[Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: Ballot SC24 V2: Fall Cleanup

Aleksandra Kapinos Aleksandra.Kapinos at assecods.pl
Tue Nov 5 23:56:41 MST 2019


Certum votes YES on ballot SC24 V2



Best regards,
Aleksandra Kapinos
Junior Quality Specialist
Security &  Trust Services Division
Asseco Data Systems S.A.
Office in Szczecin
ul. Bajeczna 13
71-838 Szczecin
aleksandra.kapinos at assecods.pl<mailto:aleksandra.kapinos at assecods.pl>
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From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg
Sent: Monday, November 4, 2019 9:01 PM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: Ballot SC24 V2: Fall Cleanup



Ballot SC24: Fall Cleanup v2



Purpose of Ballot:



This ballot proposes to correct a number of minor errata that have been discovered in the BRs and EVGLs. The specific list of changes and motivations is as follows:



To the BRs:

*       Remove overall ‘1 July 2012’ effective date for the BRs
*       Correct the authorized port descriptive label (http -> https)
*       Correct a few typos (contract -> contact, assigns -> assignees)
*       Clarify the Request Token should be documented in the CP/CPS (or a document referenced from the CP/CPS)
*       Move the construction examples of a Request Token to the definition of a Request Token
*       Remove the definition of Test Certificate, as it is no longer used in the BRs
*       Correct some of our acronyms
*       Remove effective dates that are in the past
*       Remove validation methods that are no longer permitted

   *    Note: This also involves typographical changes to section 3.2.2.4; the sections were inconsistent in their use of boiler plate, and so this simply aligned the formatting and line spacing, since this ballot is for changes that are non-normative in impact

*       Correct some unnecessarily gendered language to be gender-neutral
*       Clarify that the usable OIDs in a certificatePolicies are what the CA documents, and not simply restricted to a CA's own OID arc.

   *    This is to make it clear that it's fine to use the CABF-defined OIDs for DV/OV/IV/EV

*       Add the OID for organizationalUnitName, matching the rest of the Subscriber DN documentation
*       Clean up the algorithm requirements

   *    Section 6.1.5 is rewritten to reflect what is permitted. This is especially important to clarify the requirements are about when it's issued, and not simply the validity period expressed in the certificate.
   *    Section 7.1.3 is partially rewritten. The MUST NOT is still kept, even though Section 6.1.5 clearly omits it, in order to avoid any ambiguity.
   *    It also removes the now-expired grandfathering for OCSP responders.

*       Referring to “RFC5280” vs “RFC 5280”

To the EVGs:

*       Unify the references to BRs to consistently say Baseline Requirements



The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Jacob Hoffman-Andrews of Let’s Encrypt.



-- MOTION BEGINS --



This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as defined in the following redline, based on Version 1.6.6:



https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master@%7B10-25-19%7D...sleevi:2019-07-Cleanups@%7B10-25-19%7D<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fdocuments%2Fcompare%2Fmaster%40%257B10-25-19%257D...sleevi%3A2019-07-Cleanups%40%257B10-25-19%257D&data=02%7C01%7CAleksandra.Kapinos%40assecods.pl%7C76688c2b59d340c6f08f08d7626c3a54%7C598be90934974762a128e8e82e732db1%7C0%7C0%7C637086089285110045&sdata=2w2cmuzo%2FqTGUr5YkiWUWcxbgLqUWRNhzJ18Pbhf%2F0I%3D&reserved=0>



This ballot modifies the “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates” as defined in the following redline, based on Version 1.7.0:



https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master@%7B10-25-19%7D...sleevi:2019-07-Cleanups@%7B10-25-19%7D<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fdocuments%2Fcompare%2Fmaster%40%257B10-25-19%257D...sleevi%3A2019-07-Cleanups%40%257B10-25-19%257D&data=02%7C01%7CAleksandra.Kapinos%40assecods.pl%7C76688c2b59d340c6f08f08d7626c3a54%7C598be90934974762a128e8e82e732db1%7C0%7C0%7C637086089285110045&sdata=2w2cmuzo%2FqTGUr5YkiWUWcxbgLqUWRNhzJ18Pbhf%2F0I%3D&reserved=0>



-- MOTION ENDS --



This ballot proposes Final Maintenance Guidelines.



The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:



Discussion (7+ days)



Start Time: 21-October 2019 18:00 UTC



End Time: 05-November 2019 05:00 UTC



Vote for approval (7 days)



Start Time: 05-November 2019 05:00 UTC



End Time: 12-November 2019 05:00 UTC

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