[cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Wed Oct 29 22:24:28 UTC 2014

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Eddy Nigg <eddy_nigg at startcom.org> wrote:

> On 10/29/2014 08:50 PM, kirk_hall at trendmicro.com wrote:
> I agree that browsers and apps will make their own judgments about when a
> case of BR non-compliance is serious enough to warrant a UI warning, and
> when it can be ignored.  I would just offer my opinion that lack of CDP and
> AIA data in a cert (whether or not Chrome wants to check that information
> in the client) is a fundamental certificate flaw that renders the cert
> inherently untrustworthy, and it should automatically be rejected by
> applications (just as expired certs, etc. are now automatically rejected).
> But that’s just my opinion.
> Considering that CAs were required to modify the OCSP responders to
> include Good, Revoked and *Unknown* upon request of the browsers mostly
> (I believe Google was a strong supporter of that), it's rather confusing to
> know that browsers entirely ignore it if the certificates have no OCSP (and
> CRL) pointers, not speaking about checking this information when available.

> So what does it matter if Diginotar knew or didn't knew which certificates
> were issued if this information wouldn't be used anyway?

OCSP stapling. And OCSP Must-Staple.
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