[cabfpub] Voting begins: Ballot 218 version 2

García Jimeno, Oscar o-garcia at izenpe.eus
Wed Jan 31 01:49:08 MST 2018


Izenpe votes YES on ballot 218 version 2

.eus gara !
horregatik orain nire helbide elektronikoa da:
por eso mi dirección de correo electrónico ahora es:  o-garcia at izenpe.eus<mailto:o-garcia at izenpe.eus>

Oscar García
CISSP, CISM

[Descripción: Descripción: firma_email_Izenpe_eus]



ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!
ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.


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De: Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] En nombre de Tim Hollebeek via Public
Enviado el: lunes, 29 de enero de 2018 22:52
Para: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
Asunto: [cabfpub] Voting begins: Ballot 218 version 2


I’m highly skeptical that discussing this for another month will change anybody’s minds.  It has already been discussed for over a month, including at three validation working group meetings and once on the management call, with extensive discussion on this list as well.

There have been a number of clever attempts to distract from the matter at hand.  Everybody seems to agree that methods #1 and #5 as currently written are insufficient to validate certificates, and efforts to improve method #1 have all either been shown to be similarly weak, or have turned the validation method into one of the other existing validation methods.  In fact, this demonstrates an obvious transition path for CAs currently using method #1: use method #2 or method #3.

Since methods #1 and #5 do not sufficiently validate certificates, they should not be used, and six months should be more than enough time to cease using them.

Here is the final version of the ballot, with voting times.  A redlined document is attached (I encourage other proposers to post ballot redlines, even if it isn’t required).

-Tim

----- Ballot 218 version 2: Remove validation methods #1 and #5 -----

Purpose of Ballot: Section 3.2.2.4 says that it “defines the permitted processes and procedures for validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of the domain.”  Most of the validation methods actually do validate ownership and control, but two do not, and can be completed solely based on an applicant’s own assertions.

Since these two validation methods do not meet the objectives of section 3.2.2.4, and are actively being used to avoid validating domain control or ownership, they should be removed, and the other methods that do validate domain control or ownership should be used.

The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Rich Smith of Comodo.

-- MOTION BEGINS –

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based upon Version 1.5.4:

In Section 1.6.1, in the definition of “Domain Contact”, after “in a DNS SOA record”, add “, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar”

In Section 3.2.2.4.1, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of certificates.”

In Section 3.2.2.4.5, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of certificates.”

After Section 3.2.2.4.10, add following two new subsections:
“3.2.2.4.11 Any Other Method

This method has been retired and MUST NOT be used.

3.2.2.4.12 Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant is the Domain Contact. This method may only be used if the CA is also the Domain Name Registrar, or an Affiliate of the Registrar, of the Base Domain Name.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.“

In Section 4.2.1, after the paragraph that begins “After the change to any validation method”, add the following paragraph: “Validations completed using methods specified in Section 3.2.2.4.1 or Section 3.2.2.4.5 SHALL NOT be re-used on or after August 1, 2018.”

-- MOTION ENDS –

For the purposes of section 4.2.1, the new text added to 4.2.1 from this ballot is “specifically provided in a [this] ballot.”

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)
  Start Time: 2017-01-22  21:30:00 UTC
  End Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)
  Start Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC
  End Time: 2017-02-05 21:50 UTC

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