[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC6 v3 - Revocation Timeline Extension
Fotis Loukos
fotisl at ssl.com
Wed Sep 12 06:33:09 MST 2018
SSL.com votes YES on Ballot SC6 v3.
Regards,
Fotis
On 10/09/2018 09:54 μμ, Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg wrote:
> This ballot entered the voting period late on Friday. Voting ends this
> Friday 2018-09-14 at 20:00 UTC.
>
> On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 12:51 PM Wayne Thayer <wthayer at mozilla.com
> <mailto:wthayer at mozilla.com>> wrote:
>
> Here is version 3 of this ballot, incorporating changes to v2
> suggested by Bruce and Ryan (thanks!).
>
> I noticed that our current bylaws have reverted back to a
> fixed-length discussion period, so I have changed this version to
> comply.
>
> ==========================================
>
> Ballot SC6 version 3: Revocation Timeline Extension
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
> Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements currently requires CAs
> to revoke a Subscriber certificate within 24 hours of identifying
> any of 15 issues affecting the certificate. In cases where there is
> not an immediate threat of misuse of the certificate, this
> requirement can cause undue harm to a Subscriber that isn't capable
> of replacing the certificate prior to revocation. This ballot makes
> a number of improvements to the revocation rules imposed by the
> Baseline Requirements:
> * Primarily, it creates a tiered timeline for revocations. The most
> critical "reasons" still require revocation within 24 hours, but for
> many others 24 hours becomes a SHOULD and the CA has 5 days before
> they MUST revoke.
> * A new "reason for revocation" was added to address the fact that
> there is currently no requirement for CAs to revoke a certificate
> when requested by the domain name registrant. After considering some
> more specific language that required CAs to follow 3.2.2.4 to
> validate domain control, I settled on the following more general
> "reason": "The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain
> authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP
> address in the Certificate should not be relied upon."
> * Reason #10 states "The CA determines that any of the information
> appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;" This
> ballot removes "or misleading" because that is a subjective
> judgement that could effectively be used to justify censorship, as
> discussed at length in relation to the "Stripe, Inc of Kentucky" EV
> certificates.
> * Current reasons #11 and #13 were removed from the section on
> subscriber certificates because they address cases where the
> intermediate and/or root must be revoked, so there isn't much sense
> (and some possible harm) in requiring revocation of all the leaf certs.
> * It requires CAs to disclose their problem reporting mechanisms in
> a standard location: CPS section 1.5.2.
> * Within 24 hours of receiving a problem report, the CA is now
> required to report back to both the entity reporting the problem and
> the Subscriber on the CA's findings, and to work with the reporter
> and Subscriber to establish a date by which the CA will revoke the
> certificate.
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla
> and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> of Harica.
>
> --- MOTION BEGINS ---
This ballot modifies the “Baseline
> Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
> Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.6.0:
>
> ** Modify the definition of Key Compromise as follows: **
> Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value
> has been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized
> person has had access to it.
>
> ** Modify Section 4.9.1 to read as follows: **
>
> 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate
>
> The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of
> the following occurs:
> 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the
> Certificate;
> 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate
> request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant
> authorization;
> 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key
> corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key
> Compromise; or
> 4. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain
> authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP
> address in the Certificate should not be relied upon.
>
> The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a
> Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs:
> 1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of
> Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6;
> 2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
> 3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more
> of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms
> of Use;
> 4. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a
> Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no
> longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a
> Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant
> licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant
> and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has
> failed to renew the Domain Name);
> 5. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to
> authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified
> Domain Name;
> 6. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information
> contained in the Certificate;
> 7. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in
> accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or
> Certification Practice Statement;
> 8. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information
> appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate;
> 9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements
> expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made
> arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
> 10. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or
> Certification Practice Statement; or
> 11. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that
> exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise, methods have
> been developed that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key
> (such as a Debian weak key, see http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys), or
> if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate
> the Private Key was flawed.
>
> 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
>
> The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within
> seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:
> 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
> 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original
> certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively
> grant authorization;
> 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private
> Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a
> Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of
> Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6;
> 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
> 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued
> in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this
> document or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification
> Practice Statement;
> 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing
> in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
> 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason
> and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation
> support for the Certificate;
> 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates
> under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless
> the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the
> CRL/OCSP Repository; or
> 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy
> and/or Certification Practice Statement.
>
> ** Modify section 4.9.3 as follows: **
>
>
The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request
> revocation of their own Certificates. The process MUST be described
> in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.
> The CA SHALL maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and
> respond to revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports.
>
> The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application
> Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions
> for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse,
> or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct,
> or any other matter related to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly
> disclose the instructions through a readily accessible online means
> and in section 1.5.2 of their CPS.
>
> ** Modify section 4.9.5 to read as follows: **
>
>
Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the
> CA SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to a
> Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its
> findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the
> Certificate Problem Report.
>
> After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA SHALL work with
> the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem
> Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or
> not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which the CA
> will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the
> Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published
> revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in Section
> 4.9.1.1. The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following
> criteria:
> 1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity,
> magnitude, risk of harm);
> 2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to
> Subscribers and Relying Parties);
> 3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a
> particular Certificate or Subscriber;
> 4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a
> law enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal
> activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer
> alleging that she didn't receive the goods she ordered); and
> 5. Relevant legislation.
>
> --- MOTION ENDS ---
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.
>
>
A comparison of the changes can be found at:
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:patch-1
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
> Discussion (7 days)
> Start Time: 2018-08-31 20:00 UTC
> End Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC
> Vote for approval (7 days)
> Start Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC
> End Time: 2018-09-14 20:00 UTC
>
>
>
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>
--
Fotis Loukos, PhD
Director of Security Architecture
SSL Corp
e: fotisl at ssl.com
w: https://www.ssl.com
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