[cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

Wed Oct 8 08:49:45 UTC 2014

+1

WoSign will add CABF OV/DV OID to end user cert and sub CA soon, this is easy for third party like SSL labs to identify which type SSL the website deployed.

Best Regards,

Richard

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Steve Roylance
Sent: Wednesday, October 8, 2014 4:33 PM
To: 'Moudrick M. Dadashov'; 'Kelvin Yiu'; 'Ben Wilson'; 'Dean Coclin'; i-barreira at izenpe.net; sleevi at google.com
Cc: public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

Hi All.

Just as an FYI on the processes we follow when we create a Technically Constrained CA with Name Constraints.  An example URL cited in a Mozilla bug report and therefore public is https://www.partnerportal-deutschepost.de 

Regardless of the CA platform our customers use we add the domains and OV related information to the Directory Name Constraints.  We also add our own Policy OID to the Subordinate CA to say what process we followed to issue that CA Certificate and will follow moving forward (Auditing etc).  However for platforms running MSADCS we have to ALSO add the BR OID too.  If we miss the BR OID out of our Subordinate CA then MSADCS refuses to allow it to be added later on (in the  EE certificate).  Other CA platforms don't mandate it....or should I say seem to work without it.   It’s the Same for the OCSP EKU in the MSADCS platform as discussed in other threads.

I shall keep an eye on this thread and look for the conclusion, but as creation of Sub CAs is usually geared around chronological events it’s hard for CA’s to retro fit OIDs and Policy backwards down the chain across all customers. Just like it’s hard for Browsers to support SHA1 or SNI in all versions.  You try your best and so do we as CA’s.  (Noting that a policy of AIA support by default over chains embedded on the server might have helped combat this but that’s a whole other thread ;-))

In conclusion, GlobalSign uses the BR OIDs and we’d like all CAs to use them (Regardless for the moment of support in the Subordinate CA chains) as we’d like Netcraft and others to be able to positively identify the market for the three distinct certificate types defined.   Ideally then we can start to see what’s left out there to address.

If the consensus is that the BR (and EV) OIDs should be in whole chain (apart from the root) and that also EKUs should be in the whole chain then I can put that forward to our policy authority and product engineering teams to mandate on the next product cycle or subordinate CA re-sign.   If that makes the Browsers happy too (ie all Subordinate CAs from this point need XXX) for a positive vote on the use of OIDs for EE certificates then that sounds like a win win for all.

Sent from my iPhone

On 7 Oct 2014, at 23:16, Moudrick M. Dadashov <md at ssc.lt <mailto:md at ssc.lt> > wrote:

Hi Kelvin,

On 10/8/2014 12:40 AM, Kelvin Yiu wrote:

I don’t have a problem if a CA chooses to use the BR OIDs instead of their own OIDs to identify BR related certificate policies as long as it is consistently used in the certificate chain. My concern is with cases that do not follow RFC 5280. For example, when BR OIDs are added to end entity certificates in addition to CA specific OIDs when the CA certificate explicitly contain only CA specific OIDs. 

I realized this was a real use case where a single CP presents different types of certificates and adding a xV OID makes it just  more clear. Are you saying this doesn't follow RFC 5280?

Thanks,
M.D.  

Kelvin

From: Ben Wilson [mailto:ben.wilson at digicert.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 7, 2014 12:56 PM
To: Kelvin Yiu; Dean Coclin; i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net> ; sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> ; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

I don’t think that the use of a policy OID in a certificate necessarily “ignores” “rules” around policy processing in RFC5280.   I don’t think anyone has requested that we require a policy constraints extension.  We’re only talking about putting a policy OID in a BR certificate, along with any other policy OIDs the CA cares to insert.  The primary purpose of the CP OID is to assert the policy under which the certificate has been issued.  It is not to build a path up the chain or constrain processing—those are secondary considerations.  I agree about the necessity of putting the CP OID in your CPS and of being audited for compliance with the policy (the BRs and EVGs acknowledge that a point-in-time / readiness audit would be acceptable).   

The BRs is the closest thing to a Certificate Policy that currently exists.  It is “”A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.”  Section D.7.1.6 of the PKI Assessment Guidelines states,  “The certificate policies extension is intended to convey policy information or references to policy information.  Specifically, a PKI can place the object identifier of a certificate policy within the certificate policies extension.  The object identifier can enable a relying party to configure its systems to cause its software to look for the OID of an acceptable certificate policy, permit the transaction to continue if the system finds the OID of an acceptable CP in the certificate, and halt the transaction if it does not.”   So while it enables functionality, it doesn’t require it, in case that is a browser concern.

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>  [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Kelvin Yiu
Sent: Tuesday, October 7, 2014 1:03 PM
To: Dean Coclin; i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net> ; sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> ; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

FWIW, Microsoft provides an API on Windows 7 and later to determine whether a certificate is EV or not, according to Microsoft’s root CA program.

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163(v=vs.85).aspx <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163%28v=vs.85%29.aspx>  

I think it is a bad idea to assert BR OIDs for xV compliance by ignoring the rules around certificate policies processing in RFC 5280. While I understand the desire to have a source of information to identify xV certificates, the value is questionable to me unless the information is also in the CPS and the appropriate audit has taken place. 

Kelvin

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>  [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Dean Coclin
Sent: Tuesday, October 7, 2014 9:12 AM
To: i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net> ; sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> ; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

Hi Inigo,

Yes, I did create such a sheet and I’ve enclosed it here. And I think it proves my point that the current situation exacerbates the problem, making it difficult for one to programmatically determine what type of cert they are encountering. 

Dean

From: i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net>  [mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 12:44 AM
To: Dean Coclin; sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> ; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

Dean, time ago you created an Excel sheet with those CAs that use their own OIDs for DV and OV, similar to what was done with EV. The intention of that list was to also have another “source” of information for considering those certs as DV or OV for the browsers in case they need it.

BTW, Izenpe uses their own OIDs plus the CABF ones.

Iñigo Barreira
Responsable del Área técnica
i-barreira at izenpe.net <mailto:i-barreira at izenpe.net> 

945067705

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De: public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>  [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] En nombre de Dean Coclin
Enviado el: lunes, 06 de octubre de 2014 21:17
Para: Ryan Sleevi; public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Asunto: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

So I get the part that Chrome (and likely other browsers in the CA/B forum) don’t intend to distinguish DV and OV certs in any way. Got that. Not a point of contention. In fact, I knew that when I started this thread.  So no need to go down that path anymore. Having different OIDs does not oblige a browser do anything. 

I would have expected more negative commentary from CAs but so far there has been none. And only 1 browser has chimed in.

However, browsers are not the only application that use SSL certificates. There are others out there and I distinctly recall a conversation about 2-3 years ago where Paypal (a CA/B member) explicitly asked that these OIDs be mandatory. Brad stated that their security group had deemed DV certs to be a security threat to their ecosystem and wanted an easy programmatic way to distinguish them. At the time, there was some pushback (I don’t believe from browsers) and the OIDs ended up being optional. 

It looks as if some CAs do use OIDs in their DV and OV certs but some don’t use the CA/B Forum OIDs (rather their own). This makes it difficult to apply a uniform decision process. 

Certs conforming to policy and issued correctly are one aspect that some folks are looking for. The type of certificate is another. One that has not been vetted is different from one that has some vetting completed (other security issues being equal). Perhaps that benefit is not tangible to some but it certainly is to others. I can spew some stats on DV cert use and fraud but that will just muddle this thread so I’ll save it for another day. 

Why do browsers care one way or the other if other parties want to make this distinction? The CA/B Forum has defined different baseline standards for these types of certs. Why not make transparency around those standards easy for those that want to draw a distinction?

Certainly would love to hear from some other interested parties.

Thanks,

Dean

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com] <mailto:[mailto:sleevi at google.com]>  
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 8:56 PM
To: Dean Coclin
Cc: public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com> > wrote:

Thanks for the response and pointers. I’ve read through the threads but still have additional questions/comments. I’ll readily admit that I don’t understand all the commentary in the Mozilla threads so I apologize if these questions sound somewhat naïve. Happy to be educated:

You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of CAs and Browsers, do we have any Browsers that wish to make such a distinction? If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to require it.

>>I haven’t heard of any browsers that want to make that distinction (yet). It is my understanding that the Forum BRs do require an OID for EV certs. So why is it “inappropriate” for the Forum to require OIDs for DV/OV?

Browsers have agreed to make a distinction between EV and !EV, so have required there be a way to detect that.

Browsers have not agreed that there is a distinction between DV or OV, nor is there a need to detect the difference.

That the browsers have required (effectively all stores at this point, AFAIK) is that the root program members be BR compliant. So any new certs issued (technically, independent of the notBefore, and we know CAs regularly backdate from time of issuance, but it's a rough heuristic) are, by definition, BR compliant.

If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.

>>Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? If there’s another way to accomplish the end result, happy to explore further. But it would have to be uniform among all CAs that issue these certs.

I don't see why it needs to be uniform.

The requirement as to what shape it takes is dictated by the relying party applications.

The browsers, as relying party applications, do not and have not yet cared about the shape of DV and OV, and as per our recent F2F, aren't really keen to either.

So having the browsers dictate the shape of the solution seems unnecessary, and an issue for these relying party applications (e.g. Netcraft) to work with CAs.

As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully help address the concerns we see.

>>I wasn’t suggesting that this addition would in any way help you with your programmatic checks for mis-issuance.  Rather, it would make the task for organizations like Netcraft, EFF or others that tabulate statistics on various types of certificates easier to do. Is that not the case?

Not really. These organizations are interested in the same discussions and distinctions we are - what are the certificates being issued and do they conform to the policies that they're supposed to.

We've established that there's no 'uniform' definition of what constitutes OV, only that the BR requires certain vetting steps for certain subject fields that are OPTIONAL. CAs have taken these and marketed them as OV, but there's no such distinction as a level, nor a particular profile spelled out in the appendices as to what constitutes a "DV" vs "OV".

If that was the only degree of distinction required, it's just as easy as checking the Subject fields for any of the OPTIONAL fields.

That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to. 

>>Fully admit that I don’t understand how this works. But wouldn’t that also be the case for EV (which currently requires this OID)?

YES! And it's one of the many reasons why EV is somewhat muddled for programatic checks or distinctions. And yet this is also necessary because any change in policy, by definition, necessitates a change in OID to (meaningfully) reflect that. And that constitutes rolling a new hierarchy (and updating browsers' lists of recognized EV OIDs)

I’m just trying to suggest a  way that someone can say: X is a DV cert, Y is an OV cert, Z is an EV cert without a doubt. If OIDs are not the place to do that, is there another mechanism available?
I’m sure you are familiar with Ryan Hurst’s blog on how difficult the task currently is.

I am (you're talking about http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=203 in particular). But I'm also not supportive of encouraging a distinction that we neither recognize nor have plans to recognize, and especially not supportive of mandating such distinctions.

This is especially true, as these distinctions don't offer any tangible security benefits to the Web, as previously discussed.

If we go to the point of mandating anything additional in certificates, which requires a variety of changes in processes, profiles, and CPSes, I want it to have meaningful security value. This change - which, as has been shown by the development of audit standards and then the eventual incorporation of those audit standards into the root programs, and then FINALLY the enforcement of those audit standards of the root programs - would take several years, at BEST, to deploy, and would communicate nothing of actionable value. It's a hard sell.

Thanks,
Dean

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>  [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> ] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 3:37 PM
To: Dean Coclin
Cc: public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com> > wrote:

Further to today’s discussion on our call, I’d like to get more feedback on a proposal to make a unique standardized OID mandatory for DV and OV certificates in the Baseline Requirements. Currently we have a mandatory OID for EV certificates but optional for OV and DV.  This makes things difficult for at least two groups of constituents:

1.       Relying parties that would like to distinguish between these certificates

You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of CAs and Browsers, do we have have any Browsers that wish to make such a distinction?

If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to require it. If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.

2.       Analysts that report on SSL certificate data who have had to issue revised reports because of cert misclassification

As mentioned on the call, this has been discussed with Mozilla in the past - https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/hEOQK-ubGRcJ

As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully help address the concerns we see.

That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to. 

I would hope that https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/2tRUS444krwJ would capture some of these concerns more fully.

Finally, to do anything meaningful with this in all major clients, it would require that CAs redo their certificate hierarchy, as policy OIDs are inherited. That's a silly thing, especially when CAs are still struggling to migrate from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in their intermediates.

My proposal is for CAs to put in OID X if it’s a DV certificate and OID Y if it’s an OV certificate.

As Rick reminded me on the call, we currently have something like this for EV certificates (except that CAs are free to use the standard OID or define one of their own).

I’d like to hear pros/cons of this. Ryan S indicated that Google would not support such a proposal but we didn’t have time to discuss the reasons.

I’m sure there are both technical and policy reasons. Personally I’d like to focus on the latter but remarks on both are welcome. This proposal doesn’t require anyone to do anything with this data (i.e relying parties can choose whether or not to utilize it).

Thanks,
Dean

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