[cabfpub] CNAME-based validation

Thu Sep 8 14:59:26 MST 2016

I suppose that would work for us but wouldn't there be the same concern with _pki and wildcard domains. 

Why not permit both validation methods? 

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzb at amzn.com] 
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
Cc: Kane York <kanepyork at gmail.com>; public at cabforum.org; Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi at chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation

Yes, that is the suggestion.

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 9:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> 
> Are you suggesting _pki.shop.example.com CNAME <rnd>.cnameauth.digicert.com would be used to validate shop.example.com? 
>  
> From: Kane York [mailto:kanepyork at gmail.com]
> Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 8:32 AM
> To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>; Peter Bowen 
> <pzb at amzn.com>
> Cc: public at cabforum.org; Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi at chromium.org>
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
>  
> I think it would be more secure, but without compromising functionality, to point
>     _pki.shop.example.com CNAME <Random Value>.cnameauth.digicert.com
> 
> ... , just like how a TXT record validation sets the text to a Random Value.
> 
> (Using the BR's definition of Random Value here.)
> 
>  
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016, 10:20 PM Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> Not really. No one wants to point their site to a different domain. I'm hoping we can do something where there's a set process for showing control over the domain (such as by creating sub-domains) to validate certificate issuance.
> 
> Pointing <rnd>.shop.example.com to digicert.com is a whole lot better for customers than pointing shop.example.com.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzb at amzn.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 7, 2016 12:51 PM
> To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> Cc: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> 
> Jeremy,
> 
> It seems that there are two different discussions here that are getting conflated.
> 
> The first is allowing someone to confirm control of a standard domain by using a CNAME record instead of a TXT record.  The process would be very similar: prepend a defined string to the domain and set the canonical name to something containing a random value.
> 
> The second is authentication with one level of indirection.  I think that is already mostly covered as the Authorization Domain Name can be the result of dereferencing a CNAME pointer.  So if you have:
> 
> shop.example.com IN CNAME webstorehosting.webpki.com.
> 
> You can run the validation for webstorehosting.webpki.com using constructed email to domain contact, agreed-upon change to a website, DNS change, test certificate or TLS using random number.  If this passes, then shop.example.com is validated.
> 
> Does that not solve your issue?
> 
> Thansk,
> Peter
> 
> 
> > On Sep 6, 2016, at 5:07 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Ryan,
> >
> > Pardon my DNS ignorance, but how does the server know which CNAME record to use in this case? If shop.domain.comCNAMEs to digicert.com and *.domain.com CNAMEs to google.com, then how do you know which will resolve? There isn’t a weight/ordering preference for CNAME like there is TXT records.
> >
> > As for how to resolve this, what if the CA generated two random numbers, holding one of the numbers in reserve. Immediately after verifying that <rnd1>.domain.com CNAME points to a validated domain, the CA can then check <rnd2>.domain.com to see if it resolves. If it resolves successfully, a wildcard DNS is in place and the domain is not validated. If the domain does not resolve, a wildcard DNS is not present and the domain is considered validated. Does this resolve your concern?
> >
> > Jeremy
> >
> > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 7:40 PM
> > To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> > Cc: Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com>; public at cabforum.org
> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> >
> > Hi Jeremy,
> >
> > I'm afraid you may have misread my example.
> >
> > shop.example.com is a CNAME to paymentprovider.example.org (curse 
> > our lack of distinct TLDs). It does not resolve to example.net
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 6:29 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> > Here’s the steps:
> > 1)      CA verifies example.net using any one of the methods permitted
> >
> > 2)      CA receives request for shop.example.com
> >
> > 3)     CA retrieves CNAME for shop.example.com (permitted under Authorization Domain Name definition: “The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation”)
> >
> > 4)     CNAME causes resolution to example.net.
> >
> > 5)     Example.net is verified under step 1, permitting issuance of the certificate
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 5:12 PM
> > To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> > Cc: Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com>; public at cabforum.org
> >
> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> >
> > Right, and I'm not sure that (2) sufficiently establishes that example.com is authorizing the request, given wildcards.
> >
> > I think this would be a similar concern with, say, following HTTP open redirects and saying a "200 OK" code authorizes the request - wellllll, not really.
> >
> > I'm curious if you could expand more why you believe other methods would permit a cert to be issued in the presence of this Wildcard DNS.
> >
> > As a concrete example:
> > example.com A [my host]
> > *.example.com CNAME example.net
> > shop.example.com CNAME paymentprovider.example.org
> >
> > Under this scenario, could you explain what ways that the [<rnd>.example.com] would be able to issue a cert for either example.com or shop.example.com ? Perhaps I'm just missing the implications of the existing validation methods.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:33 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> > Yes. Those are the two steps I am proposing.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzb at amzn.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 4:31 PM
> > To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> > Cc: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> >
> > I think you are talking about two different things.
> >
> > Ryan is concerned that a customer has an existing record that is “*.example.com CNAME vanityblogs.example.net”.  If you say “if you can make a record show up at _309654fddb59444d8efd6d2cc98881d5.example.com you are validated” that is bad.  Instead, you are proposing a two prong validation test:
> >
> > 1) Confirm control of vanityblogs.example.net.
> > 2) Make _309654fddb59444d8efd6d2cc98881d5.example.com point to vanityblogs.example.net.
> >
> > You are proposing that passing these both would confirm control of example.com, right?  And this would allow getting a certificate for shop.example.com, correct?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Peter
> >
> > > On Sep 2, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > We are talking about the same thing (wildcard DNS records).
> > >
> > > Examples:
> > >
> > > sleevi.example.com CNAME vdomain.com *.example.com CNAME 
> > > vdomain.com <rnd>.example.com CNAME vdomain.com
> > >
> > > The BRs permit verification of each of these by establishing control over vdomain.com (under the definition of authorization domain name).
> > >
> > > If *.example.com can be verified this way, what is different between verifying *.example.com and <rnd>.example.com to verify all sub domains of example.com? All the RND does is make it so the website doesn’t have to point to vdomain.com.
> > >
> > > Jeremy
> > >
> > > From: public-bounces at cabforum.org
> > > [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> > > On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi
> > > Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 4:05 PM
> > > To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> > > Cc: public at cabforum.org
> > > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> > >
> > > Jeremy,
> > >
> > > Perhaps it wasn't clear, I wasn't speaking of wildcard certificates, but wildcard DNS rules, in which all requests for a given subdomain return a preconfigured record type. While for TXT and CAA records this is quite uncommon, it's exceedingly common to have CNAME records.
> > >
> > > That is, both <rnd>.example.com and sleevi.example.com may both CNAME to example.com, by virtue of of the host putting a rule of "*.example.com 3600 CNAME example.com"
> > >
> > > I am attempting to assert that placing the <rnd> in the subdomain is insufficient proof of authorization, and is meaningfully and tangibly different than the proof of control demonstrated in 3.2.2.4.7.
> > >
> > > As I read your wording, it suggests the following:
> > > CA looks up <rnd>.example.com
> > > <rnd>.example.com points to example.com CA sees it previously 
> > > issued a certificate for example.com using one of the other 
> > > methods CA issues certificate for <rnd>.example.com
> > >
> > > That concerns me.
> > >
> > > Peter's rewording suggests the inverse:
> > > CA looks up _certvalidation.example.com 
> > > _certvalidation.example.com points (CNAMEs) to 
> > > <rnd>.validation.[nameofca].com CA issues certificate for 
> > > example.com
> > >
> > > This is much less concerning.
> > >
> > > Could you help clarify which you intend, and for what names/purposes?
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> > > Wildcard domains are already allowed. We can verify Wildcard DNS because a CNAME for *.domain.com is pointing to a record previously verified. This verification method is permitted under the definition of Authorization Domain Name (where the FQDN returned by a CNAME lookup can be used to verify the requested FQDN). Although <rnd>.domain.com isn’t necessarily distinguishable from *.domain.com, the validation ends up being the same because either its considered an Authorized Domain Name (under the definition) or it was validated as a random value in this new method.
> > >
> > > For example:
> > >
> > > *.domain.com -> dcv.example.com (validated under the Authorized 
> > > Domain Name section) <rnd>.domain.com ->validation.example.com 
> > > (validated under this new section)
> > >
> > > Because each is validated properly, tracking which exact section was used in the validation isn’t necessary.
> > >
> > > Jeremy
> > >
> > > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 3:28 PM
> > > To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> > > Cc: public at cabforum.org
> > > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] CNAME-based validation
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Public mailing list
> > > Public at cabforum.org
> > > https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
> >
> 
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