[cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
Erwann Abalea
erwann.abalea at opentrust.com
Tue Oct 21 15:37:12 UTC 2014
Bonjour,
Le 21/10/2014 02:45, Dean Coclin a écrit :
>
> On last week's CA/B Forum call, we had an additional discussion on
> this topic.
>
> From my understanding, according to RFC 5280, this is OK:
>
> Root -> Intermediate (with no policy OIDs) -> End-entity (some policy OID)
>
This isn't OK (see below for what OK means). When working on
intermediate, RFC5280 section 6.1.3 step (e) sets the valid_policy_tree
to NULL, and it stays so indefinitely.
An empty CertificatePolicies extension is invalid by definition (it's a
"SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ..."), but running the algo described at
6.1.3 with an empty extension will have the same effect as an absent
CertificatePolicies extension.
> Or this:
>
> Root -> Intermediate (with special 'any policy OID') -> End-entity
> (some policy OID)
>
OK. Completely different result than the first example.
> But this is not valid:
>
> Root -> Intermediate (with policy OID A) -> End-entity (with policy
> OIDs A and B)
>
This is OK and valid for policy OID A only.
> The policy OIDs are supposed to "flow down" from intermediate to
> end-entity. The end-entity shouldn't contain a policy OID that isn't
> in the intermediate, except in the first two special cases above.
>
Validity regarding CP is different than validity regarding other
extensions (such as NameConstraints, of BasicConstraints, for example).
CertificatePolicies: depending on inputs to the validation algorithm and
on extensions found in the path (PolicyConstraints or PolicyMappings), a
certificate can either be valid for a set of policies (this set can be
empty) or invalid.
NameConstraints: if a name element isn't in the permittedSubTrees, or is
in the excludedSubTrees, the certificate is invalid.
So, regarding CP, the examples are all OK if you don't care about the
effective policyId.
If you *require* policyId A at application level, examples 2 and 3 are
OK, example 1 is not OK.
If you *require* policyId B at application level, example 2 is OK,
examples 1 and 3 are not OK.
If you *require* either one of {policyId A, policyId B} at application
level, example 2 is OK and will give you both policies, example 3 is OK
and will give you only policyId A, and example 1 is not OK.
> Now, we have a list of what some current members are doing here:
> https://cabforum.org/object-registry/, which presumable agrees with
> the above rules (hopefully?). I'd like to add more data to the list so
> if your CA is not listed, please email me the OIDs you use and I'll
> add them.
>
> Returning to the previous discussion, Ryan made a comment that CAs
> would have to "re-do" their hierarchies to implement these OIDs but
> presumably he meant if they don't follow the protocol above, is that
> right?
>
> Thanks,
> Dean
>
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>
> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On Behalf Of *Erwann Abalea
> *Sent:* Friday, October 10, 2014 12:02 PM
> *To:* public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> I'm a bit late, sorry.
>
> Le 09/10/2014 20:26, Dean Coclin a écrit :
>
> [...]
>
> What I fail to understand from this discussion is how anything is
> "broken" or "non-compliant" if everyone is already doing something
> as described above?
>
>
> A browser can't programmatically "tag" a certificate as being OV/DV
> based on its policyId, because sometimes this policyId is not present
> in its chain of issuing CAs.
>
> For example, take the first 3 CABF members as listed on the website,
> click on their link (modify it to be https if necessary). Those first
> 3 have an incoherent policyId chain (right of "=>" is the resulting
> set of acceptable policies):
> - Actalis:
> Baltimore Cybertrust Root is limited to anyPolicy => { anyPolicy }
> Actalis Authentication CA G2 is limited to
> 1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.0 => { 1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.0 }
> portal.actalis.it is 1.3.159.1.4.1 => { empty }
> - ANF:
> Baltimore Cybertrust Root is limited to anyPolicy => { anyPolicy }
> DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA is limited to
> 1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.0 => { 1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.0 }
> DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 is limited to
> 2.16.840.1.114412.1.3.0.2 => { empty }
> anf.es is 2.16.840.1.114412.1.1 => { empty }
> - AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus:
> KLASS3-SK 2010 has no CertificatePolicies extension => { empty }
> www.sk.ee <http://www.sk.ee> is 1.3.6.1.4.1.10015.7.1.2.5 => { empty }
>
> Based on X.509/RFC5280 validation algorithm, these subscriber
> certificates can at most be valid but for an empty set of policies.
> They are RFC5280 compliant, but either invalid or valid for no
> identified policy.
>
> I'm not name dropping, just took the first three. Unfortunately, I see
> this more often when reviewing Mozilla inclusion requests.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
> Dean
>
> *From:*Kelvin Yiu [mailto:kelviny at exchange.microsoft.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 09, 2014 11:13 AM
> *To:* Moudrick M. Dadashov; Ben Wilson; Dean Coclin;
> i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>;
> sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> AFAIK, the additional OIDs would not be compliant with RFC 5280.
>
> Kelvin
>
> *From:*Moudrick M. Dadashov [mailto:md at ssc.lt]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 7, 2014 3:17 PM
> *To:* Kelvin Yiu; Ben Wilson; Dean Coclin; i-barreira at izenpe.net
> <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>; sleevi at google.com
> <mailto:sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> Hi Kelvin,
>
> On 10/8/2014 12:40 AM, Kelvin Yiu wrote:
>
> I don't have a problem if a CA chooses to use the BR OIDs instead
> of their own OIDs to identify BR related certificate policies as
> long as it is consistently used in the certificate chain. My
> concern is with cases that do not follow RFC 5280. For example,
> when BR OIDs are added to end entity certificates in addition to
> CA specific OIDs when the CA certificate explicitly contain only
> CA specific OIDs.
>
> I realized this was a real use case where a single CP presents
> different types of certificates and adding a xV OID makes it just
> more clear. Are you saying this doesn't follow RFC 5280?
>
> Thanks,
> M.D.
>
>
>
> Kelvin
>
> *From:*Ben Wilson [mailto:ben.wilson at digicert.com]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 7, 2014 12:56 PM
> *To:* Kelvin Yiu; Dean Coclin; i-barreira at izenpe.net
> <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>; sleevi at google.com
> <mailto:sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> I don't think that the use of a policy OID in a certificate
> necessarily "ignores" "rules" around policy processing in
> RFC5280. I don't think anyone has requested that we require a
> policy constraints extension. We're only talking about putting a
> policy OID in a BR certificate, along with any other policy OIDs
> the CA cares to insert. The primary purpose of the CP OID is to
> assert the policy under which the certificate has been issued. It
> is not to build a path up the chain or constrain
> processing---those are secondary considerations. I agree about
> the necessity of putting the CP OID in your CPS and of being
> audited for compliance with the policy (the BRs and EVGs
> acknowledge that a point-in-time / readiness audit would be
> acceptable).
>
> The BRs is the closest thing to a Certificate Policy that
> currently exists. It is ""A named set of rules that indicates the
> applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or
> class of application with common security requirements." Section
> D.7.1.6 of the PKI Assessment Guidelines states, "The certificate
> policies extension is intended to convey policy information or
> references to policy information. Specifically, a PKI can place
> the object identifier of a certificate policy within the
> certificate policies extension. The object identifier can enable
> a relying party to configure its systems to cause its software to
> look for the OID of an acceptable certificate policy, permit the
> transaction to continue if the system finds the OID of an
> acceptable CP in the certificate, and halt the transaction if it
> does not." So while it enables functionality, it doesn't require
> it, in case that is a browser concern.
>
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>[mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> *On Behalf Of *Kelvin Yiu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 7, 2014 1:03 PM
> *To:* Dean Coclin; i-barreira at izenpe.net
> <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>; sleevi at google.com
> <mailto:sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> FWIW, Microsoft provides an API on Windows 7 and later to
> determine whether a certificate is EV or not, according to
> Microsoft's root CA program.
>
> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163(v=vs.85).aspx
> <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163%28v=vs.85%29.aspx>
>
> I think it is a bad idea to assert BR OIDs for xV compliance by
> ignoring the rules around certificate policies processing in RFC
> 5280. While I understand the desire to have a source of
> information to identify xV certificates, the value is questionable
> to me unless the information is also in the CPS and the
> appropriate audit has taken place.
>
> Kelvin
>
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>[mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> *On Behalf Of *Dean Coclin
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 7, 2014 9:12 AM
> *To:* i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>;
> sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com>; public at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> Hi Inigo,
>
> Yes, I did create such a sheet and I've enclosed it here. And I
> think it proves my point that the current situation exacerbates
> the problem, making it difficult for one to programmatically
> determine what type of cert they are encountering.
>
> Dean
>
> *From:*i-barreira at izenpe.net
> <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>[mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 07, 2014 12:44 AM
> *To:* Dean Coclin; sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com>;
> public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> Dean, time ago you created an Excel sheet with those CAs that use
> their own OIDs for DV and OV, similar to what was done with EV.
> The intention of that list was to also have another "source" of
> information for considering those certs as DV or OV for the
> browsers in case they need it.
>
> BTW, Izenpe uses their own OIDs plus the CABF ones.
>
> *Iñigo Barreira*
> Responsable del Área técnica
> i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>
>
> 945067705
>
> Descripción: cid:image001.png at 01CE3152.B4804EB0
>
> ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez
> babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera
> heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman
> abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!
> ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o
> confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el
> destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que
> no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con
> el remitente.
>
> *De:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>[mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> *En nombre de *Dean Coclin
> *Enviado el:* lunes, 06 de octubre de 2014 21:17
> *Para:* Ryan Sleevi; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Asunto:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> So I get the part that Chrome (and likely other browsers in the
> CA/B forum) don't intend to distinguish DV and OV certs in any
> way. Got that. Not a point of contention. In fact, I knew that
> when I started this thread. So no need to go down that path
> anymore. Having different OIDs does not oblige a browser do anything.
>
> I would have expected more negative commentary from CAs but so far
> there has been none. And only 1 browser has chimed in.
>
> However, browsers are not the only application that use SSL
> certificates. There are others out there and I distinctly recall a
> conversation about 2-3 years ago where Paypal (a CA/B member)
> explicitly asked that these OIDs be mandatory. Brad stated that
> their security group had deemed DV certs to be a security threat
> to their ecosystem and wanted an easy programmatic way to
> distinguish them. At the time, there was some pushback (I don't
> believe from browsers) and the OIDs ended up being optional.
>
> It looks as if some CAs do use OIDs in their DV and OV certs but
> some don't use the CA/B Forum OIDs (rather their own). This makes
> it difficult to apply a uniform decision process.
>
> Certs conforming to policy and issued correctly are one aspect
> that some folks are looking for. The type of certificate is
> another. One that has not been vetted is different from one that
> has some vetting completed (other security issues being equal).
> Perhaps that benefit is not tangible to some but it certainly is
> to others. I can spew some stats on DV cert use and fraud but that
> will just muddle this thread so I'll save it for another day.
>
> Why do browsers care one way or the other if other parties want to
> make this distinction? The CA/B Forum has defined different
> baseline standards for these types of certs. Why not make
> transparency around those standards easy for those that want to
> draw a distinction?
>
> Certainly would love to hear from some other interested parties.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Dean
>
> *From:*Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> <mailto:[mailto:sleevi at google.com]>
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 02, 2014 8:56 PM
> *To:* Dean Coclin
> *Cc:* public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Dean Coclin
> <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>> wrote:
>
> Thanks for the response and pointers. I've read through the
> threads but still have additional questions/comments. I'll readily
> admit that I don't understand all the commentary in the Mozilla
> threads so I apologize if these questions sound somewhat naïve.
> Happy to be educated:
>
> You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit
> non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of
> CAs and Browsers, do we have any Browsers that wish to make such a
> distinction? If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the
> Forum to require it.
>
> >>I haven't heard of any browsers that want to make that distinction
> (yet). It is my understanding that the Forum BRs do require an OID
> for EV certs. So why is it "inappropriate" for the Forum to
> require OIDs for DV/OV?
>
> Browsers have agreed to make a distinction between EV and !EV, so
> have required there be a way to detect that.
>
> Browsers have not agreed that there is a distinction between DV or
> OV, nor is there a need to detect the difference.
>
> That the browsers have required (effectively all stores at this
> point, AFAIK) is that the root program members be BR compliant. So
> any new certs issued (technically, independent of the notBefore,
> and we know CAs regularly backdate from time of issuance, but it's
> a rough heuristic) are, by definition, BR compliant.
>
> If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such
> distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions
> themselves.
>
> >>Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? If there's another
> way to accomplish the end result, happy to explore further.
> But it would have to be uniform among all CAs that issue these
> certs.
>
> I don't see why it needs to be uniform.
>
>
> The requirement as to what shape it takes is dictated by the
> relying party applications.
>
> The browsers, as relying party applications, do not and have not
> yet cared about the shape of DV and OV, and as per our recent F2F,
> aren't really keen to either.
>
> So having the browsers dictate the shape of the solution seems
> unnecessary, and an issue for these relying party applications
> (e.g. Netcraft) to work with CAs.
>
> As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for
> misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT
> meaningfully help address the concerns we see.
>
> >>I wasn't suggesting that this addition would in any way help
> you with your programmatic checks for mis-issuance. Rather,
> it would make the task for organizations like Netcraft, EFF or
> others that tabulate statistics on various types of
> certificates easier to do. Is that not the case?
>
> Not really. These organizations are interested in the same
> discussions and distinctions we are - what are the certificates
> being issued and do they conform to the policies that they're
> supposed to.
>
> We've established that there's no 'uniform' definition of what
> constitutes OV, only that the BR requires certain vetting steps
> for certain subject fields that are OPTIONAL. CAs have taken these
> and marketed them as OV, but there's no such distinction as a
> level, nor a particular profile spelled out in the appendices as
> to what constitutes a "DV" vs "OV".
>
> If that was the only degree of distinction required, it's just as
> easy as checking the Subject fields for any of the OPTIONAL fields.
>
> That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the
> BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was
> complying to.
>
> >>Fully admit that I don't understand how this works. But wouldn't
> that also be the case for EV (which currently requires this OID)?
>
> YES! And it's one of the many reasons why EV is somewhat muddled
> for programatic checks or distinctions. And yet this is also
> necessary because any change in policy, by definition,
> necessitates a change in OID to (meaningfully) reflect that. And
> that constitutes rolling a new hierarchy (and updating browsers'
> lists of recognized EV OIDs)
>
> I'm just trying to suggest a way that someone can say: X is a
> DV cert, Y is an OV cert, Z is an EV cert without a doubt. If
> OIDs are not the place to do that, is there another mechanism
> available?
> I'm sure you are familiar with Ryan Hurst's blog on how
> difficult the task currently is.
>
> I am (you're talking about http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=203 in
> particular). But I'm also not supportive of encouraging a
> distinction that we neither recognize nor have plans to recognize,
> and especially not supportive of mandating such distinctions.
>
> This is especially true, as these distinctions don't offer any
> tangible security benefits to the Web, as previously discussed.
>
> If we go to the point of mandating anything additional in
> certificates, which requires a variety of changes in processes,
> profiles, and CPSes, I want it to have meaningful security value.
> This change - which, as has been shown by the development of audit
> standards and then the eventual incorporation of those audit
> standards into the root programs, and then FINALLY the
> *enforcement* of those audit standards of the root programs -
> would take several years, at BEST, to deploy, and would
> communicate nothing of actionable value. It's a hard sell.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Dean
>
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>[mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>] *On Behalf Of *Ryan Sleevi
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 02, 2014 3:37 PM
> *To:* Dean Coclin
> *Cc:* public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
> On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Dean Coclin
> <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Further to today's discussion on our call, I'd like to get
> more feedback on a proposal to make a unique standardized OID
> mandatory for DV and OV certificates in the Baseline
> Requirements. Currently we have a mandatory OID for EV
> certificates but optional for OV and DV. This makes things
> difficult for at least two groups of constituents:
>
> 1.Relying parties that would like to distinguish between these
> certificates
>
> You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an
> explicit non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is
> comprised of CAs and Browsers, do we have have any Browsers
> that wish to make such a distinction?
>
> If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to
> require it. If there are non-browser relying parties
> interested in such distinctions, the CA can always provide
> such distinctions themselves.
>
> 2.Analysts that report on SSL certificate data who have
> had to issue revised reports because of cert misclassification
>
> As mentioned on the call, this has been discussed with Mozilla
> in the past -
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/hEOQK-ubGRcJ
>
> As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for
> misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT
> meaningfully help address the concerns we see.
>
> That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the
> BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was
> complying to.
>
> I would hope that
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/2tRUS444krwJ
> would capture some of these concerns more fully.
>
> Finally, to do anything meaningful with this in all major
> clients, it would require that CAs redo their certificate
> hierarchy, as policy OIDs are inherited. That's a silly thing,
> especially when CAs are still struggling to migrate from SHA-1
> to SHA-256 in their intermediates.
>
> My proposal is for CAs to put in OID X if it's a DV
> certificate and OID Y if it's an OV certificate.
>
> As Rick reminded me on the call, we currently have
> something like this for EV certificates (except that CAs
> are free to use the standard OID or define one of their own).
>
> I'd like to hear pros/cons of this. Ryan S indicated that
> Google would not support such a proposal but we didn't
> have time to discuss the reasons.
>
> I'm sure there are both technical and policy reasons.
> Personally I'd like to focus on the latter but remarks on
> both are welcome. This proposal doesn't require anyone to
> do anything with this data (i.e relying parties can choose
> whether or not to utilize it).
>
>
> Thanks,
> Dean
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> Public mailing list
>
> Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
>
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org <mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20141021/d9b61a87/attachment-0003.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: image/png
Size: 19121 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20141021/d9b61a87/attachment-0003.png>
More information about the Public
mailing list