[cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document

[Geoff Keating]

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Jeremy Rowley via Public <public at cabforum.org> wrote:
> 
> The attack vector is easier than that. 
> I use very stringent processes to verify that Google, Inc. is a legit company in Utah.
> I verify that Jeremy did indeed incorporate Google, Inc. 
> I call Jeremy at the phone listed for Google, Inc., the Utah corporation
> The domain information shows Google, Inc. as owning google.com <http://google.com/>
> Certificate issues.
>  
> Obviously this would be caught in every CA’s high risk checks, but the point remains valid. Regardless of the expertise and thoroughness of the org check, the specs lack any time between the verified org and the actual domain because orgs are not unique on a global basis.
>  

For item 4, you have to verify that “the Applicant is the Domain Contact”.  Obviously it’s insufficient to just compare names—you must verify every element of the WHOIS contact matches the Applicant, that’s typically name, postal address, phone number, and e-mail.

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