[cabfpub] F2F meeting minutes

Dean Coclin Dean_Coclin at symantec.com
Fri Jul 24 18:13:36 UTC 2015

Public release of F2F meeting minutes


Meeting 35 Minutes 

Day 1 
Wednesday, 24 June 2015 


CNNIC application 

A discussion on the CNNIC application for membership in the CA/B Forum took
place. Although it appears their application is complete, two questions
arose: 1. They don't appear to be licensed in China (BRs requires that a CA
be licensed in the country they do business if a licensing scheme is in
place) and 2. they appear to be a registrar for a TLD as well as a CA. Dean
stated that they have a valid BR audit which would address item 1 but was
asked to get clarification from CNNIC. Further discussion will take place on
the next call. 


Working Group reports 

Policy Working Group (Ben) 


*	to make it easier to understand and implement 
*	so the structure is in compliance to RFC 3647 
*	implement the Policy in the CAs CP/CPS documents 
*	address the EV requirements 

issues to resolve: 

*	revocation 
*	physical security 

done on the meeting: 

*	review of section 1, 2, 3, 4, started with 5 

There where some discussions how detailed the policy should be. To meet all
the different requirements or methods of the Standards as example
<https://www.cabforum.org/wiki/WebTrust> WebTrust or ETSI the document
should be a high level statement. Ben invited interested participants to the
working group phone calls – the time is 15:00 on Thursday in between the CAB

Validation Working Group (Kirk) 


*	initially to specify procedures for Validation of requests 
*	the purpose was changed for verification of Domains and 
*	resolving EV issues 


*	new DV proposal 
*	Methods of validation should or may be can reduced from 9 to 7, so 1
to 5 are discussed left 6 to 9 from section 7 of the DV proposal 
*	ballot 147 is ongoing regarding on company letters 
*	there are discussion regarding a new business category named “other”
to identify client regarding “local law” 

There were also some discussions how to proof the ownership of a domain –
when you put something on the website to demonstrate the control of the
domain. (more discussion on the second CAB day) The opinion on this method
is changing. 

If there are any problems with the validation during the issuance of EV
Certs report this to the validation working group members are Kirk, Cecilia,
Robin or Jeremy. 

Code Signing Working Group (Dean) 


*	The draft has been commented, there are 2 items open 
*	Final draft will be released – it will be not perfect – all are
requested to bring it forward 

What is new with this policy 

*	Formats are described 
*	The certificate has to be stored in hardware device 

The information sharing thematic could not be covered it is delegated to the
information sharing work group 

Information sharing Working Group 

The information sharing working group is working to define technical aspects

*	Data format (what is the best XML or something else) 
*	When 
*	Who 
*	Control 
*	Use 
*	Feed in the system 

So there are technical persons required – the call is taking place on every
second Friday in the same week like the CAB phone call at 16:00. 


Microsoft Root Program Update 

Consolidated root program in a single group at Microsoft. New changes went
live on June 2, 2015. Received comments from information that was sent out
in April. Only about 4-5 companies responded. 

Program was launched in Windows 95, added auto-update in XP, and added
update to certificate properties in Vista. Windows 10 will ship with April
2015 certificate update. 

Microsoft currently works with 79 commercial CA's and 47 government CA's
which manage 334 roots. 

The overview of the program changes were to do the following: 

*	Change program requirements for rules to join, requirements to stay
in, and ways to get kicked out. 
*	Streamline audit requirements and require a qualified auditor,
baseline requirements audit and set obligation on CA. 
*	Re-wrote contract to address government CA's and commercial CA's.
The new agreement supersedes all previous agreements. Agreement must be
signed in 90 days. 

The changes were made as the requirements were old, out-of-date and

Rick stated that there were still new requirements which were confusing such
as when SHA-1 was allowed or not allowed. Jody stated that they would look
into resolving this issue. 

In the new program all communication would be done by email including
contractual notices. The CA's must provide contact information three times
per year (it is possible for the CA to add an auditor as a contact).
Microsoft may contact certificate subscribers if there are issues with a
Root. Audit compliance evidence is CA's responsibility to provide. 

Microsoft has streamlined the audit requirements. The auditor must meet
Microsoft's qualification requires and as such must be licensed by
<https://www.cabforum.org/wiki/WebTrust> WebTrust or accredited per
http://www.european-accreditation.org/mla-and-bla-signatories#4. Auditor
must be one level down and not accredited by others. Qualified audits must
match EKUs requirements per the tables in the MS audit requirements
document. SSL requires a Baseline Requirement audit. Government CA's must
either be commercial or limit the TLDs. 

Don suggested that there may be some confusion for how root and third party
sub CA's audit reports must be correlated. Jody stated that this issue can
be addressed. 

CA's must use separate sub CA's for EV, DV and OV certificates. CA's must
also include the industry policy OIDs in both end-entity and sub CA's. OID
values were stated, but it was commented that there is an error which will
be corrected. 

Eddy stated that there are issues with creating new sub CA's on a short term
basis. Jody says that Microsoft will be flexible and will allow reasonable
time to implement new sub CA's. If the CA has an issue, then they should
approach Microsoft with a plan with reasonable dates and provide status

Microsoft requires separate sub CA's to 1) provide greater flexibility to
limit or revoke, 2) provide greater certainty to know the type of
certificate presented, and 3) provide additional flexibility to implement
browser or OS features. 

Wayne has issues with creating new sub CA's and to separate OV and DV CA's.
Jody emphasized that the CA can propose a plan to implement the
requirements. Jody also indicates that all technical requirements can be
checked by Microsoft through telemetry. 

The key takeaways are that 1) Microsoft intends to be firm in new
requirements, 2) Microsoft knows that changes take time, and 3) Microsoft
wants CA's to propose reasonable plans to implement. 

CA's and Microsoft must deal with incident responses for compromise,
security incidents and incidents which have exceptional circumstances. 


*	Microsoft will provide methodology to provide PKI hierarchy for each
*	Microsoft does not plan to change the contract unless there is a
material issue. 
*	Why is there a requirement that the CA has to have a time-stamp
authority (TSA). 
*	Some old roots do not have CNs, but this is a requirement 
*	If there are new sub CA's then the old certificates will not be
impacted. Just don't issue any more on the old CA. 
*	Is there an issue with KPMG not listed for Turkey. No as cross
border accreditation will allow KPMG to audit in Turkey. 
*	What about S/MIME? Microsoft will need to follow up on S/MIME. 


Short Lived certificates 

Ben Wilson: Several years ago we were trying to improve revocation response
times in the wake of the Diginotar incident. Looking at all of the things
which could be done. Some say that with a short-lived certificate, even when
that certificate doesn't include pointers to revocation information, the
amount of risk is the same as a longer lived certificate with revocation
information because the time for an OCSP response or CRL to expire is
comparable with the life of the short lived certificate. 

The BRs require that revocation info be included in all certificates. There
is no way no be compliant with the BRs while issuing certificates without
revocation info even if the certificate is short lived. There is no
prohibition on a CA issuing short lived certificates today - but they must
include the revocation pointers. When talking with people who know more than
I do about this, they say the best way to try out short lived certificates
is to remove the revocation info.
Browsers won't check (and won't complain) when no revocation info is
Eddy: Is the reason to improve the user experience or to protect from
Ben: A couple of big customer have come to us and - really it's customer
The Conversation around short-lived certificates without revocation pointers
has gone on. Some People are opposed to it. Some people support it. Some say
you could use CT logging and staple OCSP.
Against that, if you're doing CT then you're logging a new certificate every
day instead of every 2 years, so the magnitude is very great.
option: short lived certificates - put in a different log and roll the CT
log over fairly frequently - or prune logs.
I don't want to get ito massive CT details. 

Ryan: not sure I follow how CT plays into this.. 
1 argument is simply a matter of performance. It doesn't hold much weight. 
Dropping CRL URL from certificate saves bytes, but requiring CT adds more
bytes back in, so the 'saving bytes' argument is problematic.
Wayne: We're doing a lot to add size to certificates. OIDs, CT
Ryan - we don't require CT proofs in certificates - they can be stapled or
got another way. There is 1 area of concern that a number of partners have
asked for clarification - OCSP is hard. Short lived certificates could be a
real saving, especially in IOT space (e.g. Digicert-plex)
The question is whether or not for the passive attack model (e.g.
mis-issuance) - whether the short lived certificates offer the same

Robin: Ben, Your premise was that the security of a short lived certificate
without revocation info was equivalent in some sense to that of the
revocation response. It is comparable maybe, but I would disagree it is
equivalent, because if there is a certificate with revocation information
there is the opportunity for a CA to revoke the certificate, issue new
revocation response and make it available to relying parties.
I appreciate there are replay attacks that can be done on revocation
responses, but nonetheless you can get the message out to some people and
that option isnt available with short lived certificates.
Ryan: That was the distinction I was trying to make, Under active attack
OCSP responses can be replayed.
Under a passive attack (such as loss of key) the revocation can have value. 

Ben: As you say, There are situations where the circumstances are amenable
to short lived certificates (IoT)
Ryan: providers want devices to phone home every week. If it hasn't phoned
home then they want to 'stop' the certificate by not re-issuing a new
short-lived certificate. 

Wayne: current viable alternative to highly available OCSP is stapling.
Ryan: stapling itself is an alternative, but the way it is structured is
that you still have to have the ability to issue a response every day.
E.g. The Plex media streaming device. You can load it from anywhere on the
internet & need a secure connection to the device.
Dean: I've done cable boxes
Ryan: Plex is public - they wanted to understand if they could have a short
lived certificate.
Robin: If they want to do short-lived certificates, to issue the certificate
& a single OCSP response is only twice he effort. - not a million times the
Ryan: sure - The BRs say an OCSP service must be High Availability 
Robin: The BRs don't say HA - only 99.9% availability - if you control the
application then you know not much internet load will arrive. 

Ben: It's a different risk model. Web pages - lots of people going to them.
- these devices have fewer visitors.
Ryan: - Stapling is a great way to reduce OCSP responder loads for CAs. 

There's a reseller who resells Comodo and Digicert and (I think) Symantec
reseller based in the US who contributes code to Apache and ngnix, including
code supporting OCSP stapling. 

Dean: It's good to hear about this new area where this may be a necessary

Ben: How do we identify this sort of scenario where this may be permitted. 

Ryan: If the forum would like to better understand the use cases:
We have the notion in the Mozilla process of having technically constrained
The BRs are more stringent than Mozilla's requirements. It is the BRs that
need CRL and OCSP pointers in end entity certificates issued from
constrained CAs. Not Mozilla.
Mozilla say that if the intermediate itself is BR compliant then that's good
enough. Plex could have used a sub-ca Name-Constrained to their own
namespace and then issued certificates with no OCSP & CRL and Mozilla would
be happy. 

Bruce: How is the damage constrained for relying parties?
Ryan: by Name-Constraints, the subscriber sets the policy . The subscriber
can set a more relaxed policy.
Tim: as a relying party - I just know the URL. I have no way of knowing that
this portion of the internet is different.
Robin: Are you saying that revocation or other responsibilities falls at the
Eddy points out that revocation times are long for sub-CAs.
Tim: Name-Constrained sub-CAs could be used to avoid some BR requirements.
Ryan: Mozilla policy has 'get out of jail free' cards for Name-Constrained
Wayne: Do the browsers view these certificates as compliant?
Ryan: Yes. Plexapp.com - is viewed with a browser. 


Ballot process/preparation. Demo of new system of marked up version of BRs. 

Ben - The Problem: easy to keep track of changes when there was only one set
of BRs, changes were minor, and there weren't many people. Coordination of
ballot #s wasn't necessary. Had certain rules about ballot format, what the
ballot was for, why it was needed, redlined version of proposal. Ben thinks
people were starting to get a bit careless about ballots, and it wasn't
always clear what changes need to be made to the BRs after ballots had
passed. Official ballot needs to be clear about the exact changes being
voted on, without any interpretation being necessary. 

Kirk suggested unanimous consent could be used to correct minor
inconsistencies discovered while updating the BRs to reflect results. 

Ryan - The Solution: proxy-presenting for Peter Bowen Ballots done in Word
via track changes, need a particular version of Word, production of PDF is
painful, etc. Also, there is no good way to track changes to the BRs over
time. Peter has put the baselines in a textual, easy to read form, that can
be converted into "eye pleasing" formats. Dean asked if it's easy to see
which lines were the result of which ballots. Ryan answered this could be
done by checking the BRs into a source control tool like git, which has a
"blame" feature to figure out where an individual lines came from. 

Kirk - Does this apply at all stages of the ballot? Ryan - Yes. 

Ryan showed the source document in .md format, and showed the document
converted to HTML and PDF. Making a change to the BRs is as easy as editing
the text file. 

Dean had some concerns about usability of command line tools. It was
mentioned that WYSIWIG editors exist for all these tools. Ryan demoed
editing the BRs via a github web interface. Ryan demonstrated adding
comments inline to discuss changes to the BRs. Kirk asked if comments
appeared in the final document. Ryan confirmed that they do not, but
comments would be saved and the public could see all the conversation that
was involved in creating the baseline requirements. It was mentioned that
git might be a bit complex for non-technical users. Ryan mentioned that
there are two parts: converting the BRs to text, and the tools used to
simplify the process. Wayne mentioned that github really is not all that
much more complex than Word. There could be simple instructions for how to
create a ballot using github. Ryan mentioned that Ben is currently doing
quite a bit of work to create redlined versions of documents, and merging
documents, that is error prone and not necessary. Wayne: don't have a good
way to track versions today; this is exactly what github is for. Kirk: if we
need better version control, we need to do that. Wayne: Manual version
control is very costly, tools like this are designed for this. Ben: Ben
currently manages the master version of the documents, with a central server
to coordinate changes, things might work better. Rick: Could members of the
public participate in discussions? Ryan: It's up to us whether we allow
public participation. Rick: There is the danger that the comments get split
between github, and the email list. Ryan: We'd have to have rules about what
goes where, perhaps pre-ballot on github and ballot on list. Again, there
are two parts: replacing Word with something more flexible, and using
github. Rick: Could we use Google Docs? The UI is more friendly. Ryan:
Perhaps, but the version control features are less powerful. Kirk: Once a
ballot is over, who makes the changes? Ryan: If we were using github, Ben
would just have to press a button to accept the results. The view of the BRs
is the latest version. Kirk: Do I have to scroll through the entire document
to see the changes? Ryan: No, the default view shows only the changes, and a
few lines of context around the changes. 


WebTrust Update 

Don Sheehy from Deloitte LLP then gave the following WebTrust update: 

1.	The WebTrust committee met once in Seattle since the last Forum
meeting with a focus on auditor licensing, looking at the need for updates
and understanding Microsoft’s new requirements. 
2.	Auditor licensing - There were a few issues identified at the last
CAB Forum meeting with regard to potential independence (for example, the
size of engagement relative to practice) and issues identified with respect
to the performance and reporting . For a recent CA’s audit (TrustCor), CPA
Canada awarded a WebTrust seal on an incorrect report. The seal was
suspended until a period of time audit is completed and a proper period of
time report issued. The seal was recently reinstated but it was noted that
the wrong report is attached to the seal. In addition there were a number of
deficiencies in the report. Don offered to share information with the
company to make sure they post the correct report. With regard to
independence, CPA Canada acknowledged that this is a practitioner
determination – all auditors are aware of the requirement of independence so
it is their responsibility. 
3.	The Task Force began redoing the Baseline and Network security audit
guidelines. The process is very slow due to the use of the RFC 3647 format
for the Baseline Requirements (the mapping from the BRs to the BR WebTrust
audit requirements is not as clean as it once was). Further complications
arise from the fact that the new network security requirements are not in
same format. 
4.	Certain issues were identified with the recent Microsoft root
program changes 

a.	Responsibility for reporting hierarchy completeness rests with CA
(it will not be an auditor responsibility). Auditor identification of all
non-technically constrained sub-CAs may be an issue at times (independent
sub-CAs, cross-signed roots, etc.). There will be a number of scenarios
where one or more auditing firm are involved in auditing the entire
hierarchy – organized by root. 
b.	New Roots may be needed to satisfy the requirement for dedicated
sub-CAs for DV, OV, and EV certs. 
c.	Timing of audits and timeliness of reporting issues – it is the
client responsibility to submit audit reports and issues with reports to
browsers. Use of third party data centers may not allow timeliness of
reporting of certain issues in infrastructure. 
d.	There could be a need for additional reports if specific browsers
add new requirements. Microsoft stated it didn’t think auditors would need
to audit its new root program requirements – it will use telemetry to
monitor compliance. 


Browser News 

Microsoft: No update on Internet Explorer or Edge 

Google: Ryan said there wasn't much news to report. He indicated that Chrome
was considering a feature that Microsoft's new Edge browser implemented:
blocking all mixed content on sites using HSTS. To explain: There are two
types of mixed content: "Active" vs "Passive" (browsers are now calling
these "Blockable Content" and "Optionally-Blockable Content" under the Mixed
Content spec). <script> is an example of Blockable content; <img> is
Optionally-Blockable. Edge blocks both Blockable and Optionally-Blockable
for HSTS domains. Chrome currently blocks Blockable (for all domains, HSTS
or not), and doesn't block Optionally-Blockable (for any domain, HSTS or
not). Ryan said that Chrome may change in the future, such that it adopts
Edge's behavior. 

Ryan added that Google is continuing to expand the Developer Tool Console in
Chrome, and is working on better explaining why a security indicator was

Opera: Operas browser is now based on Chromium, haven’t taking all the code
- lower level APIs are used, but not the UI. We did previously run our own
root store, but this is replaced by the use of the OS root store similar to
the Chromium project. Presto is still based on our online root store and it
is still millions of installations of Presto. The online root store use
Mozilla root store (NSS). Opera Mini run Presto on the server-side. 

Opera deals with certificate related errors slightly different than
Chromium. Instead of showing a crossed out https or an exclamation mark for
mixed content we simply drop the security status to "web" which is the same
as for http. 

Opera will show user installed roots differently than pre-installed roots.
You will get a hint when you start a session. Google will show all roots the
same way. Many virus companies use user installed roots to monitor traffic
and the use of such user installed roots will give the user a warning. 

Opera migrates away from SHA1, and will simply drop the security status to
"web" (as for http). Opera will add CT-support for EV, same as for Chrome.
EV green bar is shown on desktop only, not in mobile. 

Dean said that the EV indicator is not so easy to see, at least not for
colorblind people. A suggest for improvement for Opera. 

Mozilla Firefox release schedule:

1.	1024-bit root removal - nearly complete, but had to re-enable the
“Equifax Secure Certificate Authority”. Barring a new security threat, plan
is to turn off the Websites and Code Signing trust bits for this root
certificate in the September batch of root changes, which is expected to go
into Firefox 44, due for release on 26th January 2016 

*	Bug:  <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1156844>

2.	Developer console warnings for SHA-1 and RC4 released in Firefox
37(released Mar 31) for top level page loads (doesn’t work in private
browsing mode) Examples for testing can be found in bug 1138101 

*	Developer console SHA1:
*	Developer console RC4/SSL3:
*	Subresource load warnings:

3.	Short-lived certificates - implemented code to bypass revocation,
but not yet turned on because “short-lived” hasn’t yet been defined. Contact
Richard Barnes if you’re a CA interested in working with Mozilla to trial

*	Bug:  <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1141189>

4.	HTTP secure by default - published blog post about deprecating
non-secure HTTP. Received some push back but planning to press ahead 
5.	must staple - have a patch, making some progress on implementing 

*	Bug:  <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=901698>

6.	Name constraints - currently discussing name constraints for
government CAs. This discussion has proved interesting enough that Mozilla
received a letter from the Commerce Committee of the US House of
7.	OneCRL - is the plan for publishing revocation info directly. Now
implemented with blocking either by certificate or by subject / pubkey. Not
yet bypassing OCSP/CRL checks pending confidence in ability to update the
blacklist quickly. Will then enable for intermediate CAs. 
8.	SSL telemetry - HPKP violations account for about 0.26% of SSL
warnings - appears to come from captive portals. Reports are available at
9.	Salesforce CRM - used to send May CA communications. Will issue
Salesforce license to primary contact of each CA. Kathleen looking for
Guinea pigs for using salesforce - if you want to volunteer, please email
10.	Raw responses to CA survey available at
yReport?CommunicationId=a04o000000M89RCAAZ. Have received responses from all
but 3 CAs 
11.	Copyrights - still deciding if every CP/CPS is required to be freely
redistributable. Feedback received from Symantec and would welcome feedback
from others. Currently planning to require the Creative Commons license with
or without restriction on derivative works. 
12.	Discussion of next Mozilla policy coming in August and will take
place on mozilla.dev.security.policy forum. 

*	Proposed updates:


Add more info to EV Green bar 

Richard presented a proposal for added information in the EV green bar.
There are a lot of fake sites in China - Richard proposes we add a "true
site" term to the EV bar. Richard to send out information for comments in
the main mailing list - add a note to say we discussed and would like more


Day 2 

Thursday, 25 June 2015 


EV Wildcard (EVWC) Dean: Not allowed today. It is the most authenticated so
in that sense seems more logical than DVWC. What does cert represent? Most
think business owner, but Jeremy thought it was the owner of the private key
(on a prior call). From the Netcraft conference, it was shown user generated
webpage that can be loaded into something like fbsbx.com. However any cert
could be used, so this isn’t a EVWC specific issue. 

Cloudflare is having issues with phishing DVWC? 

Ryan for EVWC. What is the authorization domain, what are the security
limits? If you can get EVWC, you can get it for any of the subdomains
anyway. The example with appspot.com. foo.appspot.com Google can get an EV
for any of these, but not the other way around. Foo can’t get it because
appspot.com is what is validated. In validation, EV removes the “any other
validation” method so can’t show control. Apple pares the URL down to the
domain. So Netcraft worries about this covering joe.azure.microsoft.com to
just azure.microsoft.com. Again, only Microsoft can get this EV for the

Bruce said store.com could be bruce.store.com or dean.store.com If Bruce
does fraud, all the info is to store.com Could this be in the subscriber
agreement that only the owner can get the EV? Fraud subscriber will click

Robin thinks the argument gets weaker. Why should ryan.store.com get the
same level of trust as store.com? Ryan said he would agree if there was a
mechanism to differentiate ryan.store.com and dean.store.com, but there
isn’t right now. Facebook wants to do sharding. Mostly for performance
reasons, but it also allows certs on each subdomain. Today they can get an
EV for each one, but if they have 30 shards it is very expensive to do. EVWC
would allow easier issuance. Wayne asked if multi-domain would cover this?
May not be better in the pure security perspective, but showing each user
domain explicitly provides more transparency. 

Kirk feels EV is for strong identity, so ryan.store.com would be shown as
store.com is not ideal. Ryan said often the payment is through store.com so
you have to call them anyway. Bruce asked why wouldn’t Google want an EV for
appspot.com. Ryan said that is a branding decision, not a security decision,
but they could. 

Robin. Don’t need just one cert. Could mix and match certs and sites. 

EV is only 4% of the market, so something is holding it back. Don’t know if
it is price or difficulty getting it or value. Why continue DVWC then if we
do EVWC? Ryan wants to push SSL and afraid no DVWC would prevent people from
doing it. Bruce said Amazon has tons of retailers, but all on Amazon. 

Richard felt EVWC good, DVWC bad. For the reason of more validation. 

Kirk proposed an EV (NOT WC) that somehow allows a cert/validation procedure
for multiple levels. Ryan feared more confusion. Site says one name and
transaction on CC statement is different. Can’t prevent that. 

Inigo fine with EVWC. 

Moudrick said EVWC infers “anything” so agrees with Wayne that multi-domain
would be better. 

Turktrust thinks EV should be highest level validation and should not allow

Eddy said what about facebook.store.com? Ryan said, you can still get an EV
for this subdomain, It might flag due to the Facebook part showing up
high-risk, but the CA can justify it and issue. So again, no further
security risk. Eddy for it, just was thinking through. 

Opera thought it sounded like a bad idea at first, but when you go through
the arguments, doesn’t see how it hurts anything. 

Tim H mentioned the private key protection issue for all WC where if you
have the key you can open any domain. Is it worse if this happened on EV
than DV? 

Dean called time. Told everybody to go consider it with their people. 


Certificate Transparency Update: Current log status, Future plans, etc. 

Ryan reviewed the current status of Certificate Transparency: 

1.	7 organizations have logs now, check the web site for the latest. 
2.	Chrome 43 and 44 follow the Relaxation requirements 
3.	The new CT policy has been released. The minimum number of SCTs has
not changed, but you need one SCT from a Google log and one from a
non-Google log (prior policy allowed all SCTs to be issued from Google
logs). The enforcement of this new logic will be in Chrome 46. Ryan will let
us know how Chrome will know if certificates fall under the prior policy or
the new one (the date of the SCT, and/or the certificate "not-before" date
must be prior to a tbs date). This "date" has not been finalized. 
4.	How to receive Green bar treatment as it applies to SCTs: 

a.	Certificates on the 2014 Whitelist 
b.	Certs with SCTs and/or a not-before date up until a tbs date with
SCTs with no log independence requirement (One or all SCTs can be from
Google Logs) 
c.	Certs with SCTs and/or a not-before date after a tbs date with at
least one Google and one Non-Google log 

5.	Relaxation of the independence requirement is not a permanent
decision. The goal is to return to the original requirement eventually. The
long term goal is also to log all types of certs, not just EV. 
6.	The goal of CT logs is that they take Certificates from any CA and
that they can contain any Domains. Google encourages log providers to take
certificates from all Roots and for all domains 

a.	If you are a log monitor you need to look at all logs 
b.	CAs should not expect to have 100% availability of the Logs and they
should be prepared for failure, the internet does not have 100%

7.	Google is building out more CT related auditing and consistency
checks to verify things like was the SCT really added to the log. An SCT is
only a promise to add it to the log. 
8.	Sometimes you cannot get enough SCTs and you need to cancel and
start over later. 

a.	Any precerts you posted should be compliant with the BRs (don't post
precerts then verify compliance). From a policy perspective people watch
logs for certs they intend to issue 
b.	If you log the same precert you are supposed to get the same SCT, so
re-posting should not result in more entries. 6962 says the log can give you
the same SCT, or a new one. 
c.	If you re-post a precert that is not binary the same, you will get a
different SCT. 
d.	If you're first issuance attempt failed and you are doing it again
for the same cert, but it has different not-before/after dates, then you
will get a new SCT. 
e.	If you first issuance attempt failed and you update the
not-before/after dates and keep the same serial number, log monitors will
see what appears to be 2 different certs with the same serial number. Even
though the first attempt did not result in the issuance of a certificate, it
indicates the intent to issue the certificate. Different pre-certs with the
same serial number may trigger some concerns. 


ETSI Presentation 

Iñigo Barreira from IZENPE made an ETSI Presentation. Initially he explained
the current sistuation of ETSI deliverables. And then he gave information
about the ETSI deliverables to be published in 2015. According to this
deliverables to be published as TS in June 2105 and starting the procedure
to became EN in 2016 

*	319 401 General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers 

EN 319 411 Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers
issuing certificates 

*	319 411-1: General requirements 
*	319 411-2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU
qualified certificates 

EN 319 412 Certificate Profiles 

*	319 412-1: Overview and common data structures 
*	319 412-2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural
*	319 412-3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal
*	319 412-4: Certificate profile for web site certificates issued to
*	319 412-5: QC Statements 
*	319 421 Policy and Security Requirements for Trust Service Providers
issuing Electronic Time-Stamps 
*	319 422 Time-stamping protocol and electronic time-stamp profiles 

319 411-1 and 319 411-2 are the general requirements according to EIDAS
regulations. 319 412-4 and 319 412-5 are the most important parts for CAB
Forum and CAs should follow these two standards. Iñigo stated that the
implementing dates of these standards have not been decided yet. During this
presentation Iñigo also informed participants about the eIDAS Audit
Requirement. The most significant requirement is Article 20.1 as follows; 

"Qualified trust service providers shall be audited at their own expense at
least every 24 months by a conformity assessment body. The purpose of the
audit shall be to confirm that the qualified trust service providers and the
qualified trust services provided by them fulfil the requirements laid down
in this Regulation. The qualified trust service providers shall submit the
resulting conformity assessment report to the supervisory body within the
period of three working days after receiving it." 

ETSI audits will be carried out only by auditing bodies accredited in
accordance with Annex E of TS 102 042. 

Jody Cloutier from Microsoft asked how does a browser know if an auditor is
qualified or not. Iñigo stated that any auditor who is able to perform ISO
27001 audits can also perform ETSI audits and the accreditation can be
checked from a website of the ETSI so an organization should understand that
if the auditor is qualified to perform such audits and added that Microsoft
Agreement's clause about qualified auditors is correct from this angle.
Browsers can also check if a specific auditor is able to perform audit.
Currently three auditing bodies (KPMG, TUVIT and LSTI) are accredited. 


Bylaw Updates 

Discussion around Kirk's proposed ballot 149 took place. A note taker was
not assigned for this segment but in summary, members felt that additional
requirements around browser root programs were not warranted so Kirk agreed
to modify the language to specify the proper name of the
<https://www.cabforum.org/wiki/WebTrust> WebTrust audit and submit to the


Domain Validation 

Robin: there are different ways to control issuance of certificates
sufficient that we can issue a certificate for it. 

Robin: The aim of the game is to get rid of the catch-all provision for
domain validation. 

The supposition is that if we do away with the catch-all and replace it with
the actual methods that CAs are using. We're not particularly trying to
block anything done today, but we are trying to make it transparent,
clarifying by setting it out in the BRs that each method in use is
enumerated in the BRs. 

It removes the reliance on the CAs estimation that any new method is
'equivalent' to any of the documented methods. 

Bruce. The purpose is not to remove what people are doing. Is that right? 

Robin: If a CA said that they always turned around 3 times and spat before
issuing a certificate and had persuaded their auditor that was OK then the
benefit of this process was that a light would be shone on the process and
the forum could decide whether it was acceptable. 

Ryan. There is a risk of having the catch-all. We have seen CAs using
methods which do not meet an acceptable standard. 

Bruce. We want to make a list. The purpose is to have a list so we can clean
it up. 

Robin. Many things could had been done, but need to have it documented. 

Robin. On Tuesday, in the working group, We were discussing the definitions.
I suggest we skip over the definitions for this presentation since, although
they are important, we need to discuss the list of acceptable methods of
domain validation as set out in this proposed revision. What are we
authorizing?- What are we proving control of? - those will be left to the
working group. 

The list is: 

1. Confirming applicant directly with Registrar - unchanged. 

2. Email to the registrant, technical, or Administrative contact from WHOIS
- unchanged. 

3. the list of 5 email prefixes. The email addresses will be held by people
who do control the domain. - unchanged. 

4. Domain authorization document - validation can be carried forward for a
period of time. - unchanged. 

Kirk: 4 now talks about including any private, anonymous, or proxy
registration service. Ryan: That language has been brought up from the
paragraph following #7 in the current BRs, but the meaning is unchanged. 

5. This is a new method. Some CAs say if you could demonstrate control of
the web-content of the domain - we'll accept it. Kirk: This is actually a
re-write of the current #6. It is not a new method, but a re-write of the
current #6 limiting the option of where the content can be posted. The
explanation we've been given for this limitation is that some hosts the
decision to allow their users to control the entirety of the content of a
website, but do not intend to give the applicant authority to order certs,
and that the intention is that site owners *will* lock down access to the
'well-known' URI. We don't agree for 2 reasons: a) If they're foolish enough
to give people access to their entire site then that is their decision. Many
web pages don't allow random people to make arbitrary changes to their sites
so this is turning the world on its head by saying that people who have less
security are limiting options for people with more security. b) Hosting
companies and other site owners won't know about this well-known path so the
protection is not effective. It creates a new vulnerability. We think that
people should still be able to post on their home-page or document root.
Ryan: The way it works today is that a CA can do whatever they want today.
Some CAs may make poor decisions - such as allowing the applicant to specify
the location for the file to be changed. This opens the door for
certificates to be issued incorrectly for many sites that host user content,
including Facebook. Rick: What about the document root? Kirk: Yes, what
about keep the .well-known URI and add the option of the document root.
Ryan: That would limit the options which hosting sites offer to their
customers and prevent them from allowing their customers to upload to the
document root. The 5 prefixes for email address validation are also weak.
Some are from RFCs, but admin@? ... FQDN vs. part of the domain for
authorization. Consider that today anyone who can demonstrate control of
foo.bar.random.com or bar.random.com or random.com can get a certificate for

6. Changes in DNS record. E.g. a TEXT record - or could be a CNAME or a
different DNS record. Ryan: There are types of DNS records which are
necessarily amendable by service users (for some protocols) and those would
not be suitable for this purpose. Robin: So that would be an argument for
drilling down and specifying the type of DNS records acceptable for this
method. We use one variation of this today (CNAME). People are happier to
trust a change made to the DNS for a domain rather than a change to a page
on the site. Its a useful method. 

7. You can indirect the domain ownership through a DNS CNAME. Ryan: A CNAME
is like a forwarding phone number. In use you are forwarded through it
without being aware of the forward. Robin: If you're interested in how this
work then there will be two steps to the validation. e.g. assets.example.com
The people who control assets.example.com have setup a CNAME so that any
query for assets.example.com forwards to assets.example.com.cdnservice.com
and then undertakes the domain control check on
assets.example.com.cdnservice.com. They could then demonstrate control of
assets.example.com.cdnservice.com using any of the 9 methods in this
section/ A CNAME can be setup at any level in the DNS, so for a FQDN or a
2nd level domain or even (in theory) a TLD. The person controlling the
domain you are validating has elected to forward the DNS lookup (and thereby
the address resolution and the destination of the traffic) to the
destination of the CNAME. 

Rick: it seems odd that this #7 is at the same level of everything else when
it requires one of the other numbers to be used also. Ryan: That's the
implementation - that when you follow this step you have to restart the
process. Doug: We could also treat this as a step in the whole process -
like for wildcards we say #1 strip off the '*.' we could say here,
optionally follow a CNAME and validate ownership / control of that domain
instead of the original. Tim: We should that put #7 as the last in the list
and say 'following the CNAME method use any of the above methods to verify
control on the new domain' Robin: Yes, maybe so. Dean - will you make a note
of that for Jeremy, please. 

8. Confirm the applicant controls an IP address. Some discussion over the
quality of the check - but it was pointed out that the check of IP control
must be carried out according to the language in section 11.1.2. 

9. The final one is of putting a certificate on the site - so a 'test'
certificate issued by the CA. If the CA creates a certificate as a unique
'thing' which they give to the applicant and if the applicant can make that
certificate live over https then they have demonstrated practical control of
the domain. 

Ryan. This is similar to number 5. It problematic for a couple of reasons.
Different ports are used by different protocols. e.g. IMAP A university
student found a CA who allowed you to specify the site name (mapping to IP)
*and* the port number. Google will hand out ports on their turn relay (and
other service providers allow this for many reasons, too). This means that
anyone can have apparent control of an (almost) arbitrary port number. Port
number requires privilege. I can open a port and get a certificate for port
number 15000. Running a SSL is not necessarily a privileged operation. 

It matters which port you're using. There are a whole set of security
concerns around port use. 

Port number under 1024 being privileged is an example and a rule of thumb,
but is not a standard. 

Your email administrator may not be authorized to order a certificate. 

Dean: Is that something we've added in? 

Ryan: Yes, this was from Gerv. It's the 'Let's Encrypt' model. Doug: It's a
<https://www.cabforum.org/wiki/GlobalSign> GlobalSign model, too. We do
something similar. If we need to specify the list of ports in section #9 to
make it robust then that's OK. Gerv had a more general one (#10?) and we
boiled it down to these two. 


Cert Validity Periods 

Dean introduced the topic: There have been discussions on 2 years vs. 3
years certificate validity periods. Some people want to reduce the maximum
validity period for OV and DV certs to 2 years to reduce security risk to
those products. Other people want to increase the period to 3 years for all
certs because they are all uniform. Customers are asking for 3 years EV
certs and we are not able to issue those, so why can’t we extend to 3 year. 

Kirk said that EV started out as something really special with high
authentication and therefore we must revalidate every year. However, we are
finding that nothing changes much and it is complex and a lot of work and I
am unsure of the value of annual revetting. We support the idea of aligning
the validity period of all certs to 2 years – with respect to revetting (not
certificate validity period). I.e. increase EV revetting periods to 2 years
and decrease OV/DV to two years vetting period. 

Dean wants to keep the revetting period a different topic from certificate
validity period (certificate lifetime). Eddy said that if we issue every 2
years, we should validate each second years. 

Tim said he had no problem with validity periods compared to the pain of
revalidating/revetting EV. If we have a customer with 5 different EV
certificates issued at different times during the period, we have to
revalidate the information every year for EV, and as Kirk was saying nothing
changes every year. 

Eddy said that they revalidate after a year. A DV is doing a very small
assertion. An EV is doing a higher assertion. A CA has more information on
an EV customer than the DV customer. Increase the validity period for EV and
decrease the validity period for OV/DV because the vetting process for EV is
more complex and therefore more secure. 

Doug said it is not ideal to have 3 year certificates and doing validating
annually, i.e. increase certificate validity period for EV from 2 year to 3
year and still doing annual validation. 

Ryan proposed annual revetting for domain and every second year for
organization. Do domain revalidation every year in case the domain has
ceased. If something changes, you have to revoke that certificate. 

If I want to be evil and shady, I can block revocation information for users
accessing the site. Revocation checking that doesn’t work makes a longer
certificate validity period a higher risk. 2 years lifetime constrains the
upper bounds. Pushing out to 3 year potentially means that the certificate
no longer properly warrants who the domain holder is. Decreased validity
periods or requirement for OCSP stapling could fix that (or we could fix the
revocation problem). 

Ryan is concerned with domain revalidation when change of domain ownership
takes place. If I sell you sleevie.com I can still get certificates for it
the next 39 months. 

This goes back to what we are trying to do with CT – if we buy sleevie.com
we would like to know what certificates are out there lurking. CT is talking
about what happened in the past. 

The CAs in this room to pretty interesting experiments on how to do domain
control validation. It could be a trade off, do the identity validation for
longer periods and then the domain control validation for a much shorter

Different proposals for certificate validity periods came up based on
different arguments: 





























The alternatives will be further discussed in the next meeting. 

There was a discussion regarding requiring the possibility of enforcing OCSP
stapling as a way of solving the revocation checking problem. 

Ryan said that pushing OCSP stapling alone will not work. This will make the
SSL harder, because the experience for the customers is awful. This is not a
browser or a server problem, but an ecosystem problem which must be solved
by all participants. 

Ryan said that he would love to see OCSP stapling working and could consider
requiring OCSP stapling for EV certificates. 


UI Indicators in browsers 

Rick Andrews: 
Firefox had previously announced they were going to degrade security user
interface (e.g. removing the green bar, changing the color/appearance of the
padlock) if any part of a site uses RC4.
Rick had asked that there be a way to identify when this happens and why. 

They've made some changes already.
(Rick demonstrated FF visiting a site which gave an exclamation mark over
the padlock) 

The certificate information screen gives a general message.
'more info..' says 'broken encryption - RC4' - which is pretty helpful. 

The browser could have contacted 1000 sites to build a page. How to identify
which caused the problem? 

If you need to dive deeper, you can look in the
"developer web console"->Network
shows every connection being made to render the site plus, beneath it, a
list of errors/warnings, including the use of RC4. 

Show request info->Security 
shows the details negotiation for each connection.
The detail you need is here - suitable for a tech support team to go at. 

Ryan says similar functionality is pre-release in Chrome.
Ryan demoed a pre-release version of Chrome.
using the publicly available test site badssl.com.
The page security state in the developer console shows errors.
Chrome will display the absence (or presence) of CT logs in all certs,
including DV and OV.
Digicert is (optionally) including CT log proofs in OV certs. 


DV/OV/EV Certificates, Appropriate use and OIDs 

Dean: Microsoft has described OIDs for DV/OV/EV to be used. DV/OV come from
the BRs, EV isn’t defined in the EVG. 

Dean: Microsoft has required that these policy OIDs in the intermediates, so
does that mean CAs need to cut new intermediates? Eddy: Depends, but not

Inigo and Arno raised that ETSI defined OIDs for each of these five years
ago, and multiple CAs are already using this. Ryan: Except the Microsoft
program requirements don’t use those. They’re free to define their own
policies, and they have. 

A discussion ensued about how OID Arcs are allocated. Ryan explained to Dean
about how OID arc allocations are made - 2.23.140 is the CABForums’, and we
can do whatever we want without telling anyone. That said, we’ve set up a
framework for how we do that - Jeremy makes sure we don’t duplicate OIDs. 

Dean asked about searching for the OIDs, he can find info about DV/OV, but
not EV, so does that mean registration is needed. Ryan explained that’s just
an informational process (Harald Alvestrand or Orange SA’s site), and that’s
what it’s for, but it’s not required by any process. 

Eddy pointed out that Microsoft trumped that procedure in putting out the
policy document. Jody made it clear that they’re not tied to the number
itself, just that there’s a process to distinguish each of these
certificates with a common identifier. 

Bruce raised the point that back years ago, a hierarchy of OIDs was setup,
so we should just follow that. Ryan pointed out that Ben’s email (about the
tor OID) was related to this. 

Wayne went and explained each of the OIDs - the OIDs used for the documents,
and how they’re assigned. Dean made a proposal for an EV OID, and checked if
Jody would be fine with it. Jody reiterated that it’s less about the
specific number, as long as there is a common OID. Applause. 

Jody explained Microsoft’s position, that they’ve begun discussing the
feedback from yesterday’s meeting, and are working on providing clarifying
changes. These aren’t minuted because Microsoft will wait to formally
announce those. 

Bruce asked for clarification with the policy OIDs - in particular, whether
or not that policy OID needs to appear within the intermediate itself, or if
it’s OK just to appear within the end-entity itself. There was some
discussion about the anyPolicy OID and how that works, but Jody clarified
that the end goal is to ensure it appears within the end-entity certificate,
and he’ll clarify how that works. 

Kirk raised that the informational explanation of the OIDs was incorrect for
OV and could be confusing. Jeremy will work to resolve this. 


Discuss F2F Meeting 36 in Istanbul Oct 5 and Future 

Istanbul October the 6th 2015 

A discussion about hotel rates for Istanbul ensued. Some suggested it should
not be above $225. Dean suggested to E-Tugra to get rates for several hotels
for different budgets. 

Hosts 2016 

Middle of February Go Daddy (Phoenix) 

Middle of June Izenpe (Bilbao) 

September or October Microsoft (Seattle) 

Host 2017 

Chunghwa Telecom February or October (Taiwan) 


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