[cabfpub] Application for SHA-1 Issuance

[Dean Coclin]

“we don't believe the remaining questions to be a blocker towards accepting this issuance”


Thank you, but what are the remaining questions? TSYS believes all outstanding questions have been responded to. Are there any remaining?




Dean

 

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com] 
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2016 1:09 PM
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Application for SHA-1 Issuance

 

 

 

On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 4:19 AM, Gervase Markham <gerv at mozilla.org <mailto:gerv at mozilla.org> > wrote:

I am moving house next week, and so cannot guarantee my ability to
participate in this discussion.

Mozilla approves the application from TSYS (that is to say, we will
accept a qualified BR audit from their CA where the qualifications
relate to this event) on the condition that the serial numbers of the
final certificates follow some documented strict construction process,
in broadly the manner PHB outlined, using a modern crypto hash algorithm
in the process of serial number generation, using an earlier form of the
cert as input. I believe this should be a sufficient stopgap to reassure
the public (who cannot see inside the CA's or TSYS's operations) that
collisions are not being attempted. Other CAs may want the process
nailed down; the above is intended to be vague enough to accommodate
whatever they decide.

We do not (although others may) require that TSYS reuse old keys, or
remove the random identifiers from the OU.

Dean indicated on yesterday's call that following this type of process
was possible for Symantec if approval from browsers was provided
quickly. This is an attempt to provide such approval with the necessary
speed.

 

As with Gerv, our primary concern for the immediate issuance is the concern with the OU. Steps taken to remedy that - either the step suggested by Geoff or as proposed by Gerv - reasonably address this, in as much as they provide reasonable public assurance, above and beyond the countercryptanalysis, that there was limited opportunity for malfeasance, both in fact and appearances.

 

While we appreciate TSYS's continued attention to the questions as we look for opportunities, as an industry forum, to improve outreach, education, and understanding about how these transitions have worked in practice, we don't believe the remaining questions to be a blocker towards accepting this issuance. We do hope they'll continue to assist in our understanding and improvement though.

 

Given the difficulty Symantec has had in following the process previously, we're more than willing to assist Symantec in the production of a tbsCertificate that meets the suggested changes by Gerv and Geoff, and incorporating in such feedback as that by Peter Bowen in https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-July/008055.html - most notably, ensuring that the serial number is properly encoded (as a positive integer). This assistance is easier because the production of a tbsCertificate, to the scheme proposed (that is, using a rigid serial construction rather than a random), allows for such tbsCertificates to be produced without any form of CA ceremony, and can be produced on any machine, by any party, and in any security zone.

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