[cabfpub] SAN private extensions pursuant specific SSL/EV Spanish ruled profile

[Kirk Hall]

Was this what you are referring to?
“I'm struggling to find this in the minutes, but if you'll recall, Gerv and I discussed various interpretations of this. For example, if a US CA were presented with an order to ignore domain validation and, say, issue a certificate for www.google.com<http://www.google.com>, would the CA be argued to be in full compliance with the BRs for doing so? We discussed questions about what it meant for the Forum to be notified - is this a public mailing list, a management list, etc. We discussed the hypothetical concern about government-issued gag notices as well.”
If that’s what you are referring to, that in not in any way a convincing argument – the Spanish government has not ordered CAs to (1) ignore domain validation or (2) issue a certificate for www.google.com<http://www.google.com>.  Those are straw man arguments not relevant to the question that Chema Lopez posed to the Forum.

Refer back to Chema Lopez’s original explanation, pasted in here:
There was a law in Spain that regulates the profile for some specific certificates, i.e.:
1.     Civil Servant or Public Employee (natural person certificate)
2.     Electronic Seal for Automated Administrative Action
3.     Electronic Office Certificate (SSL or EV for Public Administrations)
You can find the profiles attached (unfortunately only in Spanish).
 The problem is that these profiles required private extensions in the SAN, and this conflicts BR and EV Guidelines. At least, crt.sh shows this extensions as an error.
In what way would compliance with this particular law of Spain harm Google or any user?

Assuming there is no harm at all (which appears likely), on what basis would a browser insist that a CA violate the laws of its own country?  Without a compelling, proven security threat from compliance?

If browsers want to pick fights with EU governments, I guess they can, but it’s hard to see how it is justified or useful when the actual Spanish law in question has no security impact.  And the BRs and EVGL *require* CAs to comply with local law, so *not* complying with this Spanish law could put FirmaProfessional at risk of *failing* its next audit.  I don’t think any browser wants to make that happen.

As for disclosure – well, you have your disclosure, so why are we wasting any more time on it?

In addition, there is an apparent conflict between BR Sec. 8 (which is also a *mandatory* requirement of the BRs, and requires CAs to comply with local law), and whatever BR covers the profile issues in question (and does that section really prohibit what FirmaProfessional has done?).  So which of the two mandatory BR requirement should the CA follow, BR Sec. 8 or the profile section?  I would say follow local law unless it creates some proven, measurable security issue for users, like your hypotheticals above would.

Plus, BR 9.16.3 only applies “to any mandatory requirement that is illegal”.  Are there any profile requirements in the BRs that are “illegal” under Spanish law?  So does BR 9.16.3 even apply?

BR 8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
The CA SHALL at all times:
1. Issue Certificates and operate its PKI in accordance with all law applicable to its business and the Certificates it issues in every jurisdiction in which it operates; ***

BR 9.16.3. Severability
If a court or government body with jurisdiction over the activities covered by these Requirements determines that the performance of any mandatory requirement is illegal, then such requirement is considered reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal. This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. The parties involved SHALL notify the CA / Browser Forum of the facts, circumstances, and law(s) involved, so that the CA/Browser Forum may revise these Requirements accordingly.


From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Kirk Hall <Kirk.Hall at entrust.com>
Cc: Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>; Chema Lopez <clopez at firmaprofesional.com>; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] SAN private extensions pursuant specific SSL/EV Spanish ruled profile



On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 5:03 PM, Kirk Hall <Kirk.Hall at entrust.com<mailto:Kirk.Hall at entrust.com>> wrote:
Why do browsers need this kind of information to be disclosed to them?  What difference does it make to a browser?  Seems like the information is not directed at the browsers.

Could you re-read the message you're replying to and let me know what part confused you? I discussed a very real, very practical concern - one that we've discussed in person and on the list before.

Perhaps this is why it's important to keep good minutes, since we seem to keep rehashing things.

In any case, the existing BR and EVGL rules don’t require disclosure, they just require compliance with local law, which is appropriate.

Could you re-read the BRs and explain to me why you don't feel it requires disclosure? In particular, please read the statement beginning with "The parties involved SHALL notify the CA / Browser Forum". It would be useful to understand why you don't believe this represents an obligation for disclosure.


From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com<mailto:sleevi at google.com>]
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2016 3:53 PM
To: Kirk Hall <Kirk.Hall at entrust.com<mailto:Kirk.Hall at entrust.com>>
Cc: Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com<mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>>; Chema Lopez <clopez at firmaprofesional.com<mailto:clopez at firmaprofesional.com>>; public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] SAN private extensions pursuant specific SSL/EV Spanish ruled profile



On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Kirk Hall <Kirk.Hall at entrust.com<mailto:Kirk.Hall at entrust.com>> wrote:

To my mind, the provisions of BR Sec. 8 and 9.16.3, and EVGL Sec. 8.1, could be interpreted as allowing the laws and regulations of Spain concerning certificate profiles and content to override the requirements of the BRs and EVGL.



Accordingly, there may be no need for Spanish CAs to do anything differently as to the earlier certs – they can assert to their auditors that Spanish law and regulation is allowed to control on this issue, and so they are in full compliance because of BR Sec. 8 and 9.16.3, and EVGL Sec. 8.1.  See below.

However, as we discussed in person at the CA/B Forum meeting in Scottsdale, there is an obligation of CAs to disclose these regulations so that the Forum can be so informed.

While Chema has now done this (and Inigo had previously), it can't be argued these are apriori conforming and in full compliance.

I'm struggling to find this in the minutes, but if you'll recall, Gerv and I discussed various interpretations of this. For example, if a US CA were presented with an order to ignore domain validation and, say, issue a certificate for www.google.com<http://www.google.com>, would the CA be argued to be in full compliance with the BRs for doing so? We discussed questions about what it meant for the Forum to be notified - is this a public mailing list, a management list, etc. We discussed the hypothetical concern about government-issued gag notices as well.

Unfortunately, none of this was minuted. However, thankfully Gerv sent a public mail shortly thereafter, which at least helps me make sure I'm not misremembering things (although I could totally be missing where it appears on the minutes in https://cabforum.org/2016/02/17/2016-02-17-minutes-of-f2f-meeting-37/ ) - but you can read the thread at https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007465.html

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