum expiration time of ten days.
>
>
>
> For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates:
>
> The CA SHALL update information provided via an Online Certificate Status
> Protocol at least (i) every twelve months and (ii) within 24 hours after
> revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.
>
>
>
> If the OCSP responder receives an OCSP request but has no record of ever
> having issued any certificate with the certificate serial number in that
> request, using any current or previous issuing key for the CA subject, then
> the responder SHOULD NOT respond with a "good" status. OCSP responders for
> CAs that are not Technically Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST
> NOT respond with a "good" status for such certificates. The CA SHOULD
> monitor the responder for such requests as part of its security response
> procedures.
>
>
>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
>
>
> *** WARNING ***: USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.  THE REDLINE BELOW IS NOT THE
> OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CHANGES (CABF Bylaws, Section 2.4(1)):
>
>
>
> A comparison of the changes can be found at:
> https://github.com/wthayer/documents/commit/f0b7c0a27fe51e73d5ed5d8d453024c51713ed70
>
>
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
>
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
>
>
> Start Time: 3-October 2019 18:00 UTC
>
>
>
> End Time: No earlier than 10-October 2019 18:00 UTC
>
>
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
>
>
> Start Time: TBD
>
>
>
> End Time: TBD
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
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>
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