[cabfpub] SHA-1 Collision Found

Rob Stradling rob.stradling at comodo.com
Fri Feb 24 13:03:00 MST 2017


On 24/02/17 19:32, Adam Langley wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 11:09 AM, Rob Stradling via Public wrote:
>
>     My current wishlist:
>
>     Various EdDSA algorithms.  See RFC8032 and
>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/>
>
>     BLAKE2.  See RFC7693.  (No signature algorithm OIDs exist yet, AFAICT).
>
> I too have sympathies towards BLAKE2 since I wanted BLAKE to win.
> However, given that the winner was Keccak, and its performance doesn't
> matter in the context of certificate signatures (well, perhaps for
> CRLs), I suspect that we should probably just stick with SHA-3 here.
> It's certainly very different from SHA-2 and diversity is a goal.

Hi Adam.  I agree that having more options just for the sake of having 
more options isn't actually helpful.  Enough options to achieve 
sufficient diversity is enough.

How much do we care about NIST's blessing these days?

EdDSA/Curve25519/etc isn't a NIST product.

Is there a case for using BLAKE2 for certificate signatures _instead_ of 
using SHA-3?
Performance does matter for other uses of hash algorithms, so why not 
settle on using BLAKE2 for everything (and not implement SHA-3 at all)?

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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