[cabfpub] Ballot 161 - Notification of incorrect issuance

[Stephen Davidson]

While QuoVadis supports increased transparency on BR violations, we also have some concerns relating to this ballot.  As illustrated by the ENISA proposal shared by Inigo, doing this properly requires quite a bit of definition and structure.

We'd like to avoid circumstances like the wiggly usage of "certificate misuse" in the BR, which leads to much debate over when a certificate could/should/must be revoked.

We suspect that you really care about serious violations of the BR - such as SHA1 issued after 1/1/2016 - rather than the fact that an RA goofed on a name spelling and reissued the cert.

We'd support requiring CT for all TLS/SSL to encourage more machine testing of CA activity, and suggesting that auditors pay more attention to CA-initiated revocations.

Regards, Stephen
QuoVadis


-----Original Message-----
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Sigbjørn Vik
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 4:32 AM
To: public at cabforum.org
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 161 - Notification of incorrect issuance

Ballot 161 - Notification of incorrect issuance

Based on extensive discussions in the forum, Sigbjørn Vik from Opera proposes the following ballot, endorsed by Ryan Sleevi from Google and Gervase Markham from Mozilla.

-- MOTION BEGINS --

The following text is added as a sub-section to section 2.2 of the Baseline Requirements:

2.2.1 Notification of incorrect issuance

In the event that a CA issues a certificate in violation of these requirements, the CA SHALL publicly disclose a report within one week of becoming aware of the violation. A link to the report SHALL simultaneously be sent to incidents at cabforum.org.

Effective 01-Jul-16, the CA SHALL in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement announce where such reports will be found. The location SHALL be as accessible as the CP/CPS.

The report SHALL publicize details about what the error was, what caused the error, time of issuance and discovery, and public certificates for all issuer certificates in the trust chain.

The report SHALL publicize the full public certificate, with the following exception: For certificates issued prior to 01-Mar-16 the report MAY truncate Subject Distinguished Name fields and subjectAltName extension values to the registerable domain name.

The report SHALL be made available to the CAs Qualified Auditor for the next Audit Report.

-- MOTION ENDS --

The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2300 UTC on 29 January 2016, and will close at 2300 UTC on 5 February 2016. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2300 UTC on 12 February 2016. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.

A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here:
https://cabforum.org/members/

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is currently nine (9) members– at least nine members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.

--
Sigbjørn Vik
Opera Software
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