[cabfpub] Proposal of a SHA-1 exception procedure

Eric Mill eric at konklone.com
Sat Jun 18 15:24:42 UTC 2016

On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 6:35 PM, Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>
> >>I think this is the crux of the issue which will require dissecting this
> sentence. First, “That includes the necessary disclosures and information
> so that we can gather information necessary to avoid such situations in the
> future”: This is great and  I don’t think anyone has an issue with
> gathering this information so the CA/B Forum and root store operators can
> avoid future issues. The second part, “while having the necessary
> transparency for us effectively accepting, on behalf of the Internet trust
> ecosystem, the security risks” focuses on the security risks which I
> thought were ameliorated by the cryptanalysis. Is this not true?

The cryptanalysis ameliorates risks associated with the basic technical
weaknesses that prompted the SHA-1 deprecation. It doesn't speak to any
risks associated with how long it has taken the ecosystem to migrate away
from SHA-1.

Those risks are just as real, especially since continued issuance of SHA-1
signatures by any one actor creates risk for all actors. And they'll be
just as real when it's time to deprecate SHA-2, or to deal with practical
quantum computing. To the extent the SHA-1 deprecation is a dry run for
future migrations, the cryptanalysis is less important than the business
analysis -- an analysis the entire community needs access to.

-- Eric
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