[cabfpub] SHA1 options for payment processors

[Ryan Sleevi]

On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 11:34 AM, Peter Bowen <pzb at amzn.com> wrote:

> Doug,
>
> Would you be able to use the same subject public key and same subject
> distinguished name as their previous certificate?
>
> Would you be able to use the same certificate profile as your previously
> issued SHA-1 certificates?
>
> If both are true, then I think that the hash collision risk is heavily
> mitigated.
>

Agreed. Or, perhaps stated differently, if whatever changes is consistent
for all such certificates (and, even more strongly, consistent with
non-SHA1 certificates excluding the signature algorithm), the risk of a CA
colluding seems mitigated.
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