[cabfpub] Proposed new ballot on IP Addresses in SANs

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Sat Apr 16 16:37:57 UTC 2016

On Sat, Apr 16, 2016 at 9:31 AM, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews at symantec.com>

> I disagree with the tone that CAs are entirely to blame here.

Why? I provided you evidence on how you could have issued such certificates
without violating the BRs.

The fact that you:
1) Seemingly did not attempt to discover this yourself
2) If you did attempt, were unable to, and did not seek for outside input
3) When you did receive outside input, ignored it
4) Have continued to argue that it's necessary, without providing any
response in over 8 months show that it isn't

Shows that the CAs doing this ARE entirely to blame.

> The BRs are baseline requirements, and browser vendors often say that they
> have the right to impose additional requirements above and beyond the BRs.
> When that happens, though, it sometimes puts CAs in a bind.

And by a bind, it means you'd like to do something, but can't, besides
browsers say you shouldn't. That isn't a bind - that's how security works.
You can't be simultaneously trusted to be the bastion of online security
while also engaging in insecure practices. That isn't how trust works.

> This is a case in which the BRs say we can't do something, but one browser
> vendor says we can.

I'd love to hear that from Jody, given the evidence.

> Ideally, Microsoft would have recognized this back before the BRs were
> adopted, and addressed it in their platform or lobbied to rewrite the
> requirement.

"And addressed it in their platform" - but they did, as you yourself have
said. Windows 10 addressed this.

> But that didn't happen. We're trying to rectify the situation now.

You're not trying to rectify it. If you were, you would have explored 8
months ago what I proposed, and reported back to the Forum why it wasn't

And let's be clear here: there's a big difference between "not viable"
(e.g. it doesn't work) and "not desirable" (e.g. our customers or we have
to do more work). Given the role that CAs play in the online trust
ecosystem, the goal is not to enable every business desire a CA has, nor to
encourage or bless every practice that violates standards. It's to make a
balanced tradeoff between risk, reward, and standards. I have seen no
evidence of good-faith effort on your part in the past 8 months to strike
that balance, because if there had been, the line of reasoning for this
change wouldn't be what you're presently arguing.
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