[cabfpub] Ballot 179 - Amend Section 6.1.7 of Baseline Requirements

[Dimitris Zacharopoulos]

Following the discussion around timestamping certificates and Root key 
usage, I prepared the following ballot. Looking for two endorsers.

Thank you,
Dimitris.

*Background*:

Section 6.1.7 of the Baseline Requirements states that the Root CA 
Private Keys MUST NOT be used to sign end-entity certificates, with some 
exceptions. It is unclear if this exception list includes end-entity 
certificates with EKU id-kp-timeStamping. This ballot attempts to 
clarify two things:

 1. that it affects Root Keys in a hierarchy that issues SSL
    Certificates and
 2. that it does not include time stamping certificates in the exception
    list.

It also clears the exception language for 1024-bit RSA Subscriber 
Certificates and testing products with Certificates issued by a Root.

*-- MOTION BEGINS --*

/Current section 6.1.7/

Root CA Private Keys MUST NOT be used to sign Certificates except in the 
following cases:

 1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
 2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
 3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (e.g. administrative role
    certificates, internal CA operational device certificates, and OCSP
    Response verification Certificates);
 4. Certificates issued solely for the purpose of testing products with
    Certificates issued by a Root CA; and
 5. Subscriber Certificates, provided that:
     1. The Root CA uses a 1024-bit RSA signing key that was created
        prior to the Effective Date;
     2. The Applicant’s application was deployed prior to the Effective
        Date;
     3. The Applicant’s application is in active use by the Applicant or
        the CA uses a documented process to establish that the
        Certificate’s use is required by a substantial number of Relying
        Parties;
     4. The CA follows a documented process to determine that the
        Applicant’s application poses no known security risks to Relying
        Parties;
     5. The CA documents that the Applicant’s application cannot be
        patched or replaced without substantial economic outlay.
     6. The CA signs the Subscriber Certificate on or before June 30,
        2016; and
     7. The notBefore field in the Subscriber Certificate has a date on
        or before June 30, 2016

/Proposed section 6.1.7/

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates that participate in a 
hierarchy that issues Certificates with an extKeyUsage extension that 
includes the value id-kp-serverAuth [RFC5280] MUST NOT be used to sign 
Certificates except in the following cases:

 1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root Certificate itself;
 2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
 3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role
    certificates, internal CA operational device certificates)
 4. Certificates for OCSP Response verification;

/*Note:*/ After the Effective Date Feb 1st 2017, Certificates for Time 
Stamping Authorities SHALL NOT be directly issued from these Root 
Certificates.

*-- MOTION ENDS -- *

The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2200 UTC on Tuesday 
October XX 2016, and will close at 2200 UTC on Tuesday October XX 2016. 
Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting 
period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2200 UTC on 
Tuesday October XX 2016. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply 
to this thread.

A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the 
response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A 
vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear 
responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any 
representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period 
will be counted. Voting members are listed here: 
https://cabforum.org/members/

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes 
cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes 
cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is 
currently nine (9) members– at least nine members must participate in 
the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.
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