[cabfpub] LV Certificates

Erwann Abalea erwann.abalea at opentrust.com
Mon Dec 21 09:09:34 MST 2015


Bonjour,

The concerned relying parties can only support TLS1.0 at most, certainly SSL3, probably SSL2, certainly not AES, mostly 3DES/RC2/RC4, only CBC mode, maybe DHE but probably only using standard groups, probably *-export cipher suites (the 40/512 junk category), no SNI, certainly a lot of TLS attacks and CBC failures.
This proposal hopes that the RP will perform revocation checks by OCSP, or maybe no revocation check at all.

All this for 2-7% of user agents, to be confirmed, with a promise that it will be solved by 2019, « I swear ».

Is this serious?


Cordialement,
Erwann Abalea



> Le 18 déc. 2015 à 23:21, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> a écrit :
> 
> Hi everyone,
>  
> Attached is a proposal from Cloudflare and Facebook creating LV certificates in the baseline requirements.  This is a draft ballot for review that will, of course, change based on the debate in the forum. Although CAs will stop issuing SHA-1 on 2016/1/1, there isn’t any reason these changes couldn’t go into effect in early January (assuming a passing vote).
>  
> If adopted, this ballot would permit continued use of SHA1 certificates past the deprecation deadline (to support older devices) but give newer browsers an easy way to reject SHA1 for users.  The ballot also increases the resiliency of SHA1 certs against attacks by requiring higher entropy serial numbers.
>  
> I look forward to your comments.
>  
> Thanks,
> Jeremy
>  
> <DRAFT_LV_BallotProposal.pdf><DRAFT_LV_BallotProposal.docx>_______________________________________________
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