[Servercert-wg] Fwd: Discussion Period Begins on Ballot SC7: Update IP Address Validation Methods

[Wayne Thayer]

Forwarding for Jürgen:

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Jürgen Brauckmann <brauckmann at dfn-cert.de>
Date: Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 6:30 AM
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins on Ballot SC7: Update
IP Address Validation Methods
To: Wayne Thayer <wthayer at mozilla.com>, CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG
Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>


[I guess I can't post to servercert-wg@; it would be great if you could
forward my question. Thanks!]

I have a question regarding:

 > 3.2.2.5.3. Reverse Address Lookup
 >
 > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by obtaining a
 > Domain Name associated with the IP Address through a reverse-IP lookup
 > on the IP Address and then verifying control over the FQDN using a
 > method permitted under BR Section 3.2.2.4.

** Does this cover the szenario where a CA has an existing valid domain
validation, and then, some time later but within the reuse-interval for
the domain validation, receives a request for a certificate with an IP
adress?

Is the intention of 3.2.2.5.3 that the CA can rely on the existing
domain validation? This would make sense as it prevents strange "double
checking" situations.

If yes, then the wording might be not clear enough, and some additions
might be helpful, e.g.
"Previous completed validations of Applicant authority over the FQDN may
be re-used if the validation was initiated within the time period
specified in the relevant requirement (such as Section 4.2.1 of this
document)."

** Or is the intention that the CA is required to perform a new domain
validation on the result of the reverse-IP lookup in any case?

This would also make sense as it would probably be healthy if the re-use
period for the ip address validation should not extend the re-use period
for the underlying domain validation... .

Thanks,
   Jürgen









On 24.01.19 01:32, Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg wrote:
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
> Ballot 169 removed Method 11 ("Any Other Method") from 3.2.2.4 and
> replaced it with explicit validation methods, but it's sibling in
> 3.2.2.5 item 4 is still in the Baseline Requirements.
>
> This ballot removes 3.2.2.5 item 4 and replaces it with an explicit list
> of IP validation methods.
>
> The intention is that, moving forward, IP validation methods will be
> handled in the same way as domain-name validation methods, and CAs that
> want to use new methods or variants of existing methods must bring them
> to the Forum for scrutiny, first.
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and
> endorsed by Doug Beattie of GlobalSign and Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert.
>
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on
> Version 1.6.2:
>
> Add the following to the table in section 1.2.2:
>
> Compliance: 2019-08-01; Section 3.2.2.5; Summary Description: CAs MUST
> follow revised validation requirements in section 3.2.2.5 and MUST keep
> a record of IP Address validation methods used.
>
>
> Add the following definitions to section 1.6.1:
>
> IP Address:A 32-bit or 128-bit label assigned to a device that uses the
> Internet Protocol for communication.
>
> IP Address Contact:The person(s) or entity(ies) registered with an IP
> Address Registration Authority as having the right to control how one or
> more IP Addresses are used.
>
> IP Address Registration Authority:The  Internet Assigned Numbers
> Authority (IANA) or a Regional Internet Registry (RIPE, APNIC, ARIN,
> AfriNIC, LACNIC).
>
>
> Replace Baseline Requirements section 3.2.2.5, in its entirety, with the
> following text:
>
>
>         3.2.2.5. Authentication for an IP Address
>
> This section defines the permitted processes and procedures for
> validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of an IP Address listed
> in a Certificate.
>
> The CA SHALL confirm that prior to issuance, the CA has validated each
> IP Address listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods
> specified in this section.
>
> Completed validations of Applicant authority may be valid for the
> issuance of multiple Certificates over time. In all cases, the
> validation must have been initiated within the time period specified in
> the relevant requirement (such as Section 4.2.1 of this document) prior
> to Certificate issuance. For purposes of IP Address validation, the term
> Applicant includes the Applicant's Parent Company, Subsidiary Company,
> or Affiliate.
>
> After July 31, 2019, CAs SHALL maintain a record of which IP validation
> method, including the relevant BR version number, was used to validate
> every IP Address.
>
> Note: IP Addresses verified in accordance with this section 3.2.5 may be
> listed in Subscriber Certificates as defined in section 7.1.4.2 or in
> Subordinate CA Certificates via iPAddress in permittedSubtrees within
> the Name Constraints extension. CAs are not required to verify IP
> Addresses listed in Subordinate CA Certificates via iPAddress in
> excludedSubtrees in the Name Constraints extension prior to inclusion in
> the Subordinate CA Certificate.
>
> 3.2.2.5.1. Agreed-Upon Change to Website
>
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the requested IP Address by
> confirming the presence of a Request Token or Random Value contained in
> the content of a file or webpage in the form of a meta tag under the
> "/.well-known/pki-validation" directory, or another path registered with
> IANA for the purpose of validating control of IP Addresses, on the IP
> Address that is accessible by the CA via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized
> Port. The Request Token or Random Value MUST NOT appear in the request.
>
> If a Random Value is used, the CA SHALL provide a Random Value unique to
> the certificate request and SHALL not use the Random Value after the
> longer of (i) 30 days or (ii) if the Applicant submitted the certificate
> request, the timeframe permitted for reuse of validated information
> relevant to the certificate (such as in Section 4.2.1 of this document).
>
> 3.2.2.5.2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to IP Address Contact
>
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address  by sending a
> Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a
> confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value MUST be
> sent to an email address, fax/SMS number, or postal mail address
> identified as an IP Address Contact.
>
> Each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail MAY confirm control of multiple IP
> Addresses.
>
> The CA MAY send the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail identified under
> this section to more than one recipient provided that every recipient is
> identified by the IP Address Registration Authority as representing the
> IP Address Contact for every IP Address being verified using the email,
> fax, SMS, or postal mail.
>
> The Random Value SHALL be unique in each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.
>
> The CA MAY resend the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail in its entirety,
> including re-use of the Random Value, provided that the communication's
> entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged.
>
> The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response for
> no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a shorter
> validity period for Random Values, in which case the CA MUST follow its
CPS.
>
> 3.2.2.5.3. Reverse Address Lookup
>
> Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by obtaining a
> Domain Name associated with the IP Address through a reverse-IP lookup
> on the IP Address and then verifying control over the FQDN using a
> method permitted under BR Section 3.2.2.4.
>
> 3.2.2.5.4. Any Other Method
>
> Using any other method of confirmation, including variations of the
> methods defined in BR Section 3.2.2.5, provided that the CA maintains
> documented evidence that the method of confirmation establishes that the
> Applicant has control over the IP Address to at least the same level of
> assurance as the methods previously described in version 1.6.2 of these
> Requirements.
>
> CAs SHALL NOT perform validations using this method after July 31,
> 2019.  Completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be re-used for
> certificate issuance after July 31, 2019. Any certificate issued prior
> to August 1, 2019 containing an IP Address that was validated using any
> method that was permitted under the prior version of this section
> 3.2.2.5 MAY continue to be used without revalidation until such
> certificate naturally expires.
>
> 3.2.2.5.5. Phone Contact with IP Address Contact
>
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by calling the IP
> Address Contact’s phone number and obtaining a response confirming the
> Applicant's request for validation of the IP Address. The CA MUST place
> the call to a phone number identified by the IP Address Registration
> Authority as the IP Address Contact. Each phone call SHALL be made to a
> single number.
>
> In the event that someone other than an IP Address Contact is reached,
> the CA MAY request to be transferred to the IP Address Contact.
>
> In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value
> and the IP Address(es) being validated.  The Random Value MUST be
> returned to the CA to approve the request.
>
> The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response for
> no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a shorter
> validity period for Random Values.
>
>
> *3.2.2.5.6 ACME “http-01” method for IP Addresses*
>
>
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by performing the
> procedure documented for an “http-01” challenge in draft 04 of “ACME IP
> Identifier Validation Extension,” available at
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-ip-04#section-4.
>
>
> *3.2.2.5.7 ACME “tls-alpn-01” method for IP Addresses*
>
>
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by performing the
> procedure documented for a “tls-alpn-01” challenge in draft 04 of “ACME
> IP Identifier Validation Extension,” available at
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-ip-04#section-4.
>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
>
> *** WARNING ***: USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.  THE REDLINE BELOW IS NOT THE
> OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CHANGES (CABF Bylaws, Section 2.4(a)):
>
> A comparison of the changes can be found
> at:
https://github.com/wthayer/documents/compare/wthayer:master...Ballot-SC7
> <
https://github.com/dougbeattie/documents/compare/master...dougbeattie:SC14---Phone-validation-updates
>
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2019-01-24 01:00 UTC
>
> End Time: Not before 2019-01-31 01:00 UTC
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: TBD
>
> End Time: TBD
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>
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