[cabfpub] Ballot 187 - Make CAA Checking Mandatory
sleevi at google.com
Fri Feb 24 23:08:00 UTC 2017
Reposting their reply (below)
On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> wrote:
> I believe this question is highlighting whether "operate" represents being
> the authoritative name servers versus practical demonstration of control.
> Alternatively, we might pose the question as "Does demonstration of control
> of _a_ record equivocate to demonstration of control of the CAA record", if
> I understand the question correctly.
> My belief and support is that the intent of "operated by the CA or an
> Affiliate of the CA" was to match the terminology from RFC 7719, which
> would specifically mean the interpetation (b), and the answer to the
> hypothetical question is "No, demonstration of control of a record is not
> sufficient, demonstration of operation of the authoritative name servers is"
> Is that consistent with the intent Gerv? If so, does that look like
> something you see as easy to correct? I'm wondering whether introducing RFC
> 7719 as the normative dependency might provide better clarity to this
But is that the right thing to do though? Meaning if I manage my DNS
records through Example A’s DNS management portal (or whatever it is
called), but set a CAA record that only allows Example B to issue certs to
my domain (assume my website is hosted in AWS), can they still issue certs
to my domain without checking the records? Sorry if I’m missing something
My view is that Example CA (who is operating the DNS service), and who is
running the authoritative responder (e.g. they are the DNS operator), can
totally cause issuance through any number of means - such as manipulating
the WHOIS, introducing/modifying the CAA record, etc.
That said, I recognize there's a difference between technically capable
versus being appropriate, and I doubt that the applicant/subscriber could
enter into a contractual relationship with Example CA's DNS operating arm
(which might be an Affiliate) that prevents Example CA's CA arm from
ignoring CAA. However, we also identified the "Microsoft" case (as it were;
although similar for Google and Apple, operationally speaking), in which
the subordinate CA certificate is operated by the same organizational
entity managing the DNS, and it may make less sense to require checking.
My own is I'd be willing to deal with the increased risk (that comes from
using "Example CA"'s DNS services, which would allow them to potentially
issue a certificate in contravention of my CAA record), so long as it could
be clear as a domain holder that I'm accepting that risk. If I didn't want
it, I'd just choose to operate my DNS from someone who is not a CA
(assuming I could determine that).
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