[Servercert-wg] Voting begins: Ballot SC14 version 5: Updated Phone Validation Methods

Adriano Santoni adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it
Fri Jan 25 02:21:16 MST 2019


Actalis votes 'yes'.

Il 24/01/2019 19:15, Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg ha scritto:
>
> Voting begins for Ballot SC14 today and ends in one week on 2019-01-31 
> 13:15 Eastern**
>
> **
>
> **
>
> Ballot SC14: Updated Phone Validation Methods
>
> Purpose of Ballot: As discussed during the Validation Summit, Method 3 
> of the Baseline Requirements could use some improvements to close off 
> some potential bad practices that might lead to security risks.  This 
> Ballot tightens up the rules around phone validation in order to make 
> sure domain authorization or control is verified with a person who is 
> authorized to do so by introducing a replacement for Method 3.  
> Validations done under Method 3 will continue to be valid until the 
> end of the data reuse period, but new phone based validations must use 
> the new method by the date specified in the ballot below.
>
> This ballot also builds on “Ballot SC13: CAA Contact Property and 
> Associated E-mail Validation Methods” to permit domain owners to 
> publish Domain Validation phone numbers in DNS TXT records.  Since 
> these phone numbers are specifically for the purpose of validating 
> domains, it’s not permissible to be transferred to a different number.
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Doug Beattie of GlobalSign 
> and endorsed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert.
>
> --- MOTION BEGINS ---
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and 
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on 
> Version 1.6.2 with ballot SC13 changes:
>
> Add the following definition to section 1.6.1:
>
> DNS TXT Record Phone Contact: The phone number defined in section B.2.2.
>
> In section 3.2.2.4.3, after the end of the second paragraph add the 
> following text as a new paragraph: ”CAs SHALL NOT perform validations 
> using this method after May 31, 2019. Completed validations using this 
> method SHALL continue to be valid for subsequent issuance per the 
> applicable certificate data reuse periods.”
>
> Add sections 3.2.2.4.15 and  3.2.2.4.16 as follows:
>
> 3.2.2.4.15 Phone Contact with Domain Contact
>
> Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the Domain 
> Contact’s phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate 
> the ADN. Each phone call MAY confirm control of multiple ADNs provided 
> that the same Domain Contact phone number is listed for each ADN being 
> verified and they provide a confirming response for each ADN.
>
> In the event that someone other than a Domain Contact is reached, the 
> CA MAY request to be transferred to the Domain Contact.
>
> In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value 
> and the ADN(s) being validated. The Random Value MUST be returned to 
> the CA to approve the request.
>
> The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response 
> for no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a 
> shorter validity period for Random Values.
>
> Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY 
> also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels 
> of the validated FQDN.  This method is suitable for validating 
> Wildcard Domain Names.
>
> 3.2.2.4.16 Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact
>
> Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the DNS TXT 
> Record Phone Contact’s phone number and obtain a confirming response 
> to validate the ADN. Each phone call MAY confirm control of multiple 
> ADNs provided that the same DNS TXT Record Phone Contact phone number 
> is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming 
> response for each ADN.
>
> The CA MAY NOT knowingly be transferred or request to be transferred 
> as this phone number has been specifically listed for the purposes of 
> Domain Validation.
>
> In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value 
> and the ADN(s) being validated. The Random Value MUST be returned to 
> the CA to approve the request.
>
> The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response 
> for no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a 
> shorter validity period for Random Values.
>
> Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY 
> also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels 
> of the validated FQDN.  This method is suitable for validating 
> Wildcard Domain Names.
>
> Add appendix section B.2.2 as follows:
>
> B.2.2. DNS TXT Record Phone Contact
>
> The DNS TXT record MUST be placed on the "_validation-contactphone" 
> subdomain of the domain being validated.  The entire RDATA value of 
> this TXT record MUST be a valid Global Number as defined in RFC 3966 
> section 5.1.4, or it cannot be used.
>
> --- MOTION ENDS ---
>
> *** WARNING ***: USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.  THE REDLINE BELOW IS NOT THE 
> OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CHANGES (CABF Bylaws, Section 2.4(a)):
>
> A comparison of the changes can be found at: 
> https://github.com/dougbeattie/documents/compare/master...dougbeattie:SC14---Phone-validation-updates 
>
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2019-01-16 16:30 Eastern
>
> End Time: Not before 2019-01-23 16:30 Eastern
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: 2019-01-24 13:15 Eastern
>
> End Time: 2019-01-31 13:15 Eastern
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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