[cabfpub] =?gb2312?B?tPC4tDogW2NhYmZwdWJdIEJhbGxvdCAxODkgqEMgQW1lbmQgQlIgNg==?= =?gb2312?B?LjEuNyB0byBjbGFyaWZ5IHNpZ25pbmcgYnkgcm9vdCBrZXlzIGlzIA==?= =?gb2312?B?aW4gVk9USU5HIHBlcmlvZCAoZW5kcyBBUFJJTCAxMyk=?=

[xiongyuanyuan]

SHECA votes YES on ballot 189.

 

Ruby Xiong

Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority co., ltd. 

18F, No.1717, North Sichuan Road, Shanghai, China

Tel£º+86-21-36393197

Email£º <mailto:xiongyuanyuan at sheca.com> xiongyuanyuan at sheca.com 

		
		
			

 

 

·¢¼þÈË: Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] ´ú±í Kirk Hall via
Public
·¢ËÍʱ¼ä: Monday, April 10, 2017 7:30 AM
ÊÕ¼þÈË: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
³­ËÍ: Kirk Hall
Ö÷Ìâ: [cabfpub] Ballot 189 ¨C Amend BR 6.1.7 to clarify signing by root keys
is in VOTING period (ends APRIL 13)

 

Reminder: Ballot 189 ¨C Amend BR 6.1.7 to clarify signing by root keys - is
in the voting period (ends APRIL 13).

 

 

Ballot 189 - Amend Section 6.1.7 of Baseline Requirements 

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA
and endorsed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and Jeremy Rowley of Digicert 

Background: 

Section 6.1.7 of the Baseline Requirements states that the Root CA Private
Keys MUST NOT be used to sign end-entity certificates, with some exceptions.
It is unclear if this exception list includes end-entity certificates with
EKU id-kp-timeStamping. This ballot attempts to clarify two things: 

1.	that it affects Root Keys in a hierarchy that issues SSL
Certificates and 
2.	that it does not include time stamping certificates in the exception
list. 

It also clears the exception language for 1024-bit RSA Subscriber
Certificates and testing products with Certificates issued by a Root. 

-- MOTION BEGINS -- 

Current section 6.1.7 

Root CA Private Keys MUST NOT be used to sign Certificates except in the
following cases: 

1.	Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root Certificate itself; 
2.	Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates; 
3.	Certificates for infrastructure purposes (e.g. administrative role
certificates, internal CA operational device certificates, and OCSP Response
verification Certificates); 
4.	Certificates issued solely for the purpose of testing products with
Certificates issued by a Root CA; and 
5.	Subscriber Certificates, provided that: 

a.	The Root CA uses a 1024-bit RSA signing key that was created prior
to the Effective Date; 
b.	The Applicant¡¯s application was deployed prior to the Effective
Date; 
c.	The Applicant¡¯s application is in active use by the Applicant or
the CA uses a documented process to establish that the Certificate¡¯s use is
required by a substantial number of Relying Parties; 
d.	The CA follows a documented process to determine that the
Applicant¡¯s application poses no known security risks to Relying Parties; 
e.	The CA documents that the Applicant¡¯s application cannot be patched
or replaced without substantial economic outlay. 
f.	The CA signs the Subscriber Certificate on or before June 30, 2016;
and 
g.	The notBefore field in the Subscriber Certificate has a date on or
before June 30, 2016 

Proposed section 6.1.7 

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates MUST NOT be used to sign
Certificates except in the following cases: 

1.	Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself; 
2.	Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates; 
3.	Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role
certificates, internal CA operational device certificates) 
4.	Certificates for OCSP Response verification; 

These changes become Effective 30 days after the ballot passes. 

-- MOTION ENDS -- 

The procedure for this ballot is as follows (exact start and end times may
be adjusted to comply with applicable Bylaws and IPR Agreement): 


BALLOT 189 Status: Amend BR 6.1.7 

Start time (22:00 UTC) 

End time (22:00 UTC) 


Discussion (7 days) 

30 March 2017 

6 April 2017 


Vote for approval (7 days) 

6 April 2017 

13 April 2017 


If vote approves ballot: Review Period (Chair to send Review Notice) (30
days)
If Exclusion Notice(s) filed, ballot approval is rescinded and PAG to be
created.
If no Exclusion Notices filed, ballot becomes effective at end of Review
Period.
Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public
Mail List.

Upon filing of Review Notice by Chair

30 days after filing of Review Notice by Chair

>From Bylaw 2.3: If the Draft Guideline Ballot is proposing a Final
Maintenance Guideline, such ballot will include a redline or comparison
showing the set of changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to
become a Final Maintenance Guideline, and need not include a copy of the
full set of guidelines. Such redline or comparison shall be made against the
Final Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed,
and need not take into consideration other ballots that may be proposed
subsequently, except as provided in Bylaw Section 2.3(j). 

Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public
list. A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the
response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote
to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear
responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any
representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will
be counted. Voting members are listed here: https://cabforum.org/members/ 

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast
by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by
members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is shown on
CA/Browser Forum wiki. Under Bylaw 2.2(g), at least the required quorum
number must participate in the ballot for the ballot to be valid, either by
voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining. 

 

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