[Servercert-wg] [cabfpub] Voting begins: Ballot SC3 version 2
Neil Dunbar
ndunbar at trustcorsystems.com
Mon Aug 13 10:09:02 MST 2018
TrustCor Systems votes YES on Ballot SC3 version 2
Regards,
Neil
> On 9 Aug 2018, at 16:48, Tim Hollebeek via Public <public at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/SC3-PasswordChangesDieDieDie?expand=1 <https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/SC3-PasswordChangesDieDieDie?expand=1>
>
> Ballot SC3: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements
>
> Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number of times to
> improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around authentication,
> specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving the password
> requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.
>
> While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as soon as
> possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow organizations to
> develop and implement policies to implement the improved requirements, especially
> since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other
> compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based on older NIST
> guidance about passwords.
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and endorsed
> by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.
>
> — MOTION BEGINS –
>
> This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements”
> as follows, based upon Version 1.1:
>
> In the definitions, add a definition for Multi-Factor Authentication:
>
> "Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism consisting of two or
> more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e. factors) to
> verify the user’s identity for a login or other transaction: something you know
> (knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and something you
> are (inherence factor). Each factor must be independent. Certificate-based
> authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the
> private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."
>
> Capitalize all instances of the defined term "Multi-Factor Authentication".
>
> Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:
>
> "Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least FIPS 140-2
> level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."
>
> In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and strike the
> parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).
>
> In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts or shared
> role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to Certificate Systems".
>
> Change section 2.g. to read:
>
> "g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a username and password,
> then, where technically feasible, implement the following controls:
> i. For accounts that are accessible only within Secure Zones or High Security
> Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve (12) characters;
> ii. For authentications which cross a zone boundary into a Secure Zone or High
> Security Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication. For accounts accessible
> from outside a Secure Zone or High Security Zone require passwords that have
> at least eight (8) characters and are not be one of the user's previous
> four (4) passwords; and implement account lockout for failed access attempts
> in accordance with subsection k;
> iii. When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take into account the password
> guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.
> iv. Frequent password changes have been shown to cause users to select less
> secure passwords. If the CA has any policy that specifies routine periodic
> password changes, that period SHOULD NOT be less than two years. Effective
> April 1, 2020, if the CA has any policy that requires routine periodic password
> changes, that period SHALL NOT be less than two years.
>
> In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"
>
> In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"
>
> Change section 2.k. to read:
>
> "k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more than five (5) failed
> access attempts, provided that this security measure:
> i. is supported by the Certificate System,
> ii. Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and
> iii. does not weaken the security of this authentication control;"
>
> Change section 2.n. to read:
>
> "Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts on Certificate
> Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate, which equally
> applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone
> or High Security Zone; and"
>
> — MOTION ENDS –
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2018-07-26 17:45 Eastern
>
> End Time: 2018-08-09 11:45 Eastern
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: 2018-08-09 11:45 Eastern
>
> End Time: 2018-08-16 11:45 Eastern
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20180813/d54c1fd8/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the Servercert-wg
mailing list