[cabfpub] Intent to Deprecate: SHA-1 certificates

Tim Hollebeek THollebeek at trustwave.com
Thu Sep 4 14:54:48 UTC 2014

My biggest problem with Google’s policy is that it is going to lead to quite a bit of advice to end users along the lines of “please ignore the red slash through the lock; your connection is still secure”.  This is because Google failed to coordinate the change with CAs, and websites have no choice but to issue such guidance since Google decided to ambush the internet community with this change.

Red should mean there’s actually something actually wrong with the certificate, or that the certificate does not meet *agreed upon* requirements, not just “Google doesn’t like it”.  Feel free to use various forms of “less green” for things you feel are less trusted, but when you start putting up red UI elements, you’re just making an extremely confusing user experience even more confusing.

I am extremely disappointed with Google’s unwillingness to engage in serious discussion about this issue.  This, combined with Google’s rejection out of hand of the code signing requirements before they are even finalized has caused me to have serious concerns about whether Google is capable of working productively with other companies to improve the security of the internet.  *Please* prove me wrong.


From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 1:09 AM
To: Chris Palmer; Jeremy Rowley
Cc: blink-dev; net-dev; rsleevi; CABFPub (public at cabforum.org)
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Intent to Deprecate: SHA-1 certificates

Chris – a serious question.  Is it true that  google.com<http://google.com/> is still using SHA-1 in both end-entity and intermediate certificates today (as has been posted to this site)?  If so, how can Google be so condemning of ordinary websites that are also using SHA-1 certs today, even though there has been discussion of SHA-1’s potential weakness, as you say, for several years?

So many of the postings on this topics have shown a strong antipathy toward CAs – toward ALL CAs, without making any distinctions.  Google is painting everyone with the same brush.  How can we turn this around, and create a more collaborative environment among browsers, browser users, CAs, website owners?

Google’s current policy will be creating a kind of chaos for many website owners in the next few weeks who have no idea why this is happening.  It will be affecting websites that have already started transition plans to SHA-256 certs before 2017.  Isn’t there a better way?

From: security-dev at chromium.org<mailto:security-dev at chromium.org> [mailto:security-dev at chromium.org]
Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2014 9:54 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: blink-dev; security-dev; rsleevi; net-dev
Subject: Re: Intent to Deprecate: SHA-1 certificates

> Only if one ignores fairly clear statements from 6 months ago. Keep in mind that it's already 12 *years* after we've known from public literature that SHA-1 is significantly weaker than its designed guarantee.

Oops, 9 years now; 12 years in 2017. Sorry about that.
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