[cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key due to incorrect certificate info

Rich Smith richard.smith at comodo.com
Fri Jul 22 09:26:06 MST 2016


I've said in the past that I believe any non-critical change should have 
a 6 month lead time by default.  I stand by that statement and submit it 
again.  And yes, Ryan, that goes whether the change toughens or relaxes 
the requirements.  CAs are of course free and encouraged to bring 
themselves into compliance sooner if they are able to do so without 
turning their existing dev cycle on it's head, but I don't think 6 
months is unreasonable for a non-critical change either way.

-Rich

On 7/21/2016 11:02 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
> Dean,
>
> In the past, when CAs have had concerns, there's been a suggestion of 
> a timeframe that might be reasonable to make changes.
>
> Is thirty days sufficient? Why or why not?
>
> When the proposed changes relax, rather than toughen, a requirement, 
> do you share the same concerns?
>
>
> On Jul 21, 2016 7:32 PM, "Dean Coclin" <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com 
> <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>> wrote:
>
>     Josh,
>
>     This is not a criticism of this specific ballot; I have no comment
>     on its merit. However, in reviewing several recent ballots, I
>     think it's problematic to have a ballot state that it is effective
>     as of the date of passage.
>
>     If a CA has to make technical or policy changes, it's going to
>     take some time to do so. If the ballot takes effect on the day of
>     passage, then the CA has to make immediate changes, lest they be
>     technically out of compliance as of that day.
>
>     For example, this ballot will require CAs to make CPS changes. How
>     are they supposed to do this in one day? Am I reading this correctly?
>
>     Thanks,
>     Dean
>
>
>
>     -----Original Message-----
>     From: public-bounces at cabforum.org
>     <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>
>     [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org
>     <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>] On Behalf Of Josh Aas
>     Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:18 AM
>     To: CABFPub <public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>>
>     Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease
>     use of private key due to incorrect certificate info
>
>     Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private key
>     due to incorrect certificate info
>
>     The following motion has been proposed by Josh Aas of ISRG / Let's
>     Encrypt. Ben Wilson of Digicert and Chris Bailey of Entrust endorse.
>
>     Background:
>
>     BR Section 9.6.3 point 5 says:
>
>     "Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to promptly
>     cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key, and
>     promptly request the CA to revoke the Certificate, in the event
>     that: (a) any information in the Certificate is, or becomes,
>     incorrect or inaccurate, or (b) there is any actual or suspected
>     misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated
>     with the Public Key included in the Certificate;"
>
>     There is a problem here, which is that this requires a subscriber
>     to stop using a private key just because information in a
>     certificate is inaccurate or incorrect. People should stop using a
>     cert with inaccurate or incorrect information, but they shouldn't
>     be required to stop using a key pair unless there is known or
>     suspected compromise.
>
>     This is particularly problematic for HPKP.
>
>     --Motion Begins--
>
>     Effective upon the date of passage, the following modifications
>     are made to the Baseline Requirements:
>
>     Change the following text in Section 9.6.3:
>     =======================
>     Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to promptly
>     cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key, and
>     promptly request the CA to revoke the Certificate, in the event
>     that: (a) any information in the Certificate is, or becomes,
>     incorrect or inaccurate, or (b) there is any actual or suspected
>     misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated
>     with the Public Key included in the Certificate;
>     =======================
>
>     To:
>     =======================
>     Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to: (a)
>     promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it
>     and its associated Private Key, if there is any actual or
>     suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key
>     associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate; and
>     (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease
>     using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes
>     incorrect or inaccurate.
>     =======================
>
>     --Motion Ends--
>
>     The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2200 UTC on 14
>     July 2016, and will close at 2200 UTC on 21 July 2016. Unless the
>     motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period
>     will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2200 UTC on 28
>     July 2016. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this
>     thread.
>
>     A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the
>     response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the
>     response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the
>     response.
>     Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received
>     from any representative of a voting member before the close of the
>     voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here:
>     https://cabforum.org/members/
>
>     In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the
>     votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of
>     the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in
>     favor. Quorum is currently ten (10) members-- at least ten members
>     must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting
>     against, or abstaining.
>
>     --
>     Josh Aas
>     Executive Director
>     Internet Security Research Group
>     Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated, and Open CA
>     _______________________________________________
>     Public mailing list
>     Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
>     https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Public mailing list
>     Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
>     https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20160722/b5c4b855/attachment.html 


More information about the Public mailing list