[cabfpub] Defining BR scope

[Erwann Abalea]

Bonjour,

Le 5 févr. 2016 à 19:18, Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com<mailto:pzb at amzn.com>> a écrit :


On Feb 4, 2016, at 9:36 AM, Erwann Abalea <Erwann.Abalea at docusign.com<mailto:Erwann.Abalea at docusign.com>> wrote:
Le 4 févr. 2016 à 18:26, Erwann Abalea <Erwann.Abalea at docusign.com<mailto:Erwann.Abalea at docusign.com>> a écrit :
Le 2 févr. 2016 à 20:02, Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com<mailto:pzb at amzn.com>> a écrit :
According to the ssllabs analysis, the chain should fail due to policy constraints, but I’m not sure if anything enforces such constraints.

Correct.

From top to bottom, the chain is:

  *   DST ACES CA X6 (trust anchor)
  *   IdenTrust ACES CA 1
  *   Federal Bridge CA 2013
  *   Federal Common Policy CA
  *   SHA-1 Federal Root CA
  *   DoD Interoperability Root CA 1
  *   DoD Root CA 2
  *   DOD CA-28
  *   aflsa.jag.af.mil

Using RFC5280 wording, valid_policy_tree is equal to NULL at « SHA-1 Federal Root CA », and the chain fails at the « DoD Root CA 2 » certificate, because now explicit_policy is equal to 0 (and valid_policy_tree is NULL).
Strangely, certificate for « DoD Interoperability Root CA 1 » has a PolicyMappings extension, but policy mapping is forbidden since « SHA-1 Federal Root CA ».
Strangely again, the PolicyConstraints extension contained in « DoD Root CA 2 » is not critical. It’s a MUST for RFC5280, and a MAY for X.509 (with a recommendation to set it critical). It’s the extension that requires an explicit policy and makes the chain fail.

OpenSSL is able to reject such a chain (it doesn’t seem to handle the policy mappings), I’ve been told that MS can correctly reject it, I’m pretty sure that the recent Mozilla PKIX lib accepts it while the previous one rejects it. (And I wouldn’t bet a cent on GnuTLS to do such things correctly)

A correction here. Mozilla should be able to reject this chain because of unhandled critical extensions upper in the chain (Federal Bridge CA 2013 and Federal Common Policy CA).

Does ths also apply to the chains discovered here? https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=vpn.carillon.ca

There are 2 valid paths, but due to critical extensions that I think Mozilla doesn’t handle and thus rejects, those chains are possibly not trusted (InhibitAnyPolicy and PolicyConstraints). OpenSSL accepts both with an empty policy set because of unhandled policy mappings (4 sets of mappings in each chain). I have no Windows machine to test with, but I think a recent Windows should correctly accept the 2 chains.

The first one is labelled Path #4 on my SSLLabs page:

  *   DST ACES CA X6
  *   IdenTrust ACES CA 1
  *   Federal Bridge CA 2013
  *   CertiPath Bridge CA - G2
  *   CISRCA1
  *   Carillon PKI Services CA 1
  *   vpn.carillon.ca<http://vpn.carillon.ca>

The CA constrained policyId set is 1.3.6.1.4.1.25054.3.1.11


The second one is labelled Path #7:

  *   VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority
  *   VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2
  *   Federal Bridge CA 2013
  *   CertiPath Bridge CA - G2
  *   CISRCA1
  *   Carillon PKI Services CA 1
  *   vpn.carillon.ca<http://vpn.carillon.ca>

The CA constrained policy set is 1.3.6.1.4.1.25054.3.1.11, 1.3.6.1.4.1.25054.3.1.30

Cordialement,
Erwann Abalea

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20160206/7b609287/attachment-0003.html>