[cabfpub] EV Wildcards
steve.roylance at globalsign.com
Sat Mar 21 09:08:35 UTC 2015
As we all know, many things change over the years, including attitudes, best practice and rules so it's always going to be difficult to transport ourselves back to 2013 with an accurate reflection of what we all thought then, but I checked with the support teams and they were able to confirm the PKI facts. The domain odemerkezi.com<http://odemerkezi.com/> was removed from the certificate in July 2013, with the Netcraft article being written in October.
Globalsign and CloudFlare's abuse teams worked at the time of the removal of this domain after reports of abuse.
So coming back to your question, how did we hear of the abuse? Well, as the CA we get to hear from relying parties and sometimes third parties, but as the subject identified in the certificate so do CloudFlare. It is because they are the owners of the key pair used to provide SSL/TLS services on that domain. (They never were the owner of the domain and neither were they the owner of the other example you mention chounyuu.com<http://chounyuu.com>).
My point was this would not have been as easy if there were no subject information details included as relying parties would be unable to identify any 'owner' to talk to about issues. This is the reason why we spend time adding this information to certificates, your company included. Sometimes there are the few who abuse the system, but in general, better protection of communications and protection of private information for the many out ways these incidents, which is why we had to cast our mind back to 2013 in the first place.
Thanks and have great weekend everyone.
Sent from my iPhone
On 20 Mar 2015, at 22:08, Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com<mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>> wrote:
“Globalsign does follow what we believe to be best practice by not allowing mixed domain ownership at a DV level without identifying a true owner to relying parties”
Steve-can you clarify the statement above and how it relates to the cert shown in this post: http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/10/07/phishers-using-cloudflare-for-ssl.html
I may be misinterpreting what is shown so please correct me if that is the case but how does a relying party know who the true owner is of “chounyuu.com<http://chounyuu.com>” (one of the SANs in that cert) for example?
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Steve Roylance
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 5:30 AM
To: public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] EV Wildcards
Just to set the history books straight, on my vote from Nov 2012, which almost got through bar one browser. It was not to prevent the use of wildcards, but to allow the clear identify the owner of the public private key pair to be displayed when multiple FQDNs were added to a Domain Validated certificate where those FQDNs did not have the same base domain. e.g. If you wanted foo.com<http://foo.com> and foo.co.uk<http://foo.co.uk> you needed to have an OV, but foo.bar.com<http://foo.bar.com> and bar.com<http://bar.com> was acceptable as a DV (Which is I guess suggesting a stronger form of Wildcard if you look at it this way, but not quite as we wanted to keep the option of wildcards but prevent what’s still possible today which is effectively wild/mixed domains. We wanted to ensure that the person who owned or controlled the key pair was clearly identified in the case of mixed FQDNs and it was not up to the relying party to try to ‘guess’ which of the domain names included in a certificate might be the one owning/controlling the key pair on behalf of the others (As you cannot assume it’s the domain name which floats up to the deprecated CN position or is first in the SAN list).
It’s very topical now to discussions considering the need to identify the owner of key pairs operated by CA’s on behalf of others and yes, Globalsign does follow what we believe to be best practice by not allowing mixed domain ownership at a DV level without identifying a true owner to relying parties.
How time goes by so quickly!
From: Steve Roylance <steve.roylance at globalsign.com<mailto:steve.roylance at globalsign.com>>
Date: Thursday, 15 November 2012 17:27
To: <public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>>, CABForum Management <management at cabforum.org<mailto:management at cabforum.org>>
Subject: Ballot 92 - Subject Alternative Names
Steve Roylance of GlobalSign made the following motion and Yngve Pettersen of Opera and Jeremy Rowley of Digicert have endorsed it:
... Motion begins...
Effective on the 1st July 2013
... Erratum begins ...
The following sections will be amended in the Baseline Requirements document.
INSERT in Section 4. Definitions the following:
Public IP Address: An IP Address that is not a Reserved IP Address.
REPLACE Section 9.2.1 (Subject Alternative Name Extension) with the following:
9.2.1 Subject Alternative Name Extension
Certificate Field: extensions:subjectAltName
Contents: This extension MUST contain at least one entry that is either a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or Public IP Address. Each subjectAltName entry MUST either be a Domain Name or an IP Address. The CA MUST confirm the Applicant’s control of each dNSName or Public IP Address entry in accordance with Section 11.1.
SubjectAltName entries MAY include domain Names containing wildcard characters.
If the subjectAltName is:
1) a Public IP Address,
2) a Registered Domain Name that has a Domain Name Registrant different than (and not an Affiliate of) the Domain Name Registrant of any other Registered Domain Name in the subjectAltName extension in the Certificate, or
3) a Reserved IP Address or Internal Server Name.
then the CA MUST verify the identity of an entity that controls the private key in accordance with Section 11.2 and include the Subject Identity Information in the issued Certificate in accordance with 9.2.4. The CA MAY include explanatory information in the Subject Organizational Unit field or a non-subject certificate field to clarify the Subject Identity Information included in the Certificate.
Prior to issuing a Certificate containing an Internal Server Name or Reserved IP Address, the CA SHALL notify the Applicant that the use of such Certificates has been deprecated by the CA / Browser Forum and that the practice will be eliminated by October 2016. As of the Effective Date, the CA SHALL NOT issue a certificate with an Expiry Date later than 1 November 2015 if the subjectAlternativeName contains a Reserved IP Address or Internal Server Name. Effective 1 October 2016, CAs SHALL revoke all unexpired Certificates whose subjectAlternativeName extension or Subject commonName field contains a Reserved IP Address or Internal Server Name.
REPLACE Section 9.2.2 (Subject Common Name Field) with the following:
9.2.2 Subject Common Name Field
Certificate Field: subject:commonName (OID 18.104.22.168)
Required/Optional: Deprecated (Discouraged, but not prohibited)
Contents: If present, this field MUST contain a single Public IP address or single Fully-Qualified Domain Name that is one of the values contained in the Certificate’s subjectAltName extension (see Section 9.2.1). Reserved IP Addresses and Internal Server Names are prohibited.
REPLACE Section 10.2.3 (Information Requirements) with the following:
10.2.3 Information Requirements
The certificate request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant to be included in the Certificate, and such additional information as is necessary for the CA to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these Requirements and the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, the CA SHALL obtain the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third-party data source, confirm it with the Applicant.
Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one Subject Alternative Name as defined in Section 9.2.1.
INSERT in Section 11.1 (Authorization by Domain Name Registrant) the following two new sections:
11.1.3 Wildcard Domain Validation
Before issuing a certificate with a wildcard character (*) in a CN or subjectAltName of type DNS-ID, the CA MUST establish and follow a documented procedure† that determines if the wildcard character occurs in the first label position to the left of a “registry-controlled” label or “public suffix” (e.g. “*.com”, “*.co.uk<http://co.uk/>”, see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation). If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled† or public suffix, CAs SHALL refuse issuance unless the applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace. (e.g. CAs SHALL NOT issue “*.co.uk<http://co.uk/>”, but MAY issue “*.example.co.uk<http://example.co.uk/>” to Example Ltd.)
†Determination of what is “registry-controlled” versus the registerable portion of a Country Code Top-Level Domain Namespace is not standardized at the time of writing and is not a property of the DNS itself. Current best practice is to consult a “public suffix list” such as http://publicsuffix.org/. If the process for making this determination is standardized by an RFC, then such a procedure SHOULD be preferred.
... Erratum ends ...
The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 15 November 2012 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 22 November 2012. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 29 November 2012. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
... Motions ends ...
A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response.
A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted.
Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at least six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against or abstaining.
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley
Sent: 19 March 2015 23:26
To: Eddy Nigg; public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] EV Wildcards
Oh yeah. I forgot to mention another proposal was to eliminate wildcard certs for DV. This was raised a while ago by Globalsign and actually went to a ballot. It failed at that time by browser vote.
Resurrection of this proposal was brought up at the face-to-face, but there wasn’t significant discussion there (since the topic was primarily about EV wildcards, not DV)
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Eddy Nigg
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 5:21 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] EV Wildcards
Thanks again Jeremy!
I would like to state the following fact as food for thought on this subject....
Today one can secure a (main) site with an EV certificate and have all content of that site including frames and iframes secured with a regular SSL certificate including wild cards. Browsers have always allowed this with the notable exception of Opera that had at some point a configuration setting for an "All EV" requirement. So if you are on an EV site, this doesn't mean that your connection is really secured with EV - a lot of information can be still leaked to other parties that have not undergone an extended validation and that's usually not what you want (but you don't know usually).
If we consider this fact, I can't see why EV shouldn't be wild card enabled. Or to take it a step further, why should wild cards be possible with some weak domain control validation only? It's widely known that such wild card DVs can be easily abused.
On the other hand, EV has undergone a serious verification and the use of an EV certificates for malicious purpose by the certificate holder is almost zero. Except if it loses the key or something, but that's an entirely different story.
On 03/20/2015 01:00 AM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
During the face-to-face, the forum discussed allowing wildcard characters in EV certificates. The reasons for allowing it were:
1) The lack of wildcard characters is one reason many large enterprises choose OV/DV over EV. As entities move increasingly to cloud-based solutions and as IPv4 addresses become an increasingly limited resource, wildcards are being used in more and more places.
2) EV domain validation is tied to the baseline requirements. The baseline requirements, even with the proposed domain validation revisions, permit validation of the base domain of an FQDN. Validation does not necessarily happen at each subdomain level. Therefore, putting wildcard characters doesn’t increase the risk as CAs aren’t looking specifically at the FQDN (except as part of the high risk check).
The reasons against allowing it were:
1) CAs are looking at the FQDN as part of the high risk check. (The counter to this was that high risk checks are highly language and CA dependent – I might not catch that bankofamerica.mydomain.com<http://bankofamerica.mydomain.com> is a high risk domain if I’m operating outside the US)
2) Eliminating wildcards ensures the requester knows exactly what domains are being covered by the EV cert.
There were probably more arguments for and against, but I think this gets the discussion started.
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