[cabfpub] Ballot 144 -.onion domains

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Fri Feb 13 02:43:57 UTC 2015

On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:33 PM, kirk_hall at trendmicro.com <
kirk_hall at trendmicro.com> wrote:
> In contrast, a .onion domain name will be displayed to Tor users, and
> could cause confusion.  Should we require CAs to follow the rules of BR
> 9.2.4g so that .onion domains that include meaningful names are verified?
> Or better yet, not allow .onion domains to be meaningful (require them to
> be random only)?

How do you define meaningful? How do you define random? In quantifiable
ways that can either be audited or inspected by third-parties (e.g. via
Certificate Transparency)

facebookcorewwwi is a random name. That it has symbolic meaning in English
is something that happens with any random system, given sufficient time.

Would these concerns go away if Item #5 was removed from the ballot (the
automatic extension if IESG reserves)?

While I think this discussion is useful to a degree, I do have some

- Under the current provisions, anyone can issue for .onion, so this is by
no means worse in any quantifiable way

- Under the current provisions, using a .onion with HTTP is objectively
less secure than using a .onion name with HTTPS
  - A .onion name is based upon an RSA-1024 bit key, which is the only
security protection in play here.
  - A .onion name is denied access to privacy-and-security enhancing
technologies (due to browsers restricting access to features not delivered
over secure transports)

- The concerns regarding 'spoofability' of a .onion name exist independent
of any discussion in the Forum. That is, it is, at it's core, a TOR
protocol "issue" (I'm not sure I would call it that, but for sake of
  - Anyone using .onion names can create facebookwwwcore1.onion, given
sufficient time and energy
  - DNS spoofing exists entirely in the Baseline Requirements (CAs are only
required to document their procedures regarding high risk requests. They
are not prohibited from issuing such phishy names, per 11.5 of the BR 1.2.3)
  - DNS spoofing exists entirely in the EV Guidelines (CAs are only
required to inspect mixed-script domains, per 11.7.1 p2 of the EVG 1.5.2)

Nothing prohibits facebookcorewwwi.com and facebookcorewww1.com from
purchasing certificates, EV or DV, provided they demonstrate control over
that namespace. Why would or should .onion be any different?
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