[cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: SC13 version 5: CAA Contact Property and Associated E-mail Validation Methods

Rob Stradling rob at sectigo.com
Thu Dec 20 09:32:25 MST 2018


Sectigo votes NO.

We don't object to the idea behind this ballot, and we don't have any 
specific objections to the content of this ballot either.  However, the 
IETF has a process for defining new CAA properties, and this process 
needs to be followed.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-7.2 says:
   "Addition of tag identifiers requires a public specification and
    Expert Review as set out in [RFC6195], Section 3.1.1."

The BRs is a "public specification", certainly.  However, *before* the 
new CAA property proposed by this ballot can become enshrined as a 
requirement in the BRs:
   1. An application for "Expert Review" must be submitted
   and
   2. An "approved" response from the designated Expert must be received

Since IANA has not yet assigned any Expert(s) to the caa-properties 
registry [1], it's clear that the required "Expert Review" has not yet 
occurred.


[1] 
https://www.iana.org/assignments/pkix-parameters/pkix-parameters.xhtml#caa-properties

On 17/12/2018 23:55, Tim Hollebeek via Servercert-wg wrote:
> Ballot SC13: CAA Contact Property and Associated E-mail Validation Methods
> 
> Purpose of Ballot: Increasingly, contact information is not available in 
> WHOIS due to concerns about potential GDPR violations.  This ballot 
> specifies a method by which domain holders can publish their contact 
> information via DNS, and how CAs can use that information for validating 
> domain control.
> 
> The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and 
> endorsed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and Doug Beattie of GlobalSign.
> 
> --- MOTION BEGINS ---
> 
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and 
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on 
> Version 1.6.0:
> 
> Add the following definitions to section 1.6.1:
> 
> DNS CAA Email Contact: The email address defined in section B.1.2.
> 
> DNS TXT Record Email Contact: The email address defined in section B.2.2.
> 
> Add Section 3.2.2.4.13: Email to DNS CAA Contact
> 
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random 
> Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the 
> Random Value. The Random Value MUST be sent to a DNS CAA Email Contact.  
> The relevant CAA Resource Record Set MUST be found using the search 
> algorithm defined in RFC 6844 Section 4, as amended by Errata 5065 
> (Appendix A).
> 
> Each email MAY confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each 
> email address is a DNS CAA Email Contact for each Authorization Domain 
> Name being validated.  The same email MAY be sent to multiple recipients 
> as long as all recipients are DNS CAA Email Contacts for each 
> Authorization Domain Name being validated.
> 
> The Random Value SHALL be unique in each email. The email MAY be re-sent 
> in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that 
> its entire contents and recipient(s) SHALL remain unchanged. The Random 
> Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more 
> than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a shorter validity 
> period for Random Values.
> 
> Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY 
> also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of 
> the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard 
> Domain Names.
> 
> Add Section 3.2.2.4.14: Email to DNS TXT Contact
> 
> Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random 
> Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the 
> Random Value. The Random Value MUST be sent to a DNS TXT Record Email 
> Contact for the Authorization Domain Name selected to validate the FQDN.
> 
> Each email MAY confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each 
> email address is DNS TXT Record Email Contact for each Authorization 
> Domain Name being validated.  The same email MAY be sent to multiple 
> recipients as long as all recipients are DNS TXT Record Email Contacts 
> for each Authorization Domain Name being validated.
> 
> The Random Value SHALL be unique in each email. The email MAY be re-sent 
> in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that 
> its entire contents and recipient(s) SHALL remain unchanged. The Random 
> Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more 
> than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a shorter validity 
> period for Random Values.
> 
> Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY 
> also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of 
> the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard 
> Domain Names.
> 
> Add Appendix B: DNS Contact Properties
> 
> These methods allow domain owners to publish contact information in DNS 
> for the purpose of validating domain control.
> 
> B.1. CAA Methods
> 
> B.1.1. CAA contactemail Property
> 
> SYNTAX: contactemail <rfc6532emailaddress>
> 
> The CAA contactemail property takes an email address as its parameter.  
> The entire parameter value MUST be a valid email address as defined in 
> RFC 6532 section 3.2, with no additional padding or structure, or it 
> cannot be used.
> 
> The following is an example where the holder of the domain specified the 
> contact property using an email address.
> 
> $ORIGIN example.com.
> 
>                 CAA 0 contactemail "domainowner at example.com"
> 
> The contactemail property MAY be critical, if the domain owner does not 
> want CAs who do not understand it to issue certificates for the domain.
> 
> B.2. DNS TXT Methods
> 
> B.2.1. DNS TXT Record Email Contact
> 
> The DNS TXT record MUST be placed on the "_validation-contactemail" 
> subdomain of the domain being validated.  The entire RDATA value of this 
> TXT record MUST be a valid email address as defined in RFC 6532 section 
> 3.2, with no additional padding or structure, or it cannot be used.
> 
> --- MOTION ENDS ---
> 
> *** WARNING ***: USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.  THE REDLINE BELOW IS NOT THE 
> OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CHANGES (CABF Bylaws, Section 2.4(a)):
> 
> A comparison of the changes can be found at: 
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/Ballot-SC4---CAA-CONTACT-email?diff=unified&expand=1
> 
> The changes between version 5 and version 4 are here:
> 
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/commit/92dd4a3a9afa38e9abf6765eb19e27508663ae61
> 
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
> 
> Discussion (7+ days)
> 
> Start Time: 2018-12-10 17:30 Eastern
> 
> End Time: Not before 2018-12-17 17:30 Eastern
> 
> Vote for approval (7 days)
> 
> Start Time: 2018-12-17 19:00 Eastern
> 
> End Time: 2018-12-24 19:00 Eastern
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
> 

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
Email: rob at sectigo.com
Bradford, UK
Office: +441274024707
Sectigo Limited

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