[cabfpub] Forbid DTPs from doing Domain/IP Ownership Validation ballot draft (2)

Peter Bowen pzb at amzn.com
Mon Apr 24 14:24:20 UTC 2017

> On Apr 24, 2017, at 7:06 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 10:35 PM, Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com <mailto:pzb at amzn.com>> wrote:
> already does permit this for many methods.  Looking at BR 1.4.1:
> Clearly covers namespace, as it only uses Base Domain Name (put another way, reuse of validation information is valid across full namespace)
> The data or documents obtained are valid across the Base Domain Name, but I don't think you can argue reuse is consistent for all sub-methods equally.
> For example, requires a contact consistent with 3.2.5. That would need to be performed every validation. (2) and (3), however, could be reused.
> same as .1
> How do you argue this? The random value must be unique and cannot be reused > 30 days, so the documents and data obtained would need to be redone.

I’m not suggesting to reuse the random value itself.  I’m reusing the documentation created when I verified the random value within 30 days of creation.

> That was somewhat my point - that it's not explicitly permitted to cover the domain namespace, and so there's no explicit permission to reuse, either under (which is explicitly scoped to per-FQDN, not domain namespace) or in the method.
> To make sure I understand the interpretation you're advancing:
> - Authorization Domain Name permits validation of any names constructed from the FQDN, removing labels until encountering a Base Domain Name.
> - That is, "www.example.com <http://www.example.com/>" is an FQDN, but it can be validated as "example.com <http://example.com/>" as the Authorization Domain Name, because that's constructed by removing a label 'www'
>   - Since 'example.com <http://example.com/>' is a Base Domain Name, you cannot validate 'www.example.com <http://www.example.com/>' using 'com'
> - If you issue a cert for 'www.example.com <http://www.example.com/>', but authorized it using an ADN of 'example.com <http://example.com/>', then pursuant to, the completed confirmation is for the ADN, not the FQDN, and thus can be reused for other FQDNs that share an ADN of 'example.com <http://example.com/>'
> Is that (roughly) correct?

I’m roughly suggesting that the documentation created in the validation of the ADN can be reused to validate various FQDNs.

> And I suppose the interpretation that I'm taking is that doesn't enumerate ADN, but does enumerate FQDN, and the confirmation applies to the FQDN, not the ADN, even if the FQDN was confirmed using an ADN. Because of this, "completed confirmations" refers to the FQDN - so you can reissue certificates for the same names, but you cannot add new names, even if an ADN is used.
> On first reading, I was inclined to support your interpretation (if we made it explicitly worded), but one problem with that interpretation is the intersection with CAA. If we allow the ADN authorization to be reused, then it allows bypassing the CAA checks for the FQDN, does it not? Or would you agree that applies regardless of the reuse of information - that every FQDN must have CAA checked, regardless if authority was validated using a (reused) ADN validation?

Where do you see says you can skip it?  I’m trying to take your view that one runs the validation workflow (flowchart) each time you issue, but the inputs may have been collected on a previous validation run.

> I would push this a step further and require Enterprise RAs to only approve issuance when the CA has performed domain validation and subject identity validation for all attributes to be in the subject listed in  The Enterprise RA’s primary job then is to confirm the authority of the Applicant Representative under BR Section 3.2.5.
> That seems a reasonable way of delegating. 

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