[cabfpub] (Eventually) requiring id-kpServerAuth for all certs in the chain?

[Jeremy.Rowley]

Maybe not. I'm only aware of the Mozilla communities.  I sent one a PM 
asking them to chime in if there is a problem for their community.  They 
probably won't chime in but this gives awareness in what's going on.

Where do you get that the items mentioned violate Mozilla's policy? 
Mozilla expressly excluded the auditor requirements from the BRs, don't 
have a policy for key ceremonies, and  permit either CRLs or OCSP (while 
the BRs require both for intermediates). No violation if you weren't 
intending to issue SSL.


On 11/13/2014 2:34 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 13, 2014 11:28 AM, "Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com 
> <mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>> wrote:
> >
> > That page was updated in October 2014. I don’t think we can imply 
> knowledge to all communities who might have existed before then.
> >
> >
>
> Sure, but isn't that the point - Mozilla makes its decisions in the 
> interest of its user community, and if you're forking the trust list 
> from Mozilla (which is what it is), you should follow the fork.
>
> Again, I don't think this is something relevant to the discussion at 
> hand or the Forum at large. If it was, why aren't we talking about 
> communities who MIGHT have forked authroots.ctl or copied the roots 
> from the Security.keychain services?
>
> If Mozilla requires all CAs in their program follow their policies, 
> and if a CA can't follow Mozilla's policies (which currently go above 
> and beyond the BRs), then that isn't a Forum issue - it is for Mozilla 
> and those CAs to work out.
>
> >
> > I also don’t think the audit itself is a concern.  However, the 
> requirements on key generation under Section 17.7 might not have been 
> followed, the intermediate might not have CRLs or OCSP (depending on 
> the community), and auditor qualifications might be bigger problems.
> >
>
> And then they're in violation of Mozilla's inclusion policies already. 
> Which is a matter for Mozilla to take up, but suggests they're already 
> in trouble independent of the Forum requiring the same.
>
> >
> >
> > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com>]
> > Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2014 2:18 PM
> > To: Jeremy Rowley
> > Cc: Moudrick M. Dadashov; CABFPub
> >
> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] (Eventually) requiring id-kpServerAuth for 
> all certs in the chain?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 13, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Jeremy Rowley 
> <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com <mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>> wrote:
> >
> > One other thought is that a lot of groups use NSS as their basis for 
> a trust store.  Impairing all the communities relying on that trust 
> store might negatively impact the usefulness of NSS, meaning the issue 
> is not as simple as using a single CA for multiple purposes v. 
> creating forum rules.
> >
> >
> >
> > Can you please clarify what you mean by "impairing"? If you're using 
> the Mozilla Trust Store to make decisions outside of the Mozilla 
> purview. That is, it has three trust bits, only one of which has an 
> audit requirement - namely, the Website bit requires BR AND Mozilla 
> Policy compliance. The Mozilla Policy compliance ALREADY requires 
> (effectively) that all certificates (transitively) be BR compliant. So 
> if there is an incompatibility in schemes, these users are already 
> "impaired"
> >
> >
> >
> > And Mozilla's made it clear the risks these groups run if they're 
> using the NSS trust store outside of NSS - 
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:FAQ#Can_I_use_Mozilla.27s_set_of_CA_certificates.3F 
> - so I don't think that's a consideration the Forum should engage in, 
> as Mozilla's already explicitly disclaimed it.
>

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