[cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates: User input

[Christian Heutger]

> I can see why there's some confusion here :-) Ryan is not arguing that we should switch to 13 months so that we will always in future move from "let's eliminate Algorithm X" to "Algorithm X is gone" in 13 months. One would always consider lots of data points in setting such a timetable. His point is that 3.25 > year certs make it very hard to move faster than that in _any_ deprecation scenario, whether simple or complex.

I don’t believe, moving faster is required for normal situations. If there are issues arising needing faster reaction, revocation and reissue is still a possible way. For normal situations, enterprises need to be able to react and they can’t move faster. Why are most enterprises skipping one Windows version and roll out the next one? As they are not able to move faster in controlled enterprise security environments.

> I don't agree that replacing your certificates once a year requires automation. It's made easier by automation, but it doesn't require it.

As I understood the discussion, 1 year is the first step on a road to months or weeks.
   
> I'm sure there are plenty of CAs, big and small, who would assert their automation solutions are secure. :-)

But as you know, there is nothing, which is 100% secure and if we talk about certificates in their sense of encryption and(!) identity assurance, such job shouldn’t be based on automatism.


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