[cabfpub] Proposed Ballot 183 - Allowing 822 Names and (limited) otherNames

Jeremy Rowley jeremy.rowley at digicert.com
Tue Jan 3 21:07:40 UTC 2017

Agreed, but this line of reasoning always leads to simply not supporting third party projects because the projects may cause issues with the CAB Forum update. IMO, if a group wants to use publicly trusted certs, then that group inherits all the baggage that goes with it. We really control all the cards on this one as the interoperability is one-way. What would you propose to make sure we can update requirements in the future?  A statement like “CAB Forum can do whatever it wants without notice” is superfluous as this is already the case.




From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 3, 2017 1:54 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>; Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Proposed Ballot 183 - Allowing 822 Names and (limited) otherNames




On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 12:46 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com <mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> > wrote:

There is a public file (in the link I provided), but it requires filling out information to access. It’s the HotSpot 2.0 Technical documentation, which includes the Certificate Policy (“Hostspot 2-0 (R2) OSU Certificate Policy Specification”).  The documentation is already free to anyone who wants to enter information and agree to the terms of use.  


Ah, the many meanings of free ;) I suppose it wasn't clear that I was talking more about freedom than beer there :)


We essentially already have a liaison member from the WFA (DigiCert, Microsoft, Apple, and Google are all members).


I wouldn't put Google in that list - none of Google's CA/B Forum participants participate in HotSpot 2.0 nor communicate developments on either side of that profile to the other party. I would suggest, to date, only DigiCert does, and only to the extent you've shared anything to the Forum.


Obviously, the context was that we shouldn't be introducing this to the Web PKI unless we're sure we're not going to repeat all the same mistakes we're currently going through the SHA-1 exception process - or at least trying to learn from them. It would be foolish to ignore the feedback we've received from those affected by SHA-1 when considering expanding that scope. 

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