[Servercert-wg] Voting begins: Ballot SC3 version 2

[戴业琪]

SHECA votes Yes on ballot SC3 version 2.


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DAI YEQI
 
daiyeqi at sheca.com, +862136393162
 
 
Shanghai Electronic Certificate Authority Center Co., Ltd.
 
18F, No.1717
 
North Sichuan Road, Hongkou District
 
Shanghai,  China


 




------------------ Original ------------------
From:  "Tim Hollebeek via Servercert-wg"<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>;
Date:  Thu, Aug 9, 2018 11:48 PM
To:  "CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List"<public at cabforum.org>;
Cc:  "servercert-wg at cabforum.org"<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; 
Subject:  [Servercert-wg] Voting begins: Ballot SC3 version 2



 
 

https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/SC3-PasswordChangesDieDieDie?expand=1

 

Ballot SC3: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements

 

Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number of times to 

improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around authentication,

specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving the password 

requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.

 

While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as soon as 

possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow organizations to 

develop and implement policies to implement the improved requirements, especially

since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other

compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based on older NIST 

guidance about passwords.

 

The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and endorsed 

by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.

 

— MOTION BEGINS –

 

This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements” 

as follows, based upon Version 1.1:

 

In the definitions, add a definition for Multi-Factor Authentication:

 

"Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism consisting of two or 

more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e. factors) to 

verify the user’s identity for a login or other transaction: something you know 

(knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and something you 

are (inherence factor).  Each factor must be independent.  Certificate-based 

authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the 

private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."

 

Capitalize all instances of the defined term "Multi-Factor Authentication".

 

Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:

 

"Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least FIPS 140-2

level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."

 

In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and strike the 

parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).

 

In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts or shared

role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to Certificate Systems".

 

Change section 2.g. to read:

 

"g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a username and password, 

    then, where technically feasible, implement the following controls:

  i.           For accounts that are accessible only within Secure Zones or High Security 

               Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve (12) characters; 

  ii.          For authentications which cross a zone boundary into a Secure Zone or High 

               Security Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication.  For accounts accessible 

               from outside a Secure Zone or High Security Zone require passwords that have 

               at least eight (8) characters and are not be one of the user's previous 

               four (4) passwords; and implement account lockout for failed access attempts 

               in accordance with subsection k;

  iii.         When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take into account the password 

               guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.

  iv.          Frequent password changes have been shown to cause users to select less 

               secure passwords.  If the CA has any policy that specifies routine periodic 

               password changes, that period SHOULD NOT be less than two years.  Effective 

               April 1, 2020, if the CA has any policy that requires routine periodic password 

               changes, that period SHALL NOT be less than two years.

 

In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"

 

In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"

 

Change section 2.k. to read:

 

"k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more than five (5) failed 

    access attempts, provided that this security measure:

  i.           is supported by the Certificate System,

  ii.          Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and

  iii.        does not weaken the security of this authentication control;"

 

Change section 2.n. to read:

 

"Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts on Certificate

Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate, which equally

applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone

or High Security Zone; and"

 

— MOTION ENDS –

 

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

 

Discussion (7+ days)

 

Start Time: 2018-07-26  17:45 Eastern

 

End Time: 2018-08-09 11:45 Eastern

 

Vote for approval (7 days)

 

Start Time: 2018-08-09 11:45 Eastern

 

End Time: 2018-08-16 11:45 Eastern
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