[cabfpub] Ballot 150 - OIDs

Ben Wilson ben.wilson at digicert.com
Wed Aug 26 17:18:51 MST 2015


I’m unaware of someone issuing certificates where this cannot be changed now.  I should have noticed the problem earlier.   What about Facebook?  Weren’t they the only ones who wanted this?  But if it’s too late, then I’ll accept that and concede.  

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2015 5:45 PM
To: Ben Wilson <ben.wilson at digicert.com>
Cc: Dean Coclin (Dean_Coclin at symantec.com) <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>; kirk_hall at trendmicro.com (kirk_hall at trendmicro.com) <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 150 - OIDs

 

It's worth noting that would be a technical change that would affect anyone using the existing descriptor, and make it difficult for UAs that may choose to exempt such certificates from special constraints (e.g. as has been requested of Chrome).

 

My inclination would be to vote against it, unless no such certificates had been issued yet. But I'd be surprised by that.

 

On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 4:39 PM, Ben Wilson <ben.wilson at digicert.com <mailto:ben.wilson at digicert.com> > wrote:

Dean and Kirk?  If you agree, then I’ll assume that when voting starts on Friday afternoon the ballot will include this additional section 5).

 

From: Jeremy Rowley 
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2015 11:41 PM
To: Ben Wilson <ben.wilson at digicert.com <mailto:ben.wilson at digicert.com> >; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 


Subject: RE: Ballot 150 - OIDs

 

Sounds good to me

 

From: Ben Wilson 
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2015 7:12 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com <mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> >; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: RE: Ballot 150 - OIDs

 

Jeremy, 

 

Would it be a problem to add the following to this Ballot 150?

 

5) Modify the first paragraph of Appendix F of the EV Guidelines by striking .1 from the TOR Service Descriptor Hash so that the paragraph reads as follows:

A CA may issue an EV Certificate with .onion in the right-most label of the Domain Name provided that issuance complies with the requirements set forth in this Appendix: 1. CAB Forum Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension (2.23.140.1.31).  The CAB Forum has created an extension of the TBSCertificate for use in conveying hashes of keys related to .onion addresses. The Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension has the following format: 

cabf-TorServiceDescriptor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2.23.140.1.31 } 

The reason for this request is that the .1 OID arc under the CABF’s assigned entity number (2.23.140) is reserved for policy identifiers and certificate types.  The OID structure should be:

 

2.23.140.1 – policies / certificate types …

2.23.140.31 – TorServiceDescriptor

2.23.140.41 – caSigningNonce

2.23.140.42  – applicantSigningNonce

 

Thanks,

 

Ben

 

 

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>  [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2015 9:26 AM
To: public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 150 - OIDs

 

Here’s an updated draft of the OID ballot:

 

Ballot 150-Addition of Optional OID for Individual Validation

 

 The following motion has been proposed by Dean Coclin of Symantec and endorsed by Jeremy Rowley of Digicert and Kirk Hall of Trend Micro.

 

-- MOTION BEGINS –

 

1)      Modify section 1.2 of Baseline Requirements as follows:

 

1.2 Document Name and Identification

This certificate policy (CP) contains the requirements for the issuance and management of publicly‐trusted SSL certificates, as adopted by the CA/Browser Forum. 

 

The following Certificate Policy identifiers are reserved for use by CAs as an optional means of asserting compliance with this CP (OID arc 2.23.140.1.2) as follows: 

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) domain‐validated(1)} (2.23.140.1.2.1); 

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) organization-validated(2)} (2.23.140.1.2.2) and

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) individual-validated(3)} (2.23.140.1.2.3).

 

2)      Modify section 7.1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements as follows:

 

7.1.6.1. Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers 

 

This section describes the content requirements for the Root CA, Subordinate CA, and Subscriber Certificates, as they relate to the identification of Certificate Policy. 

 

The following Certificate Policy identifiers are reserved for use by CAs as an optional means of asserting compliance with these Requirements as follows: 

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐requirements(2) domain‐validated(1)} (2.23.140.1.2.1), if the Certificate complies with these Requirements but lacks Subject Identity Information that is verified in accordance with either Section 3.2.2.1 or Section 3.2.3.

 

If the Certificate asserts the policy identifier of 2.23.140.1.2.1, then it MUST NOT include organizationName, givenName, surname, streetAddress, localityName, stateOrProvinceName, or postalCode in the Subject field. 

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐requirements(2) organization-validated(2)} (2.23.140.1.2.2), if the Certificate complies with these Requirements and includes Subject Identity Information that is verified in accordance with Section 3.2.2.1.

 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐requirements(2) individual-validated(3)} (2.23.140.1.2.3), if the Certificate complies with these Requirements and includes Subject Identity Information that is verified in accordance with Section 3.2.3.

 

If the Certificate asserts the policy identifier of 2.23.140.1.2.2, then it MUST also include organizationName, localityName, stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and countryName in the Subject field. If the Certificate asserts the policy identifier of 2.23.140.1.2.3, then it MUST also include (i) either organizationName or givenName and surname, (ii) localityName, (iii) stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and (iv) countryName in the Subject field.

 

3)      Modify the definition of “EV OID” in the EV Guidelines as follows:

 

EV OID: An identifying number, in the form of an “object identifier,” that is included in the certificatePolicies field of a certificate that: (i) indicates which CA policy statement relates to that certificate, and (ii) is either the CA/Browser Forum EV policy identifier or a  policy identifier that, by pre-agreement with one or more Application Software Supplier, marks the certificate as being an EV Certificate.

 

4)      Modify Section 9.3.2 of the EV Guidelines as follows:

Each EV Certificate issued by the CA to a Subscriber MUST contain a policy identifier that is either defined by these Guidelines or the CA in the certificate’s certificatePolicies extension that: (i) indicates which CA policy statement relates to that Certificate, (ii) asserts the CA’s adherence to and compliance with these Guidelines, and (iii), is either the CA/Browser Forum’s EV policy identifier or a policy identifier that, by pre-agreement with the Application Software Supplier, marks the Certificate as being an EV Certificate.

 

The following Certificate Policy identifier is the CA/Browser Forum’s EV policy identifier: 

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) ev-guidelines (1) } (2.23.140.1.1), if the Certificate complies with these Guidelines.

 

 

If the ballot passes, the custodian of the Forum OIDs will be instructed to obtain the new OID for IV as indicated above.

 

-- MOTION ENDS –

 

The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2200 UTC on Friday, August 21, 2015, and will close at 2200 UTC on Friday, August 27, 2015. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2200 UTC on Friday, September 4, 2015. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.

 

A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here:  <https://cabforum.org/members/> https://cabforum.org/members/

 

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is currently nine (9) members– at least nine members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.

 

 


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