[cabfpub] Draft CAA motion (3)
Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com
Thu Jan 12 21:15:16 UTC 2017
Hi Ryan, responses below.
From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2017 3:39 PM
To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>
Cc: Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Draft CAA motion (3)
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 10:28 AM, Bruce Morton via Public <public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>> wrote:
I know there was some discussion about caching. I do think that 1 hour may be a period which is too short. For instance it does not address the case where a CA issues a certificate manually from a secure room/secure server. In these cases, the server will not be able to evaluate a CAA record. I think that this should be raised to 24 hours.
How often does that scenario happen - that you're issuing a server certificate via ceremony (as opposed to an intermediate or root certificate)?
[BM] We have a model where about 20-30 certificates per business day are issued. We can change the model, but this will add more implementation time. Please note that we currently check CAA records for those certificates, but at the time of validation, not issuance.
I can appreciate that there might be things that 1 hour would make hard - but I think it is a valid question to ask how often those exceptional situations realistically happen, relative to the riskiness of the proposed solution.
The effective time of 6 months may be too short. For many CAs, they will just start to deploy based on the new ballot. In this case with technical requirements which will impact the issuance of certificates, there should be more time allowed to ensure CAA is deployed effectively. I propose 12 months after the voting period ends.
As with previous discussions about implementation times, can you speak to your specific concerns, rather than hypothetical generalizations? This helps ensure we're picking a reasonable time, not simply an appealing time. I think this is especially important because as proposed, Gerv hasn't touched upon what interaction, if any, this has on cached validations - potentially meaning it's 4 years before domain holders can have any reasonable semblance of security.
[BM] We have a release cycle which is already planned for many future releases. Improvements to CAA are not yet planned in the release cycle. For us to implement new requirements for CAA for multiple brands, then it will drastically impact our current plans. More time to implement for a feature which is used by so few Subscribers would be appreciated. On the other hand, I understand that those that use CAA would like their records to be respected. It would be great to have a list of the current CAA records, then we can just black-list or block-list those domains as a transitions plan.
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