[cabfpub] Increasing concurrent compliance compatibility

[陳立群]

Peter, 

 

Microsoft Trusted Root Certificate: Program Requirements 4. Program Technical Requirements has below requirement: 

 

CAs must use the following OIDs in the end-entity certificate: DV 2.23.140.1.2.1; OV 2.23.140.1.2.2; EV 2.23.140.1.1.; IV 2.23.140.1.2.3; EV Code Signing 2.23.140.1.3; Non-EV Code Signing 2.23.140.1.4.

 

       Li-Chun CHEN

 

 

From: 陳立群 [mailto:realsky at cht.com.tw] 
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2016 9:58 PM
To: 'Ryan Sleevi'; 'Peter Bowen'
Cc: 'CABFPub'
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Increasing concurrent compliance compatibility

 

  We agree with Ryan’s thought that Peter’s new proposal may create a rather large loophole for potential abuse/mistakes.

 

     The proposal will also let Dean’s leading to encourage to use CABF EV/OV/IV/DV OID instead of CA’s CP OID of EV/OV/IV/DV OID delaying progress.

 

We suggest to choose Ben’s or Wen-Cheng’s proposed versions to amend section 7.1.4.2.2 d & e to solve small countries /jurisdictions do not set up any state or province (or they follow their law, or X.520, or organizationName is already unique at the country level. ).  Their versions will not affect CAs that issues OV/IV SSL certificates in countries/jurisdictions that have set up state/province or CAs that  identify Origination / Individual by physical address.

 

Besides, I  just curious about US Federal PKI’s entities certificates Distinguished Name, Peter , could you explain it?  Thank you.

 

Li-Chun CHEN

 

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2016 5:53 AM
To: Peter Bowen
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Increasing concurrent compliance compatibility

 

 

 

On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com> wrote:

I propose that we amend the BRs to change the “trigger” for OV/IV to be the explicit inclusion of the appropriate CA/B Forum policy identifier rather than an implicit trigger based on attributes found in the Subject distinguished name.

This would allow CAs who are issuing certificates that need to comply with both the BRs and other certificate policies the ability to set the subject distinguished name as needed.  For example, some CAs may need to follow X.521 for the DN while others may need to use the country, state/province, and locality attributes to indicate legal jurisdiction rather than physical address and others may need to ensure that each legal or natural person has a distinct DN.

Concretely, if a certificate has one or both of:
{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) organization‐validated(2)} (2.23.140.1.2.2)
{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) individual‐validated(3)} (2.23.140.1.2.3)
in its certificate policies extension, then the current BR requirements apply to the subject DN.

If neither are in the certificate policies extension, then the only Subject DN restriction would be on the commonName (CN) attribute.  All other attributes would be set according to the non-CABF policy for the certificate

I believe this would help resolve the issues Li-Chen has raised and I think it would help existing PKIs, such as the US Federal PKI, align their policies with the CABF BRs.

Anyone agree or disagree?

Thanks,
Peter

 

Doesn't this create a rather large loophole for potential abuse/mistakes?

 

For example, I'm not aware of any browser that specifically recognizes the OV OID, but all display the organization information in some way, most commonly as some short-name in some form of UI. As proposed, if a CA didn't assert the OV OID, then it would seem reasonable that a CA might decide that no policies apply, and put "Google, Inc" in the O field.

 

Is that desirable? Is that right?

 

It's unclear whether CAs reasonably understand 7.1.2.4 (b), or whether that clearly prohibits that - or if it even should.

 

Similarly, what happens to 7.1.4.2.2 (i)? Do you see that being exempt?

 

Given Relying Party applications' longstanding and preexisting use of the fields (in particular, those noted in 7.1.4.2.2 a-h), I'm concerned with the introduction of semantics that would, in effect, change the meaning based on the policies asserted. If we were starting over from scratch, I would think it'd be an entirely reasonable suggestion, but given the preponderance of legacy systems in place, it seems slightly troublesome on principle to allow 'caveat CA' to rule here.



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