[cabfpub] (Eventually) requiring id-kpServerAuth for all certs in the chain?

[Ryan Sleevi]

On Nov 13, 2014 11:54 AM, "Jeremy.Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
wrote:
>
> Maybe not. I'm only aware of the Mozilla communities.  I sent one a PM
asking them to chime in if there is a problem for their community.  They
probably won't chime in but this gives awareness in what's going on.
>
> Where do you get that the items mentioned violate Mozilla's policy?
Mozilla expressly excluded the auditor requirements from the BRs, don't
have a policy for key ceremonies, and  permit either CRLs or OCSP (while
the BRs require both for intermediates). No violation if you weren't
intending to issue SSL.
>
>

I was merely pointing out that the Mozilla policy requires the entire
hierarchy follow the Mozilla policy, and that any CA technically capable of
issuing certs must meet the Mozilla policy, including explicitly being BR
audited.

This differs from the BRs, which allow CAs significant leverage to carve
out parts of their infrastructure as excluded from audits.

>
> On 11/13/2014 2:34 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Nov 13, 2014 11:28 AM, "Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
wrote:
>> >
>> > That page was updated in October 2014. I don’t think we can imply
knowledge to all communities who might have existed before then.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> Sure, but isn't that the point - Mozilla makes its decisions in the
interest of its user community, and if you're forking the trust list from
Mozilla (which is what it is), you should follow the fork.
>>
>> Again, I don't think this is something relevant to the discussion at
hand or the Forum at large. If it was, why aren't we talking about
communities who MIGHT have forked authroots.ctl or copied the roots from
the Security.keychain services?
>>
>> If Mozilla requires all CAs in their program follow their policies, and
if a CA can't follow Mozilla's policies (which currently go above and
beyond the BRs), then that isn't a Forum issue - it is for Mozilla and
those CAs to work out.
>>
>> >
>> > I also don’t think the audit itself is a concern.  However, the
requirements on key generation under Section 17.7 might not have been
followed, the intermediate might not have CRLs or OCSP (depending on the
community), and auditor qualifications might be bigger problems.
>> >
>>
>> And then they're in violation of Mozilla's inclusion policies already.
Which is a matter for Mozilla to take up, but suggests they're already in
trouble independent of the Forum requiring the same.
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
>> > Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2014 2:18 PM
>> > To: Jeremy Rowley
>> > Cc: Moudrick M. Dadashov; CABFPub
>> >
>> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] (Eventually) requiring id-kpServerAuth for all
certs in the chain?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thu, Nov 13, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Jeremy Rowley <
jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > One other thought is that a lot of groups use NSS as their basis for a
trust store.  Impairing all the communities relying on that trust store
might negatively impact the usefulness of NSS, meaning the issue is not as
simple as using a single CA for multiple purposes v. creating forum rules.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Can you please clarify what you mean by "impairing"? If you're using
the Mozilla Trust Store to make decisions outside of the Mozilla purview.
That is, it has three trust bits, only one of which has an audit
requirement - namely, the Website bit requires BR AND Mozilla Policy
compliance. The Mozilla Policy compliance ALREADY requires (effectively)
that all certificates (transitively) be BR compliant. So if there is an
incompatibility in schemes, these users are already "impaired"
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > And Mozilla's made it clear the risks these groups run if they're
using the NSS trust store outside of NSS -
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:FAQ#Can_I_use_Mozilla.27s_set_of_CA_certificates.3F
- so I don't think that's a consideration the Forum should engage in, as
Mozilla's already explicitly disclaimed it.
>
>
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