[cabfpub] LEI information in web certificates
sleevi at google.com
Fri Jul 6 15:38:41 MST 2018
I'm not sure that sort of hand-waving will help us find a good technical
solution. By defining precisely how these LEI identifiers are to be used,
we can better understand and address the design space.
For example, we've already standardized on "someone else's" OID arc for
plenty of X.500 attributes. While OIDs are a dime a dozen, it's important
in identifying who the change management authority is and the context for
this information. If it's using the CA/Browser Forum OID arc, then it's an
expression that the CA/Browser Forum believes there is particular value in
this expression - and thus, the expression of, and suitability of, that
information is extremely relevant to the discussion.
If using a GLEIF arc, then it's saying that the naming and attribute
authority is GLEIF. This avoids the host of issues with the ETSI
repuroposing of the X.500 attributes in a way that are ambiguous, and makes
it far easier to say "If you believe this attribute has value, then sure,
you can include it". Relying parties know to trust that information as far
as GLEIF throws it. Put differently, I'd be inclined to suggest that if it
uses a GLEIF OID arc, then there's nothing that the Baseline Requirements
would need to endorse or specially support - it would simply be "validated
as defined by GLEIF" - and they can set their own requirements there for
those that would wish to use this information.
As for the CA/Browser Forum being in the business of telling people how to
use the information that is validated - I think that's a rather absurd
suggestion. If we're saying it's valuable to include in certificates, it's
because it fit for a purpose when validated according to a set of
requirements. If we'd like to avoid that responsibility to the Web PKI
community, then either not expressing it in server certificates (an
entirely appropriate response) OR deferring the requirements of that
validation (and, therefore, the RP usage) to GLEIF entirely - through the
expression of the GLEIF OID arc - is another.
That's why this is such an important thing to resolve. Just because we can
stick things in certs does not mean we should. The CA/Browser Forum offers
considerable flexibility with respect to X.509v3 extensions, and for good
reason - it allows a host of innovations in the space. In this regard, it
is a blacklist, rather than a whitelist. But to the extent folks in the
Forum believe that there is any value in subject information beyond that
which is essential for server certificates (namely, the domain name), then
it's necessary to blacklist.
Now, obviously, one can do an end-run around this whole issue by expressing
the LEI identifier as an X.509v3 extension, rather than as a subject
attribute, without any involvement of the CA/Browser Forum (nor any changes
required). However, to the extent folks believe it is relevant in the
Subject Name (or Subject Alt Name), then it's necessary to discuss and
resolve these expected, valid, and anticipated use cases, in order to
choose an appropriate design.
On Fri, Jul 6, 2018 at 6:27 PM Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> I’m not sure us standardizing using someone else’s OID arc instead of ours
> has a lot of added value, but it could be done. I doubt they really care.
> I certainly don’t.
> Google is certainly free to not consume the information if they do not
> feel it is valuable to them. To be clear, the link would be between a
> validated identity and the associated LEI (we continue to see lots of value
> in asserted and validated identities whether it be a VAT id or any other
> identifier with well-defined validation rules). You can put LEIs into DV
> certificates, but I’m not sure I see the point.
> Relying parties are free to make use of validated information found in
> certificates in any way they find useful. We’re generally not in the
> business of telling people how to use the information we validate, which is
> one of the things that distinguishes us from some other CAs.
> *From:* Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, July 6, 2018 5:37 PM
> *To:* Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>; CABFPub <
> public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] LEI information in web certificates
> On Fri, Jul 6, 2018 at 4:29 PM Tim Hollebeek via Public <
> public at cabforum.org> wrote:
> As many of you are aware, the GLEIF foundation recently invited CA/Browser
> Forum members to its identity management workshop. Some people have
> contacted us about the possibility of putting LEI identifiers into web
> certificates. This is in some ways similar to the recent proposal from
> ETSI to put additional identity information into certificates, though it
> has the advantage that we are free to determine ourselves how best to
> encode it.
> CAs are already allowed to include this information in certificates,
> assuming it has been appropriately validated. There is a Global Legal
> Entity Identifier Index that is authoritative for LEIs. However it would
> be valuable if there were a standardized CABF OID and extension so that
> every CA that chooses to include this information includes it in an
> interoperable way. This also allocates the OID in a namespace we control,
> allowing us to state in the BRs the purpose and semantics of the extension,
> and require that it only be used for authentic and validated LEIs.
> It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to standardize this, instead of
> every CA coming up with their own way of doing it. What do other people
> Could you explain how this information would be used by Relying Parties?
> The GLEIF model effectively relies on third-party RAs, with all of the
> attendant issues, and without a clear framework for addressing many of the
> issues that has been held in the CA ecosystem. I'm not sure the value
> proposition here, or that the information is something RPs should
> necessarily use. As to whether or not it's appropriate, I think that's
> going to be very much contingent upon what the intended semantics being
> introduced are - that is, what relationship, if any, is being expressed
> between the LEI ID and the domain - and that opens a host of complexity
> that could easily detract from the far more pressing and meaningful work on
> improving the domain and information validation.
> I'm not sure why a CABF OID would be more useful than a GLEIF OID (which
> seems far more appropriate), and with a defined syntax relevant for GLEIF.
> I can think of no good reason to use the CABF arc, so I'm hoping you could
> explain more that thinking.
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