[cabfpub] Ballot 161 - Notification of incorrect issuance

[Ben Laurie]

On 5 February 2016 at 08:02, "Barreira Iglesias, Iñigo" <
i-barreira at izenpe.eus> wrote:

> Doug,
>
> You can log all your SSL certs in the CT logs now, there´s no "technical"
> or "legal" restrictions to do so. If you consider that logging all SSL
> certs issued will improve the transparency, then do it. We are doing it for
> the same reasoning but also consider that this is not the "unique" solution
> and there are other options to improve the whole ecosystem, and this ballot
> could be one for sure. But, what I indicated is to work together and not
> having 2 similar procedures/processes for the same goal, which is what is
> stated in eIDAS regulation article 19 and that affects to lots of CAs. So,
> what I´m against is to have a procedure for the CABF and another one (quite
> similar or not) according to eIDAS when the goal is the same.
>

Whilst I am very much in favour of CAs logging all certs to CT, I have to
point out that until a browser requires CT, some types of misissuance (i.e.
malicious ones) will presumably not be detectable because such certs will
not be logged.


>
> Regards
>
>
> Iñigo Barreira
> Responsable del Área técnica
> i-barreira at izenpe.eus
> 945067705
>
>
>
> ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta
> egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea
> gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi
> erantzuna. KONTUZ!
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>
> -----Mensaje original-----
> De: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] En
> nombre de Doug Beattie
> Enviado el: jueves, 04 de febrero de 2016 18:34
> Para: Ryan Sleevi; Rick Andrews
> CC: public at cabforum.org
> Asunto: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 161 - Notification of incorrect issuance
>
>
> >> On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 5:07 PM, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews at symantec.com>
> wrote:
> >> In summary, Symantec can’t support this ballot. Symantec instead
> >> recommends adoption of a new ballot that would require all publicly
> >> trusted CAs to log all their issued certificates in accordance with
> >> the Google EV/CT Plan. This requirement should provide CAs a
> >> reasonable amount of time to complete implementation, and to address
> privacy concerns, Symantec further recommends that all certificates be
> logged in 6962-bis-compliant CT log servers.
>
> > Given that no 6962-bis-compliant CT log servers exist, and 6962-bis
> > continues to be worked on as the lessons learned from CT are applied,
> > what timeframe do you see as reasonable? While it's understandable
> > that Symantec is expected to comply with this policy in four months,
> > regardless of the status of 6962-bis, it would be helpful to know what
> you believe is reasonable.
>
> GlobalSign endorses the plan presented by Rick and we would be ready to
> support a mandatory CT effective date of December 1, 2016 for compliance
> with the Google EV/CT Plan for all SSL certificates, provided 6962-bis is
> approved at least 4 months prior to this date and there are a sufficient
> number of CT logs to use with this updated RFC.  We would support earlier,
> interim dates for mandatory posting all DV certificates to CT logs post
> issuance (without included SCTs).  While this isn’t necessarily compliant
> with the Google EV/CT plan, it would improve transparency sooner and define
> a phased plan.
>
> We would also support the use of CAA to flag orders for manual review to
> further strengthen issuance processes with pre-issuance checks to
> supplement CT logging by December 1, 2016.
>
> Doug
>
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