[cabfpub] .onion proposal

[Ryan Sleevi]

On Nov 12, 2014 10:52 AM, "Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
wrote:
>
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> I’d like to continue the .onion discussion that I started here about a
month ago.  Primarily, I’d like to see how we can create a very limited
exception to the general prohibition on internal name certificates that
will take effect in 2015 for the purpose of permitting the CA community to
 show support for both Tor and entities operating .onion names.  Here’s
what I propose as issuance requirements:
>
>
>
> 1)      The CA MUST verify the applicant for an EV Certificate
>
> 2)      The CA MUST verify a non-onion domain name owned by the applicant
and assert that domain name in the same certificate as the .onion address
>

If we go down this route, I would prefer to see a white listed subset of
verification methods here. In particular, I have reservations for both
nontechnical demonstrations (e.g. opinion letters / "equivalent methods")
and for file-based schemes.

> 3)      The CA MUST verify  the applicant’s control over the .onion name
using a practical demonstration of control that is verifiable through the
Tor browser
>

I'm also not a fan of coupling this to "What the TOR Browser says". How
.onion names work and is documented - can we find a way to express this
demonstration through specifying how at the protocol level one must verify?

For example, consider if there was a bug in TBB version X, fixed in Y - it
would be unambiguous how to verify if you specified it in protocol terms
(since X failed to do those protocol things, and Y fixed the bug and thus
does do them), but ambiguous if you just say "Verify in the TOR browser"

>
>
> Obviously, if supported, I’d need revise the language to fit with the
BR/EV framework  before a vote is possible.  However, I think this is
general framework is a good starting point for continued discussion and
hope it will help us find a solution that everyone agrees with.
>
>
>
> To facilitate the discussion moving forward, here is summary of the
previous discussion:
>
> 1)      Although not delegated by IANA, .onion is recognized by Tor as an
address used to provide anonymous services
>
> 2)      Tor uses its own encryption so the certificates are about
identification
>
> 3)      .onion addresses are generated from the service provider’s key,
meaning they are unique (you don’t choose the onion address)
>
> 4)      A certificate would permit service providers to remove their
anonymity while preserving the anonymity of their clients
>
> 5)      Continued use of certs for .onion is important for companies like
Facebook who would like to facilitate free speech in countries that do not
necessarily recognize that as a fundamental right
>
>
>
> Any thoughts on this?
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
>
>
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