[cabfpub] .onion proposal

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Wed Nov 19 13:52:29 MST 2014


No, Nov 2015 is the date that all certificates issued after the BR
effective date (July 2012) MUST expire. If the certificate issued expires
after that, then it was done so in violation of the BRs. (I don't have Tor
setup to check the cert).

My point is that the issue being raised for why the Forum should consider
.onion names is to prevent CAs from misissuing or using lax validation,
thus presenting a security risk to users of Tor. The obvious solution to
that is not to have 3 months+ of free-for all debate in the Forum (as these
things always take), leaving Tor users at risk during this period - it's to
immediately stop issuing certs, revoke all the existing certs, then work
out how they should work in a consistent manner.

It's hardly a slap in the face - it's a recognition of the security risks
of allowing .onion names to be a wild-west free for all with no vetting -
meaning ANYONE can MITM / any CA can issue for
https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/  without violating a single one of the BRs
or any root policy.

That alone should be concerning enough to immediately stop issuing and
revoke these certs, and may not be something that Facebook or the Tor
community are aware of.

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:48 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
wrote:

>  Well, Nov 1 2016 is the date that the certs should be revoked. Nov 2015
> is the date of no more issuance.
>
>
>
> I’m not really interested in ceasing all support for Tor.  Having a
> special cut-off for onion seems like a slap in the face to their browser
> after they posted their support for the project, especially since Google
> doesn’t use .onion names.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 19, 2014 1:45 PM
> *To:* Jeremy Rowley
> *Cc:* Brian Smith; Gervase Markham; public at cabforum.org
>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] .onion proposal
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:36 PM, Jeremy Rowley <
> jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
>
> How do you address this concern other than by modifying the way the onion
> names are assigned? I guess either not permit conflicting services by only
> routing to the service with the oldest identified service (instead of
> evicting the old service) or having Tor move to a SHA-2 hash.  I know Tor
> is looking at the issue and will likely have more insight they can share.
>
> While a solution is in flux, the Forum should still have validation rules
> in place for onion that last until 2016 (the revocation date of all
> internal names) so that current certs undergo a set process for issuance
> rather than issue as internal names.
>
> Jeremy
>
>
>
> You mean 1 November 2015. That's been the date that no BR-conforming CA is
> allowed to set the expiration date past. (9.2.1 of BR 1.2.2)
>
>
>
> PROPOSAL: Effectively immediately, CAs MUST NOT issue certificates for the
> .onion TLD and MUST revoke all certificates issued for the .onion TLD
>
>
>
> Then we work out a proposal to set up rules for validating .onion names,
> which may or may not be blocked on Tor work at the protocol or browser
> level, and also work - with the broader Tor community - to see if there is
> any interim steps that can be accepted.
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brian Smith [mailto:brian at briansmith.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 1:26 PM
> To: Gervase Markham
> Cc: Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] .onion proposal
>
> Gervase Markham <gerv at mozilla.org> wrote:
> > I'm in support of this in principle. There are two issues with 'normal'
> > internal server names:
> >
> > 1) It's not possible to prove exclusive ownership of them (because they
> >    aren't exclusively owned);
>
> <snip>
>
> > For .onion names, problem 1) does not apply.
>
> That is only true assuming you can rely on the second-preimage resistance
> of truncated SHA-1, like Ryan pointed out. I think his point is that the
> second-preimage resistance of truncated SHA-1 is not strong enough to make
> claims like this. (Ryan: Sorry if I'm misunderstanding you. Corrections
> appreciated.) I think that concern should be addressed. This is one reason
> I suggested to limit the maximum lifetime of .onion certificates.
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
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