[cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV

Jeremy.Rowley jeremy.rowley at digicert.com
Fri Oct 3 10:21:16 MST 2014


DigiCert supports this, and not because we expect the browsers to use 
the information.  Requiring these OIDs would be invaluable in our own 
research on BR compliance and the use of OV/DV/IV. Examination of 
certificates does not clearly indicate how the certificate was validated 
since companies like Amazon.com might be validated as OV/DV. Similar 
problems arise distinguishing between IV and OV certs.  Requiring the 
OIDs corresponding the appropriate validation will greatly improve 
evaluation of these certificates.

There doesn't need to be an OID per revision.  Section 11 rarely 
changes.  You can get a very good approximation of use based on the 
notBefore date.  Besides, even if there are revisions to these sections, 
the principles behind them are the same.  DV requires a verification of 
domain ownership.  OV adds a record check for the authorization of the 
requester and authenticity of the subject.  IV requires a photo ID or 
similar mechanism.  The language may change, but the process has 
essentially stayed the same since adoption.

Jeremy

On 10/2/2014 6:55 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com 
> <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>> wrote:
>
>     Thanks for the response and pointers. I’ve read through the
>     threads but still have additional questions/comments. I’ll readily
>     admit that I don’t understand all the commentary in the Mozilla
>     threads so I apologize if these questions sound somewhat naïve.
>     Happy to be educated:
>
>     You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit
>     non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of
>     CAs and Browsers, do we have any Browsers that wish to make such a
>     distinction? If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the
>     Forum to require it.
>
>     >>I haven’t heard of any browsers that want to make that distinction
>     (yet). It is my understanding that the Forum BRs do require an OID
>     for EV certs. So why is it “inappropriate” for the Forum to
>     require OIDs for DV/OV?
>
>
> Browsers have agreed to make a distinction between EV and !EV, so have 
> required there be a way to detect that.
> Browsers have not agreed that there is a distinction between DV or OV, 
> nor is there a need to detect the difference.
>
> That the browsers have required (effectively all stores at this point, 
> AFAIK) is that the root program members be BR compliant. So any new 
> certs issued (technically, independent of the notBefore, and we know 
> CAs regularly backdate from time of issuance, but it's a rough 
> heuristic) are, by definition, BR compliant.
>
>     If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such
>     distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.
>
>     >>Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? If there’s another way to
>     accomplish the end result, happy to explore further. But it would
>     have to be uniform among all CAs that issue these certs.
>
>
> I don't see why it needs to be uniform.
>
> The requirement as to what shape it takes is dictated by the relying 
> party applications.
> The browsers, as relying party applications, do not and have not yet 
> cared about the shape of DV and OV, and as per our recent F2F, aren't 
> really keen to either.
>
> So having the browsers dictate the shape of the solution seems 
> unnecessary, and an issue for these relying party applications (e.g. 
> Netcraft) to work with CAs.
>
>     As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for
>     misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully
>     help address the concerns we see.
>
>     >>I wasn’t suggesting that this addition would in any way help you
>     with your programmatic checks for mis-issuance.  Rather, it would
>     make the task for organizations like Netcraft, EFF or others that
>     tabulate statistics on various types of certificates easier to do.
>     Is that not the case?
>
>
> Not really. These organizations are interested in the same discussions 
> and distinctions we are - what are the certificates being issued and 
> do they conform to the policies that they're supposed to.
>
> We've established that there's no 'uniform' definition of what 
> constitutes OV, only that the BR requires certain vetting steps for 
> certain subject fields that are OPTIONAL. CAs have taken these and 
> marketed them as OV, but there's no such distinction as a level, nor a 
> particular profile spelled out in the appendices as to what 
> constitutes a "DV" vs "OV".
>
> If that was the only degree of distinction required, it's just as easy 
> as checking the Subject fields for any of the OPTIONAL fields.
>
>     That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs,
>     to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to.
>
>     >>Fully admit that I don’t understand how this works. But wouldn’t that
>     also be the case for EV (which currently requires this OID)?
>
>
> YES! And it's one of the many reasons why EV is somewhat muddled for 
> programatic checks or distinctions. And yet this is also necessary 
> because any change in policy, by definition, necessitates a change in 
> OID to (meaningfully) reflect that. And that constitutes rolling a new 
> hierarchy (and updating browsers' lists of recognized EV OIDs)
>
>     I’m just trying to suggest a  way that someone can say: X is a DV
>     cert, Y is an OV cert, Z is an EV cert without a doubt. If OIDs
>     are not the place to do that, is there another mechanism available?
>     I’m sure you are familiar with Ryan Hurst’s blog on how difficult
>     the task currently is.
>
>
> I am (you're talking about http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=203 in 
> particular). But I'm also not supportive of encouraging a distinction 
> that we neither recognize nor have plans to recognize, and especially 
> not supportive of mandating such distinctions.
>
> This is especially true, as these distinctions don't offer any 
> tangible security benefits to the Web, as previously discussed.
>
> If we go to the point of mandating anything additional in 
> certificates, which requires a variety of changes in processes, 
> profiles, and CPSes, I want it to have meaningful security value. This 
> change - which, as has been shown by the development of audit 
> standards and then the eventual incorporation of those audit standards 
> into the root programs, and then FINALLY the *enforcement* of those 
> audit standards of the root programs - would take several years, at 
> BEST, to deploy, and would communicate nothing of actionable value. 
> It's a hard sell.
>
>
>     Thanks,
>     Dean
>
>     *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org
>     <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>
>     [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org
>     <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>] *On Behalf Of *Ryan Sleevi
>     *Sent:* Thursday, October 02, 2014 3:37 PM
>     *To:* Dean Coclin
>     *Cc:* public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org>
>     *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV
>
>     On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Dean Coclin
>     <Dean_Coclin at symantec.com <mailto:Dean_Coclin at symantec.com>> wrote:
>
>     Further to today’s discussion on our call, I’d like to get more
>     feedback on a proposal to make a unique standardized OID mandatory
>     for DV and OV certificates in the Baseline Requirements. Currently
>     we have a mandatory OID for EV certificates but optional for OV
>     and DV.  This makes things difficult for at least two groups of
>     constituents:
>
>     1.Relying parties that would like to distinguish between these
>     certificates
>
>     You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit
>     non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of
>     CAs and Browsers, do we have have any Browsers that wish to make
>     such a distinction?
>
>     If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to require
>     it. If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such
>     distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.
>
>         2.Analysts that report on SSL certificate data who have had to
>         issue revised reports because of cert misclassification
>
>     As mentioned on the call, this has been discussed with Mozilla in
>     the past -
>     https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/hEOQK-ubGRcJ
>
>     As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for
>     misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully
>     help address the concerns we see.
>
>     That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs,
>     to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to.
>
>     I would hope that
>     https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/2tRUS444krwJ
>     would capture some of these concerns more fully.
>
>     Finally, to do anything meaningful with this in all major clients,
>     it would require that CAs redo their certificate hierarchy, as
>     policy OIDs are inherited. That's a silly thing, especially when
>     CAs are still struggling to migrate from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in their
>     intermediates.
>
>         My proposal is for CAs to put in OID X if it’s a DV
>         certificate and OID Y if it’s an OV certificate.
>
>         As Rick reminded me on the call, we currently have something
>         like this for EV certificates (except that CAs are free to use
>         the standard OID or define one of their own).
>
>         I’d like to hear pros/cons of this. Ryan S indicated that
>         Google would not support such a proposal but we didn’t have
>         time to discuss the reasons.
>
>         I’m sure there are both technical and policy reasons.
>         Personally I’d like to focus on the latter but remarks on both
>         are welcome. This proposal doesn’t require anyone to do
>         anything with this data (i.e relying parties can choose
>         whether or not to utilize it).
>
>
>         Thanks,
>         Dean
>
>
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