[cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation policy
Doug Beattie
doug.beattie at globalsign.com
Wed Sep 3 13:56:29 UTC 2014
Adriano,
That is a great suggestions, have you heard from Ryan on this yet? I also
find it hard to locate and reference the current Google Chrome baseline
within the long thread in the google groups discussion.
Doug
> -----Original Message-----
> From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> On Behalf Of Adriano Santoni - Actalis S.p.A.
> Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 2:57 AM
> To: public at cabforum.org
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation
policy
>
> Ryan,
>
> apart from the discussion, it would be a good thing if you published your
plan on
> some Google's web site (like e.g.
> http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy)
>
> It would be easier for CAs to show their customers in a more convincing
way
> what Google is going to do.
> In other words, publishing your intent on a web site would have a little
bit more
> officiality -- that would help CAs.
>
> How about that?
>
> Thank you
> Adriano
>
>
>
> Il 29/08/2014 04:13, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:
> >
> > Hi Kirk,
> >
> > I feel like I have sufficiently explained our concerns and motivations
> > throughout this thread, with both you and other CAs, that it should be
> > readily apparent that this neither meets our goals nor helps our users.
> >
> > I appreciate your thoughtful consideration in writing it.
> >
> > Best,
> > Ryan
> >
> > On Aug 28, 2014 7:04 PM, "kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
> > <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>" <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
> > <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Ryan and Chris - here is a serious proposal for a modified Google
> > SHA-1 policy. It meets all of your stated goals. Please give it
> > some consideration.
> >
> > 1. SHA-1 certs issued on or after [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
> > after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google upon
> > issuance - red slash and nasty click-throughs. (This will stop
> > issuance of 2017 SHA-1 certs this fall.)
> >
> > 2. SHA-1 certs issued before [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
> > after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google
> > starting [March 1, 2015] - red slash only and nasty
> > click-throughs. (This will force existing websites with 2017
> > SHA-1 certs to change them within the next six months).
> >
> > Result: All 2017 SHA-1 certs will be gone by next March 2015 -
> > which certainly meets your goals. Customers with existing 2017
> > certs can get through this holiday season, CAs can get the message
> > out.
> >
> > Advantages:
> >
> > 1. CAs that have never issued 2017 certs, and never will (like
> > Trend Micro) and their customers are not affected - that's
> > appropriate, as we have never been a part of this problem.
> >
> > 2. CAs that have issued three year SHA-1 certs expiring in 2017
> > will stop by this fall.
> >
> > 3. CAs that have issued 2017 certs in the past (and their
> > customers) will be affected, but will have six months to adjust.
> > That will be a much smaller number of customers affected than if
> > those with 2016 certs are forced to change their certs twice (in
> > 2014 and again in 2015).
> >
> > 4. All SHA-1 certs will likely be gone by next spring.
> >
> > I don't think Google should spend much time worrying about how CAs
> > communicate with their customers about the need to move to SHA-256
> > before 2017 - that's for us to worry about, and we are all
> > strongly incentivized to get the message out (selling a 2017 cert
> > that doesn't work creates legal problems, and none of us wants to
> > be dealing with angry SHA-1 customers in late 2016 who have to
> > switch to SHA-256). We may also be able to get behind Google's
> > policy if it is revised - something that isn't the case today.
> >
> > You mentioned somewhere that you worried that simply deprecating
> > SHA-1 certs as of 2017 could create a big customer service burden
> > on Google as of late 2016 or early 2017. I don't think that's the
> > case with this new proposed policy, as all the negative UI effects
> > will happen in 2014-15. Plus, I predict Google will be deluged
> > with customer service complaints under your current policy, when
> > thousands of websites start showing as "untrusted" in the next
> > 6-12 weeks. Why not make life easier for Google with a revised
> > policy?
> >
> > So what do you think? Can we make a change to the policy that is
> > focused on the real problem (2017 certs)?
> >
> > Thanks for your consideration.
> >
> > */Kirk R. Hall/*
> >
> > Operations Director, Trust Services
> >
> > Trend Micro
> >
> > TREND MICRO EMAIL NOTICE
> > The information contained in this email and any attachments is
confidential
> > and may be subject to copyright or other intellectual property
protection.
> > If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to use
or
> > disclose this information, and we request that you notify us by
reply mail or
> > telephone and delete the original message from your mail system.
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Public mailing list
> > Public at cabforum.org
> > https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 5615 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20140903/0d53de78/attachment.p7s>
More information about the Public
mailing list