[cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key due to incorrect certificate info
Dimitris Zacharopoulos
jimmy at it.auth.gr
Wed Jul 27 14:00:34 UTC 2016
HARICA votes "yes" for ballot 173.
Dimitris.
> On 26 Ιουλ 2016, at 20:10, Ben Wilson <ben.wilson at digicert.com> wrote:
>
> DigiCert votes "yes".
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Dean Coclin
> Sent: Friday, July 22, 2016 6:28 PM
> To: Josh Aas <josh at letsencrypt.org>; CABFPub <public at cabforum.org>
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key due to incorrect certificate info
>
> Thanks Josh. So for clarification for others voting, the revised ballot includes the 45 day effective date.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Josh Aas
> Sent: Friday, July 22, 2016 7:49 PM
> To: CABFPub <public at cabforum.org>
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key due to incorrect certificate info
>
> To clarify, my YES vote includes the 45-day waiting period before the changes take effect.
>
> All votes from this point on should be for the ballot as originally proposed but with a 45 day waiting period before the changes take effect. Thanks.
>
>> On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 4:30 PM, Josh Aas <josh at letsencrypt.org> wrote:
>> Let's Encrypt votes YES
>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Josh Aas <josh at letsencrypt.org> wrote:
>>> Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key due
>>> to incorrect certificate info
>>>
>>> The following motion has been proposed by Josh Aas of ISRG / Let's
>>> Encrypt. Ben Wilson of Digicert and Chris Bailey of Entrust endorse.
>>>
>>> Background:
>>>
>>> BR Section 9.6.3 point 5 says:
>>>
>>> "Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to promptly
>>> cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key, and
>>> promptly request the CA to revoke the Certificate, in the event that:
>>> (a) any information in the Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or
>>> inaccurate, or (b) there is any actual or suspected misuse or
>>> compromise of the Subscriber’s Private Key associated with the Public
>>> Key included in the Certificate;"
>>>
>>> There is a problem here, which is that this requires a subscriber to
>>> stop using a private key just because information in a certificate is
>>> inaccurate or incorrect. People should stop using a cert with
>>> inaccurate or incorrect information, but they shouldn't be required
>>> to stop using a key pair unless there is known or suspected compromise.
>>>
>>> This is particularly problematic for HPKP.
>>>
>>> --Motion Begins--
>>>
>>> Effective upon the date of passage, the following modifications are
>>> made to the Baseline Requirements:
>>>
>>> Change the following text in Section 9.6.3:
>>> =======================
>>> Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to promptly
>>> cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key, and
>>> promptly request the CA to revoke the Certificate, in the event that:
>>> (a) any information in the Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or
>>> inaccurate, or (b) there is any actual or suspected misuse or
>>> compromise of the Subscriber’s Private Key associated with the Public
>>> Key included in the Certificate; =======================
>>>
>>> To:
>>> =======================
>>> Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to: (a) promptly
>>> request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it and its
>>> associated Private Key, if there is any actual or suspected misuse or
>>> compromise of the Subscriber’s Private Key associated with the Public
>>> Key included in the Certificate; and (b) promptly request revocation
>>> of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the
>>> Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate.
>>> =======================
>>>
>>> --Motion Ends--
>>>
>>> The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2200 UTC on 14
>>> July 2016, and will close at 2200 UTC on 21 July 2016. Unless the
>>> motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will
>>> start immediately thereafter and will close at 2200 UTC on 28 July
>>> 2016. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
>>>
>>> A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the
>>> response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response.
>>> A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response.
>>> Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from
>>> any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting
>>> period will be counted. Voting members are listed here:
>>> https://cabforum.org/members/
>>>
>>> In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the
>>> votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the
>>> votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor.
>>> Quorum is currently ten (10) members– at least ten members must
>>> participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.
>>>
>>> --
>>> Josh Aas
>>> Executive Director
>>> Internet Security Research Group
>>> Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated, and Open CA
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Josh Aas
>> Executive Director
>> Internet Security Research Group
>> Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated, and Open CA
>
>
>
> --
> Josh Aas
> Executive Director
> Internet Security Research Group
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